Prosječan građanin koji se potrudi da pročita dokument o reformskoj agendi u BiH koji su potpisali svi nivoi vlasti u BiH ne može a da ne primijeti nekoliko veoma očiglednih stvari. Prvo, to se ne čita kao dokument koji je formulirao iko u vlasti BiH na bilo kom nivou (što je uglavnom tačno); drugo, on sadrži dugačku listu strogih socio-ekonomskih i drugih reformi koje su vjerovatno politički veoma nepopularne; i treće, izgleda da uzima zdravo za gotovo da će nakon donošenja reformskih zakona i drugih mjera da bi se popravilo ono što muči BiH uslijediti njihova puna implementacija i izvršenje, što je naravno bitno za njihov uspjeh.

Ako razgovarate sa onima koji su uključeni u ovu aktivnost kazaće vam – u nekim slučajevima s velikom ozbiljnošću, u drugim s rezigniranim prihvatanjerm – da je ovo prvi neophodan korak i da se mora učiniti prije nego što se pokrene ijedna od težih političkih reformi. Kažu da je ovo proces gradnje povjerenja, koji će pokrenuti važnije ekonomske probleme s kojima se suočava BiH.

Ali ne treba zaboraviti nesretnu istoriju prošlih reformskih inicijativa. Skoro sve su propale jer im je nedostajao podržan konsenzus u cijelom etnički određenom političkom spektru. I već ima znakova, uprkos nizu potpisnika na sadašnjem planu reformi, da je konsenzus slab. Jedan od razloga za to, još jednom, jeste da je reformska inicijativa pokrenuta spolja, uglavnom ovog puta od strane EU, MMF i Svjetske banke. Ali to je zato što nema političkog dogovora unutar BiH o tome kako zemlja treba da bude definirana i kako da se u njoj vlada. Uistinu, većina pitanja koja ulaze u reformski plan – rad, poslovna konkuretnost, takse, finansije, penzije, troškovi zdravstvene zaštite, reforma javne administracije i korupcija – su ona koja implicitno ako ne eksplicitno pretpostavljaju da BiH ima funkcionalnu strukturu vlade koja je potpuno sposobna da racionalno i efikasno vodi politiku i zakonodavstvo koji se za to traže. Ovo nedvojbeno nije tako veselo previđeno i odbačeno sa argumentum da će vlasti u BiH na kraju (čitaj u nadi) shvatiti da pokretanje tih pitanja treba da učvrsti vladu. To je kao kad bi vozač automobila vozeći na ispuhanim gumama nekako popravio gume dok je automobil još u pokretu.

The average citizen who takes the time to read the BiH Reform Agenda document which all levels of government in BIH signed off on can’t help but notice a few very obvious things. First, it doesn’t read like a document drafted by anyone in BiH government at any level (which is largely true); Second, it contains a long laundry list of austerity driven socio-economic and other reforms which are likely to be politically very unpopular; and, third, it seems to take for granted that the passage of reform legislation and other measures to fix what ails BiH will be followed by their full implementation and enforcement, which is of course essential to their success.

If you talk to those involved in this exercise they will tell you—in some cases with great seriousness, in others with resigned acceptance—that this is a necessary first step and that it has to be done before any of the harder political reforms could possibly be tackled. This is a confidence building process, they say, which will address the more pressing economic problems facing BiH.

But the unfortunate history of past reform initiatives should not be forgotten. Almost all of them fell short of the mark because they lacked sustained consensus across the ethnically-determined political spectrum. And there are already signs, despite the array of signatories on the current reform plan, that consensus on it is tenuous. One reason for this is that, once again, the reform initiative is externally and extrinsically driven, chiefly this time round by the EU, IMF, and World Bank. But this is because there is no political agreement within BiH on how the country should be defined and governed. Indeed, most of the issues being addressed in the reform plan—labor, business competitiveness, taxes, fiscality, pensions, health care costs, public administration reform and corruption—-are ones which implicitly if not explicitly assume that BiH has a functioning governmental structure that is entirely capable of rationally and effectively pursuing policies and legislation that address them. That this is unambiguously not so is blithely overlooked, and dismissed with the argument that the BiH authorities will eventually (read hopefully) realize through tackling these issues that they need to fix the government. This is sort of like assuming that an automobile operator driving on flat tires can somehow repair the tires while keeping the automobile moving forward.

