Toby Vogel:
Dodik traži konfrontiranje sa međunarodnom zajednicom jer uspijeva u tome. Neki diplomati vjeruju da, uzmicanjem, međunarodna zajednica daje Dodiku ono što on želi. Ali ako ne uzmaknu to će mu dozvoliti da proglasi pobjedu i utre put za novu konfrontaciju u vrijeme koje će on da izabere. Prevod: Dijalog BiH2.0
11.08.2015.
Toby Vogel:
Dodik has sought confrontation with the international community because he thrives on confrontation. Some diplomats believe that by pushing back, the international community is giving Dodik what he wants. But by not pushing back, it would allow him to claim victory - and pave the way for yet another confrontation at a time of his choosing.
11.08.2015.
Kampanja Milorada Dodika, lidera bosanskih Srba, protiv sudstva u Bosni i Hercegovini prijeti da izbaci iz kolosijeka pristup zemlje Evropskoj uniji.
Bosanski Srbi idu na održavanje referenduma o ovlastima državnog tužilaštva i sudstva početkom septembra i mada su diplomati upozorili Dodika da će referendum biti nezakonit, nije izvjesno o kakvim se kontramjerama, ako ih uopće i ima, razmatra.
Sredinom jula strani diplomati, uključujući ambasadore EU, nekoliko zemalja članica i SAD, otputovali su u Banjaluku, glavni grad Republike Srpske (RS), da bi upozorili bosanske Srbe da odustanu od referendum.
“Duboko smo zabrinuti da će predloženi referendum predstavljati neustavni pokušaj ne da se reformiraju nego da se potkopaju i oslabe te institucije i tako postati direktna prijetnja suverenitetu i sigurnosti zemlje u cjelini”, izjavili su u zajedničkom saopćenju. “Ovo se ne može tolerirati.”
Diplomati na terenu i u glavnim gradovima sada razmatraju opcije kako da reagiraju na prijetnje referendumom.
Još ima prepreka koje treba ukloniti da bi došlo do referenduma. Bošnjački (bosanski muslimani) poslanici u skupštini RS dali su veto na odluku o referendumu, što bi moglo značiti da posljednju riječ ima Vrhovni sud RS.
Ali tek mali broj promatrača vjeruju da bi ta procedura mogla zaustaviti referendum. Samo međunarodna zajednica, a posebno EU zajedno sa SAD, ima snagu da spriječi Dodika da sprovede plan – bilo da mu se suprotstave ili ga smire. Da bi odlučile koji kurs da preduzmu i EU i SAD treba da razmotre izvore sadašnje krize.
Referendum traži da se ponište odluke koje je nametnuo visoki međunarodni predstavnik koji nadgleda implementiranje Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma iz 1995, a posebno one odluke koje se odnose na sud Bosne i Hercegovine i državno tužilaštvo, sa njihovim odjeljenjima za korupciju i organizirani kriminal.
Dodik tvrdi da su te dvije institucije neustavne pošto Dejton nadležnost za sudska pitanja daje entitetima, a ne državi – argument koji je 2009. odbacio Ustavni sud BiH (Sud i Tužiteljstvo uspostavljeni su uz saglasnost entitetskih skupština, a odluku je u to vrijeme podržao Dodik i njegova stranka).
Dodik takođe smatra da je sudstvo na državnom nivou antisrpsko jer su sudski postupci fokusirani na bosanske Srbe.
A campaign by Milorad Dodik, the Bosnian Serb leader, against the judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina is threatening to derail the European Union’s approach to the country.
The Bosnian Serbs are poised to hold a referendum on the powers of state-level prosecutors and judges as early as September, and while diplomats have warned Dodik that the referendum would be illegal, it is unclear what counter-measures, if any, they might be considering.
In mid-July, foreign diplomats, including the ambassadors of the EU, several member states, and the US, travelled to Banja Luka, the capital of Republika Srpska (RS), to warn the Bosnian Serbs against the referendum.
