Francisco de Borja Lasheras :
16.12.2014.
Francisco de Borja Lasheras :
16.12.2014.
Zaustaviti osmogodišnji silazni trend Bosne i pojačati momentum zemlje prema Evropi je glavni cilj prijedloga o Bosni, njemačkog ministra vanjskih poslova Frank-Waltera Steinmeiera i britanskog državnog sekretara Philipa Hammonda u svjetlu narodnih protesta, ekonomskog pada i izbora koji su uveliko vratili na vlast etnički bazirane stranke.
Prije godinu dana, na početku ključnog susreta sa bosanskim liderima, da bi se dogovorili o ustavnoj reformi, evropski komesar Štefan Füle najavio je, na čuđenje bosanske delegacije, da će morati skratiti svoje učešće da bi hitno otišao u Ukrajinu. Zbog stiske u vremenu sastanak Evropske unije predvidivo nije donio nikakav rezultat i ubrzo EU je opozvala svoje ‘intenzivne napore olakšica’.
Ovo je bilo indikativno za agendu vanjske politike EU da danas prioritizira makro geopolitiku, bilo da je to rat u Ukrajini ili takozvana Islamska država, oko najvažnijih aspekata mikro dilema u vezi gradnje države i konsolidacije mira u zemljama koje su postale stara vijest. Rotirajući međunarodni dužnosnici žele brze i dramatične rezultate brzinom twittera – što je loš recept za transformacionu diplomatiju koju EU vidi kao dio svoje vanjske politike.
Međutim, Balkan predstavlja region gdje je EU zvanično u vođstvu i Evropljani moraju da promisle o demokratizaciji i konsolidaciji mira tamo. I geopolitika je u igri: nezavršen posao u srcu Evrope sve više se isprepliće sa post-krimskim geopolitičkim balansiranjem i hitnošću za političkim modelima koji propituju liberalnu demokratiju. Evropljani bi bili ludi da čekaju početak konflikta ili druge oblike pogoršanja da bi revidirali politike poduzete u drukčijem kontekstu. Izazovi za evropske interese i stabilnost preuzimaju suptilnije forme nego što su jednostavne vijesti pune ratova.
U ovom kontekstu, Njemačka i Velika Britanija sada zagovaraju ‘preuređen slijed’ pristupa EU, odgađajući ustavnu reformu po odluci koju je 2009. donio Evropski sud za ljudska prava u slučaju Sejdić i Finci, po kojoj institutivna mjesta u kolektivnom predsjedništvu i Domu naroda ne smiju biti ograničena na članove tri konstitutivna naroda u Bosni (Bošnjake, Hrvate i Srbe).
Umjesto tog, ministri vanjskih poslova Njemačke i Velike Britanije raspravljaju o potrebi šire reformske agende koju u suštini treba da definišu bosanski lideri i koja će obuhvatiti društveno-ekonomska pitanja, dobru vladu, vladavinu prava i ‘selektivna’ institucionalna pitanja. Bosanski lideri će potpisati ‘dugoročno, neopozivo pismeno opredjeljenje’ da bi se uspostavila funkcionalnost na svim nivoima države i implementirale reforme, s tim da će EU tada deblokirati stupanje na snagu Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju (SAA) i naredne faze koje generalno prate uspostavu procedura pridruživanja.
Prijedlog se bazira na velikom broju pretpostavki velike politike, od kojih neke oblikuju pristup vanjske politike EU prema susjedstvu, konsolidaciji mira i evropskoj integraciji uopšte.
Pretpostavka 1: Proces proširenja, kroz uslovljavljanja, donosi duboku demokratsku promjenu
Glavna pretpostavka (i nada) prijedloga jeste da su proces pridruživanja i njegova uslovljavljanja veliki ‘podstrek za istinsku reformu i stabilnost u regionu’, uz zajedničko pismo ministara u kome se kao primjer navode Srbija, Crna Gora i Albanija. Problem Bosne jeste da ovaj instrument nikad nije imao šansu da zaživi. Naglasak EU na implementaciji odluke Sejdić-Finci značio je prerano se latiti ‘zahtjevnih pitanja u procesu’, dovodeći do ćorsokaka koji je spriječio druge potrebne reforme, posebno one društveno-ekonomske. Kao i svugdje u svijetu, EU bi trebala da slijedi pristup odozdo prema gore, postepeni pristup transformaciji, sa posebnim fokusom na ekonomiju.