Lako je shvatiti zašto je međunarodna zajednica, uprkos njenoj ograničenosti, poticala socijalne i ekonomske reforme kao strategiju za stabilizaciju BiH i dovođenje zemlje na put ka integraciji u EU: jednostavno nije postojala volja od strane nekih stranaka u BiH da učvrste vladu koja bi djelovala u nacionalnom interesu a niko u međunarodnoj zajednici ne želi da se suoči s ovim problemom zbog mogućeg destabilizirajućeg efekta. Bolje je rješavati reforme jednu po jednu i zaobilazno i vjerovati da će usput politički stavovi kao i političari postati odgovorniji prema nacionalnom interesu.

Ali kako je naslijeđe Dejtonskog sporazuma, potpisanog prije 20 godina, jasno pokazalo, mnoge od pažljivo artikuliranih struktura i institucija postavljenih u aneksima – a sve je pažljivo formulirala međunarodna zajednica – nisu bile dovoljne ili pogodne da se riješe problemi ili postignu pohvalni ciljevi politike koji su bili zacrtani. I onda, kao sada, neke od strana u Sporazumu bile su uveliko ambivalentne o tome kako ih sprovesti.

Ukratko, nema načina da se riješe mnogi izazovi u BiH ni kratkoročno niti srednjeročno – jedini vremenski okvir koji zaista vrijedi i za njene građane i međunarodnu zajednicu – kroz zakonodavstvo, reforme i druge odredbe koje ne dotiču te izazove u cijelosti i integralno sa spremnošću i ubjedljivošću što će odlučno i konačno prekinuti ciklus političkog nefunkcioniranja koje muči zemlju otkako je postigla nezavisnost. Upravo ovaj inkluzivni pristup svim važnim pitanjima bio je na stolu koji je dopustio neposrednim razgovorima u Dejtonu da se postigne dogovor koji je okončao rat i uspostavio BiH kao nezavisnu, jedinstvenu zemlju uprkos kasnijim nedostacima u implementaciji.

Stoga je došlo vrijeme da BiH, uz pomoć i saradnju međunarodne zajednice, inicira i pokrene reformski proces koji je istovremeno ekonomski, socijalni i politički i opsežan u cjelini. Postoji apsolutna i bezuvjetna potreba da se razmrsi način na koji se u BiH vlada a koji je iznad interesa svake pojedine grupe u zemlji ili ugađa međunarodnim sklonostima. Venecijanska komisija je ovo nedvosmisleno pojasnila još 2005. u svom Mišljenju o ustavnoj situaciji u Bosni I Hercegovini i ovlastima visokog predstavnika.

Opsežan reformski proces će zahtijevati nivo političke hrabrosti i volje kojih, kako izgleda, nedostaje ili su drukčije usmjerene među BiH vlastima i čak među članovima međunarodne zajednice. Ali upravo tu se traže kreativna, nova politička, ekonomska i diplomatska rješenja. U Dejtonu su pregovori vođeni i uspješno zaključeni zahvaljujući volji. U pregovorima oko Aprilskog paketa sve do kraja 2005, učinjen je napredak jer su sve strane odlučivale same, uz pomoć međunarodnog tima, o opsežnom nizu ustavnih i političkih pitanja na nivou države za koja su se složili da ih treba pokrenuti.

It is easy to understand why the international community has encouraged the social and economic reform effort despite its obtuseness as a strategy for stabilizing BiH and setting it on a path to EU integration: there has simply been no willingness on the part of some parties in BiH to fix the government so it works in the national interest, and no one in the international community wants to confront this problem because of its destabilizing potential. Better to go for piecemeal and oblique reforms and trust that down the road political attitudes and by extension politicians will become more amenable to the national interest.

But as the legacy of the Dayton Agreement, signed 20 years ago, has plainly demonstrated, many of the carefully articulated structures and institutions laid out in the annexes—all carefully crafted by the international community—were insufficient or unsuited to fixing the problems or achieving the laudable policy objectives they were designed to address. And then, as now, some of the parties to the Agreement were decidedly ambivalent about making them work.

In sum, there is no way of fixing the many challenges of BiH in either the short or medium term—-the only time frame that really matters for both its citizens and the international community—-through legislation, reforms, and other fixes that fall short of tackling these challenges wholly and integrally with an alacrity and a cogency that will firmly and finally break the cycle of political dysfunction that has plagued the country since it became independent. It was this inclusive approach to all the major issues on the table which allowed the Proximity Talks at Dayton to achieve an agreement that ended the war and established BiH as an independent, unitary state, despite its subsequent shortcomings in implementation.

The time has thus come for BiH, with the assistance and cooperation of the international community, to initiate and pursue a reform process that is simultaneously economic, social, and political and thus comprehensive in scope. There is an absolute and unconditional need to sort out the way BiH is governed that transcends any particular group’s interests within the country or accommodates any international preferences. The Venice Commission made this unequivocally clear as far back as 2005 in its Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High Representative.

