Prof. R. Bruce Hitchner:

Dejton je put ka temeljima koji se tek moraju postaviti

29.11.2014.

Prof. R. Bruce Hitchner:

Dayton and Bosnia-Herzegovina after 19 Years

29.11.2014.

BiH treba vlast koja radi s mnogo većim stepenom odgovornosti u interesu svih građana.

„Naivno je i pomisliti da se rješenja za prepravku i popravku Dejtona mogu naću samo unutar BiH.“

„Ne zagovaram dramatične promjene i centralizaciju. Zagovaram, jednostavno, više odgovornosti, transparentnosti i rada u interesu svih u BiH.“

Dejtonski mirovni ugovor okončao je rat u Bosni i Hercegovini koji je trajao od 1992. do 1995. godine. I u tome se svi slažu. Ali, zato što su zaraćene strane bile definirane etničkim odrednicam, dejtonski ustav stvorio je političke institucije koje su se temeljile na etnicitetu i zbog toga su duboko bile sukobljene.

Neki smatraju da je baš to bila greška. No, uvijek se moraju imati na umu kontekst i okvir u kojima su pregovori tekli. Niko u međunarodnoj zajednici te 1995. godine nije bio politički spreman ds pregovara o sporazumu koji se neće temeljiti na etnicitetima, jer bi naišli na izuzetan otpor barem jedne od pregovaračkih strana.

Način promjene

Ono što niko u međunarodnoj zajednici u vrijeme Dejtona nije shvatio jeste kako modificirati brojne dejtonske mehanizme zaštite etničkih interesa. Također, nikome nije naumpalo koji je to mehanizam koji će ratom zavađene strane prevesti u saradnike koji će raditi u zajedničkom interesu i navesti ih da prevladaju etničke zaštitne mehanizme.

Krivica za neuspjeh reformiranja Dejtona ne leži samo na bh. političkim liderima. Međunarodna zajednica još se čvrsto drži Dejtona jer voli statu quo, negativan, a ne pozitivan trend i drži se svega što neće „destabilizirati“ državu.

I svi znaju da je Dejton „sami đavo“. I s usponom ruske imperijalne politike i utjecaja na Balkanu, još su manje šanse da bilo ko čak i pomisli na pregovore kojima će Dejton biti više demokratski, a manje etnički dokument (naglašavam, ne govorim o neetničkom).

Šta je ostalo od Dejtona, 19 dugih godina kasnije? Neki imaju mantru da Dejton mogu promijeniti samo građani BiH. Dani međunarodne intervencije i pregovora, sporazuma skovanih u američkoj zrakoplovnoj bazi ili evropskim gradovima davna je prošlost, kažu oni. Možda je to istina. Ali naivno je i pomisliti da se rješenja za prepravku i popravku Dejtona mogu naći samo unutar BiH.

Građani BiH odista znaju šta žele: demokratsku, odgovornu, funkcionalnu, transparentnu vlast koja poštuje zakone, vlast koja predano radi na poboljšanju uvjeta života, političare koji neumorno rade na integriranju BiH u EU.

Ali, iskreno – i odista bi mi bilo vrlo drago da pogriješim – BiH je previše podijeljena strukturama skovanim u Dejtonu, da to onemogućava bilo kom političaru ili grupi da pokrene reformski pokret koji bi obuhvatio cijelu državu.

Vidjeli smo to tako zorno nakon februarskih protesta, ali i poplava.

Ljudi širom BiH se možda i mogu dogovoriti da se Dejton promijeni. Ali, realizacije te ideje, bez međunarodne pomoći i uključenja, bila bi Sizifof posao. I, naravno, zar se to smije zaboraviti, postdejtonska BiH napravljena je na temeljima obavezujućeg međunarodnog sporazuma. U njemu su odgovornosti i obaveze kako onih u BiH tako i onih izvan BiH.

Dejton se mora popraviti zarad BiH, ali i stabilnosti zapadnog Balkana. EU i SAD to moraju znati i prihvatiti i ponašati se u skladu s tim. Brisel i Vašington trebaju biti jasni i jednoglasni u stavu šta se mora popraviti i koje opcije daju najbolje rješenje problema. Isto tako, ako promjena nema, koje su posljedice.

Prvi pokušaj

Nedavna britansko-njemačka inicijativa je prvi pokušaj koji vodi u tom smjeru. Ne radi se o svemirskoj tehnologiji. Nije to tako komplicirano i jednostavno se može vidjeti šta se treba mijenjati. BiH treba vlast koja radi s mnogo većim stepenom odgovornosti u interesu svih građana, te države kao cjeline. Prava etniciteta su drugorazredna, ali su i ona tu negdje u pozadini.

Ne zagovaram dramatične promjene i centralizaciju. Zagovaram, jednostavno, više odgovornosti, transparentnosti i rada u interesu svih. BiH treba i vlast koja će govoriti jednim glasom o pitanjima njenih međunarodnih ambicija, obaveza i politike.

Dejton se mora shvatiti kakav jeste. On je jedan atrofirajući dokument koji je donio mir i postavio strukturalne osnove za budućnost države. Dejton nije temelj. On je tek put ka temeljima koji se moraju postaviti.

The Dayton Peace Accords ended the 1992-1995 war. On that everyone agrees. Before it was halted, the war had cost over 100,000 lives and displaced one million people. No matter what one may think about the terms of the Agreement, it stopped the killing and that counts for a lot. Dayton brought peace.