Pretpostavka 2: Mogu se naći elite i građansko izborno tijelo koji su opredijeljeni za promjenu
Ovaj normativni pristup neliberalnim, postkonfliktnim društvima je tipičan za EU i takođe odražava vodeći stav Njemačke prema Balkanu. To pretpostavlja ranije postojanje dva osnovna faktora. Prvi - da će ključni lideri preuzeti pravo na promjenu, ako se obezbijedi pravi spoj inicijativa, i ispoštovati opredjeljenje. Specifično za Bosnu, ovo će zahtijevati kritičnu masu lidera sa izvjesnom etikom za odgovornost i državništvo, slažući se sa kulturom kompromisa koja je temelj za evropsku integraciju. Drugi - da postoji neiskorišteno izborno tijelo za promjenu unutar bosanskog društva koje će u svoje vrijeme djelovati iza ove agende i izvršiti unutrašnji pritisak da se društvo transformiše.
Pretpostavka 3: Bosna može biti Švajcarska
Za zagovornike pristupa Steinmeiera i Hammonda, Bosna, kroz proširenje, može, treba i konačno će postati kao Švajcarska ili Belgija, sa decentralizovanom ali funkcionalnom državom. Etnički temelji dejtonske države i njen zamršeni sistem nisu problem, pošto liče na ustave nekih država članica EU. U tom pogledu, lideri u Republici Srpskoj žele evropsku integraciju, sve dok proces ne ometa prerogative entiteta. Stoga Bosnu treba tretirati kao svaku drugu zemlju u borbi za ulazak u EU, bez ‘posebnih uslova’ i učvrstiti je u post-dejtonsku fazu.
Neke od ovih pretpostavki velike politike su klimave kad se gledaju u svjetlu aktuelnog iskustva sadašnjih i prethodnih rundi proširenja, kao i samog bosanskog konteksta.
Jedno je raspravljati o tome da proces proširenja može biti katalizator za reforme i efekt poluge. Potpuno je drukčije trubiti o proširenju i integraciji EU – što lideri EU i institucije stalno rade – kao sinonimima za linearnu, duboku demokratsku promjenu i kao lijek za rješenje konflikta. Transformativna moć kroz uslovljavanja poprimila je kvazi-teološki status u vođenju EU politike, uprkos dokazu koji pokazuje ograničenja te politike – ne samo na Zapadnom Balkanu.
Zajedno sa putem priključenja, i druge političke priče inspirisane neliberalnom demokratijom u stilu Viktora Orbána i putinizmom predstavljaju izazov za evropski model u područjima gdje efekt poluge treba da bude veći. Ponekad nije jasno da li EU ovlašćuje društva i pojedince ili je na djelu ceremonijalna adaptacija. Značajno je da monitori kao što su Bartelsmannov indeks transformacije ili Freedom House svrstavaju većinu zemalja kandidata EU u ‘polu-konsolidovane demokratije’ ili ‘hibridne režime’. Osvrt na slobodu medija i drugi kriteriji pokazuju da ‘napredak’ može biti površan i lako promjenjiv.
Utvrđeni rascjepi i interesi i zamrznuti konflikti ne nestaju sami od sebe unutar EU, iako se mogu labavo neutralisati. Oni ustvari reafirmišu sami sebe – ali onda vladajuće elite imaju manje incijativa za reformu a EU manje instrumenata da zaustave povratak na staro. Put koji se zagovara za Bosnu stoga nije nepobitan. I on zavisi od privlačnosti modela koji je izgubio efekt poluge zahvaljujući oslabljenoj reputaciji EU i kontradikcijama (uključujući nazadovanje i ‘starih’ i ‘novih’ država članica), kao i kredibilitet obećanja o proširenju, koje izgleda suviše daleko za hitnost sadašnje situacije na Balkanu – i za borbu oko premoći u regionu.