A comprehensive reform process will require a level of political courage and will that appears lacking or other-directed among the BiH authorities, and even among some members of the international community. But this is where creative, path-breaking political, economic, and diplomatic solutions are required. At Dayton the negotiations were conducted and successfully concluded by the willing. In the April Package negotiations up through the end of 2005, progress was being made because all sides decided on their own, with assistance from the international team, on a comprehensive range of constitutional and political issues at the state level which they agreed needed to be addressed.

Nema razloga zašto sve strane u BiH ne mogu da sjednu – dok rade na sadašnjem planu reformi – i počnu da definiraju i pregovaraju o nizu političkih reformi koje će omogućiti i usaglasiti implementaciju i izvršenje sadašnjeg socio-ekonomskog plana reformi, posebno između države i entiteta. Fokus takvih diskusija ne smije se bazirati na ideološko jalovoj debati na tome da li državne institucije treba da imaju minimalnu ulogu a entiteti jaču ili suprotno, nego na tome šta je najfunkcionalnije i šta najadekvatnije ustavnoj podjeli odgovornosti.

U ovom pogledu međunarodna zajednica bi mogla biti od pomoći predlažući neka “pravila puta” za opsežnu reformu koja poštuje ustavnu strukturu Dejtona, a ne “bilo kakav” aranžman od strane BiH. Na primjer, dobro je i poželjno da entiteski premijeri rade zajedno na reformama, ali cijeli proces, koji se tiče zemlje u cjelini, treba da nadgleda i vodi čelnik Vijeća ministara na nivou države. Drugim riječima, međunarodna zajednica treba da očekuje od vlasti BiH da se drže ustava. Nema smanjivanja ovlasti entiteta u prihvatanju ovog principa, samo potvrda da BiH ima vladajuću strukturu koju treba poštovati kad se radi o odgovornosti.

Naposljetku, postojaće potreba za diskusijom o tome kako osigurati da sve reforme nisu jednostavno definirane i artikulirane kroz pregovore iza zatvorenih vrata između vlasti BiH i međunarodne zajednice. Sve prijedloge reformi treba da ponudi, izvede i potiče vlada na svim nivoima sa strukturalnom sposobnošću i resursima kako bi to bilo učinjeno nezavisno od direktnog međunarodnog uplitanja a da o njima rasprave i nadgledaju ih parlamenti koji imaju kapacitet za to. Ovo znači usmjeravanje i, tamo gdje je potrebno, proširenje i racionaliziranje vladinih institucija na način koji nema smisla za EU ili međunarodnu zajednicu ali ima za drušvo BiH da mora izbaciti antidemokratski, kolektivistički i etnički obojeno naslijeđe nedavne istorije. Zemlje mogu i mijenjaju svoje puteve; nema razloga da BiH ne može učiniti isto.

There is no reason why all parties in BiH cannot now sit down—while working on the current reform plan—and begin to define and negotiate a set of political reforms that would make the implementation and enforcement of the current socio-economic reform plan possible and well-coordinated, especially between the state and entities. The focus of such discussions should not be based on the ideologically sterile debate over the whether the state institutions should have a minimal role and the entities a stronger one, or vice versa, but on what is the most functionally efficient and constitutional appropriate division of responsibilities.

The international community could be helpful in this regard by proposing some “rules of the road” for a comprehensive reform that honors the constitutional structure of Dayton, rather than a “whatever works” arrangement on the BiH side. It is all well and good for the entity prime ministers to work together on reforms, for example, but the entire process, which relates to the country as a whole, should be overseen and guided by the Head of the Council of Ministers at the State level. The international community in other words should expect that BiH authorities adhere to the constitution. There is no lessening of the entities’s powers in holding to this principle, merely an affirmation that BiH has a governing structure which needs to be honored in terms of responsibilities.

Ultimately, there will need to be discussion over how to ensure that all reforms are not simply defined and articulated through closed-door negotiations between the BiH authorities and the international community. All proposals for reforms need to be proposed, carried out, and enforced by government at all levels with the structural capacity and resources to do so independently of direct international involvement, and be debated and overseen by parliaments with the capacity to do so. This means streamlining and where necessary expanding and rationalizing BiH governmental institutions in ways that don’t just make sense for the EU or international community, but for a BiH society that must evacuate the anti-democratic, collectivist, and ethnically over-driven legacies of its recent history. Countries can and do change their paths; there is no reason BiH cannot do the same.