The Dayton Agreement was negotiated with the main warring parties to the war, apart from the Bosnian Serbs who were represented by Slobodan Milosevic. And because the warring parties were defined in ethnic terms, the Dayton constitution created political institutions that were ethnicity based and thus deeply conflicted. Some have argued that this was a mistake. But the context and framework in which the negotiations were conducted needs to be kept in mind. No one in the international community in 1995 was politically prepared to negotiate a non-ethnicity based settlement that would be fiercely opposed by some of the warring parties and would in turn require a massive and sustained military intervention to enforce. The consequences of such an approach for regional stability were too risky to contemplate.

Instead, the US and EU opted for an agreement that ethnically divided post war BiH but which also, significantly, provided the essential tools embedded in the Dayton constitution for moving the country from an overly ethnicity-based consociational government.

What no one in the international community fully grasped at Dayton was how difficult it would be to moderate the thick Dayton ethnic protections once installed, or how all sides among the former war-turned-peace-time ethnic leaders found it politically expedient to exploit these protections in one form or another. The international community responded to the unintended stasis fostered by the Dayton institutions by first expanding its already considerable power—-also based on Dayton—-to implement the Agreement through the so-called Bonn Powers. The international community also sought to incentivize elected political leaders to fix Dayton’s overdrawn ethnic decentralization through the promise of Euro-Atlantic integration, and later direct negotiations (April and Butmir) and rulings (Sejdic – Finci) designed to amend various clauses of the Dayton constitution. All of these efforts fell short of moving BiH institutions away from the main thrust of the immediate post-war constitutional arrangements of Dayton, despite every indication that they were increasingly outdated, dysfunctional, politically corrosive and corrupting to the body politic of BiH.

But the failure to reform Dayton does not lie solely with the political leadership of BiH. The international community still holds on strongly to Dayton because it prefers the status quo—-negative rather than positive peace—-over anything that would destabilize the country. Dayton is the devil everyone knows. And with the resurgence of Russian imperial influence in the Western Balkans, any thought of negotiating to make Dayton more democratic and less ethnic (I did not say non-ethic) seems fraught with unintended and unwanted consequences just now. Post-Dayton BiH is not just a sports match with easy winners and losers; it’s a country that went to war in the heart of Europe when everyone thought wars in Europe were no longer possible.

So what to do about Dayton after 19 long years? A frequent refrain of some is that only the citizens of BiH can sort this out. The days of international interventions negotiated at US military bases or European capitals are over, they say. Perhaps true, but it is naïve to think that the solution to fixing Dayton can only be internally resolved. The citizens of BiH may know what they want: governments that are democratic, responsive, functional, transparent, law-abiding, committed to improving living standards—-and actively negotiating BiH’s integration into the EU now. But frankly—and I would be delighted to be proved wrong—the country is too divided by the structures of Dayton for any politicians or groups to launch a sustained nation-wide reform movement, as the aftermath of the riots and floods of the spring and summer demonstrated. People everywhere in BiH may agree on the need for Dayton reform, but acting on that without some international engagement is, at least now it seems, Sisyphean. And as if it needed saying, Post-Dayton BiH for better or worse is the creation of a binding international peace agreement which carries with it responsibilities and obligations that involve participants both within and outside BiH.

The bottom line is that Dayton needs to be fixed for both BiH’s sake and for the sake of the stability of the Western Balkans, and the European Union and the United States need to say as much. Moreover, Brussels and Washington need to be clear and unequivocal about what needs to be fixed, and what options might best achieve those fixes, and critically what the benefits are of doing so, and what costs will be attached to continuing the status quo. The recent German-UK initiative is a tentative step in this direction. It is not rocket science to figure out what those fixes might be: governments at all levels that govern with greater accountability to the interests and rights of citizens, the country as a whole, and less (not without) the interests and rights of ethnic groups. This does not mean that post-Dayton BiH should, all things being equal, evacuate its current structures of government or all its built-in ethnic protections or necessarily become radically more centralized; these governments just need to work together more efficiently and democratically than they do now. BiH also needs a government that speaks with one voice when it comes to its international responsibilities, policies, and aspirations.

One of the more consistent refrains about Dayton I have heard since 1995—-a refrain that is often stated privately but not publicly by both political leaders in BiH and the international community—-is that Dayton could work if everyone wanted to work. That may be true in the abstract, but in reality Dayton works better when it is pulling everyone apart—away from country-wide consensus toward regional and ethnic group self-interest. One cannot embrace Dayton, as it now stands, as both the solution and the problem for BiH’s future. It is neither. Dayton needs to be understood for what it is: an atrophying Agreement that brought peace and laid the structural groundwork for the country’s future. It is not a foundation, only a path to a foundation that is still in need of construction.

Brus Hičner (Bruce Hitchner) je glavni urednik portala „Dialogue BiH2.0“. Profesor na Tufts univerzitetu u Bostonu. Svjedočio je pregovorima u Dejtonu i bio prvi čovjek Nevladine organizacije „Dejtonski mirovni ugovor“

R. Bruce Hitchner, Editor-in-Chief of Dialogue BiH2.0. Professor of Classics and International Relations and Director of the Peace and Justice Studies Program at Tufts University (USA). He was also Chair of the Dayton Peace Accords Project.

Objavljeno u: Dnevni avaz, 29. novembar/studeni, 2014.

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