“We are deeply concerned that the proposed referendum would represent an unconstitutional attempt not to reform but to undermine and weaken those authorities, and would thus pose a direct threat to the sovereignty and security of the country as a whole”, they said in a joint statement. “This cannot be tolerated”.
Diplomats on the ground and in the capitals are now considering their options in reacting to the referendum threat.
There are still hurdles to clear for the referendum to take place. Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) deputies in the RS parliament vetoed the referendum decision, which might mean that the RS supreme court has the last word.
But few observers believe that this procedure could stop the referendum. Only the international community, and specifically the EU together with the US, has the weight to prevent Dodik from following through on the plan - either by confronting him or by appeasing him. In deciding which course to take, the EU and the US should consider the sources of the current crisis.
The referendum seeks to annul decisions imposed by the international high representative, who oversees implementation of the 1995 Dayton peace accords, and specifically those decisions to do with the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the state-level Prosecutor’s Office, with their branches for corruption and organized crime.
Dodik claims that the two institutions are unconstitutional since Dayton assigns competence for judicial matters to the entities, not to the state - an argument refuted by Bosnia’s constitutional court in 2009 (the Court and Prosecutor’s Office were established with the agreement of the entity parliaments, a decision backed by Dodik and his party at the time).
Dodik also maintains that the state-level judiciary is anti-Serb because its proceedings have focused on Bosnian Serbs.
Tri cilja
Izgleda da u svom napadu na sudstvo Dodik slijedi najmanje tri određena cilja.
Prvo, on želi da spriječi istrage o korupciji što bi moglo izmaći njegovoj kontroli. U ovome on ima prešutnu podršku i drugih političkih lidera u zemlji koji strahuju, barem teoretski, od opunomoćenog, nezavisnog tužitelja protiv korupcije.
Drugo, Dodik želi da se suprotstavi ‘bonskim ovlastima’ visokog predstavnika (to je trenutno austrijski diplomata Valentin Inzko). Bonske ovlasti uključuju ovlaštenja da se odbiju domaći zakoni ili odluke koje su antidejtonske, i ovlaštenja da se nametnu odluke kako bi se ojačao dejtonski sistem.
Prethodni visoki predstavnici koristili su ove ovlasti da bi nametnuli različite mjere kako bi se ojačale bosanske institucije na državnom nivou. Tako je Dodikov treći motiv u prijetnji referendumom da opstruira centralnu vladu i potkopa njenu nadležnost.
Three goals
In going after the judiciary, Dodik appears to be pursuing at least three distinct goals.
First, he wants to prevent corruption investigations that might be outside of his control. In this, he has the tacit support of other political leaders in the country who have much to fear, at least in theory, from an empowered, independent anti-corruption prosecutor.
Second, Dodik wants to challenge the ‘Bonn powers’ of the high representative (currently Valentin Inzko of Austria). The Bonn powers include the power to strike down domestic laws or decisions deemed to be anti-Dayton, and the power to impose decisions in order to strengthen the Dayton system.
Previous high representatives used these powers to impose various measures to strengthen Bosnia’s state-level institutions. So Dodik’s third motive in threatening a referendum is to obstruct the central government and to chip away at its authority.
Deja vu
Međunarodna zajednica je i ranije bila sa ovim suočena.
Krajem 2009. reagirala je kad je Dodik zatražio okončanje izvršne uloge međunarodnih tužitelja i sudija na Sudu Bosne i Hercegovine koji su se bavili organiziranim kriminalom i korupcijom (bilo je dozvoljeno da ostanu oni koji se bave ratnim zločinima, što osvjetljava pravu prirodu Dodikove zabrinutosti).
Kad je 2011. Dodik ponovo osporio nadležnost sudstva na državnom nivou, Catherine Ashton, tada na čelu vanjske politike EU, napravila je presedan odlazeći u Banjaluku da ponudi ustupke.
U zamjenu za odbacivanje prijetnje o referendumu – “za sada”, kako je on naglasio, stojeći pored Ashtonove, za vrijeme njihove zajedničke konferencije za štampu – Dodik je odnio simboličnu pobjedu: Pokrenut je “strukturalni dijalog” o sudstvu, šaljući signal da bi Dodikova žalba na sudstvo mogla imati validnost.