Preinaka implementacije odluke Sejdić-Finci (odlažući ustavnu reformu da bi se ukinula etnička diskriminacija u kolektivnom predsjedništvu i Domu naroda) može se opravdati iz pragmatične perspektive diplomatije i pregovaranja. Ali ovo ne bi trebalo da znači da je žrtvovanje pitanja Sejdić-Finci glavni faktor za sadašnji zastoj na putu EU (nova konvencionalna mudrost). Takav potez pogrešno predstavlja kulturu blokade koja prožima skoro sve - ne samo ustavnu reformu – u zemlji u kojoj i najluđa stavka može biti politički, ili na drugi način paralisana, čak i kad je očita dobrobit zajedničkog djelovanja (napr. poljopivreda). Ovakva priča previđa odgovornosti međunarodne zajednice zbog neuspjeha da zaustavi opstrukciju i eroziju države, kao i otvorena pitanja o nekim aspektima pristupa EU pregovorima i medijaciji.
Čak i ako su Njemačka i Britanija složne oko uslovljenosti, ova preinaka slijedi ranije preinake uslovljavljanja EU (implementacija odluke Sejdić-Finci bila je sama po sebi Plan B). Na terenu mnogi ovo tumače kao još jedan dokaz da crvena linija EU nije crvena i da se može zaobići, kao i međunarodne obaveze Bosne. Ovo se može vratiti EU kao mora kad se zajamči pouzdaniji pristup.
Na kraju, odluka nije manje pitanje, kako neki tvrde, nego je inherentna samoj vladavini zakona koji prijedlog traži za novu reformsku agendu. Odluka Sejdić-Finci bila je pobjeda individualnih prava Bosanaca, obeštećujući biračka prava ne samo manjina nego i svakog Bosanca koji želi da odbaci etničku identifikaciju. Prijedlog ministara imao je namjeru da pokrene Bosnu od Dejtona. Odluka Sejdić-Finci bi mogla tome da doprinese, kroz relativno umjerenu ustavnu reformu. Činjenica da i neke druge evropske zemlje imaju donekle slične restrikcije je pitanje za promjenu unutar Unije – ne za prihvatanje više izuzetaka za građanska odgovornost na kojim se nekad bazirala.
Fokus prijedloga o društveno-ekonomskim pitanjima je dobrodošao, pošto su ta pitanja vodeći faktori iza februarskih protesta i izvor nestabilnosti. Ali takve reforme će pogoditi sistem moći i pokroviteljstvo nad sprječavanjem promjena. I očite rasprave da u neliberalnim, kleptokratskim sistemima, ekonomska reforma vodi prema političkoj reformi.
Prijedlog se bazira na istoj politici vlasništva koju EU vodi od 2006. Isti lideri koji izvlače korist iz bosanskog sistema pozvani su da definišu ono što je bitno za zajedničko dobro. Takav pristup neinvolviranja je uveliko problematičan. Na Zapadnom Balkanu kompromis se često vidi kao znak slabosti i poraza, ne kao vrlina.
Na neki način, prijedlog odražava njemačku perspektivu za eurozonu, baziranu na obavezivanju i pravilima – ali bez ikakvih štapova i repera da se provede implementacija. Ako se ovaj pristup ospori u uskom okruženju eurozone, u kojoj nositelji uloga dijele interese u uspjehu projekta, može li biti isporučen u potpuno drukčijem kontekstu kome nedostaju takvi faktori?
Naposljetku, ako ikad Bosna postane kao Švajcarska ili Belgija, svi njeni konstitutivni dijelovi i politički lideri moraju prihvatiti Bosnu kao državu – i željeti ‘normalizaciju stanja’. Ovo još nije slučaj i tako zbog sistematske politike urušavanja koju vode neki lideri, EU će tražiti od njih da se opredijele. Ova stabilizacija institucija koja se traži u prijedlogu ministara ide protiv egzistencijalnih interesa tih elita. Postoji fina crta između tvrdih i ‘lako rješivih institucionalnih pitanja’, kao što to može potvrditi svako uključen u gradnju institucija.
U idealnom slučaju, prijedlog bi mogao povećati odgovornost i omogućiti imenovanje i posramljenost onih koji kvare put Bosne u EU. Na toj tački, aktivno izborno tijelo moglo bi biti game-changer. Da li postoji ili bi moglo nastati takvo tijelo za promjenu je da se nagađa. Postoje primjeri neetničke mobilizacije građana, ali preovlađuje trulost sistema a biračko tijelo je jako za status quo.