Dodik je sada aktivirao svoju žalbu o navodnoj pristrasnosti suda. Ovaj put odgovor međunarodne zajednice bio je manje mlak; izgleda da su neke zemlje članice prepoznale da smirivanjem Dodika neće ukloniti problem nego samo odgoditi dan obračuna.
Kad su ministri vanjskih poslova EU raspravljali o prijetnji referendumom na njihovom mjesečnom sastanku 20. jula, Slovenija, Hrvatska i Slovačka bile su nepopustljive u tome da bi referendum bio kršenje Dejtonskog sporazuma (ministar vanjskih poslova Slovačke Miroslav Lajčak je bio visoki predstavnik prije Inzka).
Ured visokog predstavnika, u analizi pripremljenoj prije odluke o referendumu, takođe je imao u vidu ovaj stav.
Ovo bi u principu dopustilo Inzku da krene na Dodika i one zadužene za organiziranje referenduma, na primjer da budu uklonjeni sa svojih pozicija.
Ali ovo je čisto teoretski: ovlasti visokog predstavnika su podrivene godinama namjernog zanemarivanja od strane EU, koja ne voli izvršni mandat te institucije, i on neće biti u stanju da djeluje bez podrške velikih zemalja članica. On takođe nema ni instrumente da bi sproveo svoje odluke.
Deja vu
The international community has been here before.
In late 2009, it caved in to Dodik when he demanded an end to the executive role of international prosecutors and judges at the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina dealing with organised crime and corruption (those dealing with war crimes were allowed to stay on, highlighting the true nature of Dodik’s worries).
When Dodik again challenged the power of the central-level judiciary, in 2011, Catherine Ashton, the EU’s foreign-policy chief at the time, made an unprecedented visit to Banja Luka to offer concessions.
In exchange for dropping the referendum threat - “for now,” as he stressed, standing next to Ashton, during their joint news conference - Dodik was given a symbolic victory: A “structured dialogue” on justice was launched, sending the signal that Dodik’s complaint about the judiciary might have some validity.
Dodik has now dusted off his complaint about the judiciary’s alleged bias. This time around, the international response was less tepid; it appears that some EU member states have recognised that appeasing Dodik will not make the problem go away but merely postpone the day of reckoning.
When the EU’s foreign ministers discussed the referendum threat at their monthly meeting on 20 July, Slovenia, Croatia, and Slovakia were adamant that a referendum would be in violation of the Dayton agreement (Slovakia’s foreign minister, Miroslav Lajcak, was Inzko’s predecessor as high representative).
The Office of the High Representative, in an analysis prepared ahead of the referendum decision, also took that view.
This would, in principle, allow Inzko to move against Dodik and those in charge of organising the referendum, for example by removing them from office.
But this is purely theoretical: the high representative’s authority has been sapped by years of deliberate neglect on the part of the EU, which dislikes the institution’s executive mandate, and he will not be able to act without the backing of major member states.
He also has no instruments to enforce his decisions.
Dodik
I sama EU bi, u principu, mogla da krene na Dodika, za koga se zna da ima imovinu u jednoj zemlji članici EU i da bi stoga bio pogođen zamrzavanjem imovine.
Ali prilika da se napravi preventivan potez je izgubljena: prvi sastanak Vijeća vanjskih poslova poslije ljetnog odmora biće tek 12. oktobra i koju god akciju ministri preduzmu ona će biti retroaktivna.
Nikakav sastanak nije predviđen za septembar, kada će ministri vanjskih poslova biti u Njujorku na zasjedanju Generalne skupštine UN. Za neformalni sastanak 4. i 5. septembra u format “Gymnich” nedostaje moć da se donesu restriktivne mjere ili formalni zaključci.
Dodik je napravio teren za konfrontaciju uloživši znatna javna sredstva na lobiranje i pravno zastupništvo u Vašingtonu, i po svoj prilici i u Briselu.
Prošle godine vlada RS je potrošila najmanje 2.5 miliona dolara u SAD, prema izvodima Akta za registraciju stranih agenata. (u EU nema takvih obaveza). Od 2009. RS daje mjesečni paušal vašingtonskoj firmi Picard, Kentz & Rowe. Iznos je opao sa 167.000 $ mjesečno na 90.000 $ u najnovijem ugovoru, potpisanom u januaru 2015.
Prema oblasti angažmana u usluge firme spada “savjet i zastupanje” kad je riječ o pitanjima u koje spade “Legalna prava i obaveze RS po primjenjivom međunarodnom zakonu, uključujući Dejtonski mirovni sporazum” i “Prava i obaveze RS i BiH vis à vis ureda visokog predstavnika” – precizira se to pitanje.
Definisana postavka
Sada izgleda nevjerovatno da će EU nametnuti sankcije ili neke druge mjere. Definisana postavka EU je da se angažiraju sa izabranim liderima, bez obzira na uvrede koje stižu iz njihovih ureda.
To je slučaj sa makedonskim premijerom Gruevskim, koji je ponovo osnažen loše promišljenim dilom u EU.
Dodik traži konfrontiranje sa međunarodnom zajednicom jer uspijeva u tome. Neki diplomati vjeruju da, uzmicanjem, međunarodna zajednica daje Dodiku ono što on želi.
Ali ako ne uzmaknu to će mu dozvoliti da proglasi pobjedu i utre put za novu konfrontaciju u vrijeme koje će on da izabere.
Dodik
The EU itself could, in principle, move on its own against Dodik, who is reported to have property in an EU member state and would therefore be vulnerable to an asset freeze.
But the chance to move pre-emptively has been lost: the first Foreign Affairs Council meeting after the summer break is on 12 October, and whatever action the ministers might take would be retrospective.
No meeting is scheduled for September, when foreign ministers will be in New York for the UN General Assembly. An informal meeting on 4 and 5 September in the ‘Gymnich’ format lacks the power to adopt restrictive measures or formal conclusions.
Dodik has been laying the groundwork for a confrontation by spending considerable public funds on lobbying and legal representation in Washington, and, presumably, Brussels as well.
Last year, the RS government spent at least $2.5 million in the US, according to filings under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. (there are no such reporting obligations in the EU).
Since 2009, the RS has been paying a monthly retainer to the Washington firm of Picard, Kentz & Rowe. The retainer dropped from a peak of $167,000 a month to $90,000 in the most recent contract, signed in January 2015.
According to its Scope of Engagement, the firm’s services include “advice and representation” on matters including “RS legal rights and obligations under applicable international law including the Dayton Peace Accords” and “RS and BiH rights and obligations vis a vis the Office of the High Representative” - precisely the issue at stake.
Default setting
At present, it looks unlikely that the EU will impose sanctions or any other measures.
The EU’s default setting is to engage with elected leaders, no matter how abusive of their office they may be.
Prime minister Gruevski of Macedonia, newly empowered by a badly thought-through deal brokered by the EU, is a case in point.
Dodik has sought confrontation with the international community because he thrives on confrontation. Some diplomats believe that by pushing back, the international community is giving Dodik what he wants.
But by not pushing back, it would allow him to claim victory - and pave the way for yet another confrontation at a time of his choosing.
Toby Vogel, baziran u Briselu, piše o vanjskoj politici i viši je saradnik Vijeća za demokratizaciju politike.
Toby Vogel is a writer on foreign affairs based in Brussels and a senior associate of the Democratization Policy Council.
Tekst je prvobitno objavljen na EUobserver portalu (10.08.2015).
Prevod: Dijalog BiH2.0
This article was originally published on the EUobserver portal (10.08.2015).
Odgovornost za informacije i gledišta iznesena u ovom članku, isključivo leži na autorima i nužno ne odražavaju mišljenje urednika Dialogue - BiH2.0 – Dijalog, njegovog savjetodavnog odbora, Tufts univerziteta, partnera, pobornika i donatora.
Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Dialogue - BiH2.0 - Dijalog Editors, its Advisory Board, Tufts University, Partners, Supporters and Donors.}