Inicijativa Steinmeiera i Hammonda vjerovatno će postati politika EU, čak i ako postoji duboki skepticizam o njenim osnovama. Ipak je dobro da Evropljani pokazuju znake dobre volje da se ponovo angažuju u Bosni. Odlučno ponovno angažovanje u regionu je u njihovom interesu; pomoći će da podupre moć Evrope, s obzirom na rusko balansiranje i kraj Pax Americana iz 1990-ih. To je prilika za još neiskušanu diplomatiju visoke predstavnice Federice Mogherini.
Neće pomoći samo jedan potez. Ova inicijativa mora biti dio šire i regionalne evropske strategije, angažujući diplomatiju i neke manje forme izbalansiranosti. Prvo, Evropljani treba da koriste svoje poluge sa regionalnim akterima, ponajprije Hrvatskom kao članicom EU i Srbijom kao kandidatom za EU, da bi se podržala drugačija politička dinamika u Bosni – uključujući ulagivanja njihovim štićenicima i onim koji prave probleme.
Drugo, Big Bang kroz ponovno otvaranje Dejtona i gradnju sistema od početka, iako poželjan, ne mora biti sada izvodljiv (i možda neće promijeniti druge štetne modele, kao što je štela). Ali druge mjere (ili manji Big Bangovi) treba da budu na stolu, paralelno sa glavnom agendom EU o reformi. Ustavna reforma Federacije je pravi primjer, iako su propali raniji napori. I Evropljani treba da budu odlučni u zaustavljanju erozije zajedničkih institucija.
Treće, zemlji je potreban temeljno drukčiji politički diskurs. To je više od EU fondova, projekata i izjava ‘zabrinutosti’. To zahtijeva dinamičan spoj političkog angažmana i čvrste diplomatije, uključujući mjere protiv govora mržnje kakav koriste mediji i vodeći lideri, što je izvor podjelea– i što mnoge države EU (posebno Njemačka) nikad neće tolerisati kod sebe. Po istom uzoru i slijedeći svoju strategiju proširenja, EU i zemlje članice takođe treba da podstiču pomirenje s vrha prema dole i odozdo prema gore, uzbrdo. Preovlađujući pristup bilo pa prošlo ne sluti na dobro u budućnosti.
Četvrto, Evropi treba štap a ne mrkva. Evropljani i Amerikanci treba do kraja da se slože o usklađivanju finansijskog uslovljavljanja, vežući napredak u strukturalnim reformama EU sa programima IMF.
Bosanci su sve to vidjeli i imaju malo povjerenja u međunarodne dužnosnike koji dolaze i odlaze. A i zdrav je izvjestan skeptiziam u njihovom odmjeravanju (u Bosni i drugim problematičnim kontekstima). Naposljetku, zavisi od samih Bosanaca da pokušaju mijenjati stvari. Ali ako Evropljani zaista misle da nešto urade, moraće istinski da se angažuju i ujedine iza zajedničke agende. Inače, oni koji prave probleme u Bosni samo će ih sačekati, dočekavši svoj trenutak da se inicijativa spotakne, kao i druge prije. Ako se ovo desi, za nekoliko godina, dok ministri Hammond i Steinmeier budu pisali knjige o svom međunarodnom ograničenju, isti klanovi će nastaviti da vladaju krnjom državom, možda unutar EU, sklonoj izljevima nestabilnosti, sa masovnim odljevom ljudskog kapitala i sve manjom međunarodnom podrškom.
Halting Bosnia’s eight-year downward trend and boosting the country’s momentum towards Europe is the main goal of German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond’s proposal for Bosnia, in the wake of popular protests, economic downturn and elections that largely returned ethnic-based parties to power.
A year ago, at the beginning of a key meeting with Bosnian leaders to agree on constitutional reform, European Commissioner Štefan Füle announced to the amazement of the Bosnian delegation that he would have to cut short his participation in order to rush to Ukraine. Hard-pressed for time, the European Union-facilitated meeting predictably yielded no result and soon afterwards, the EU called off its “intensive facilitation efforts”.
This was indicative of an EU foreign policy agenda that nowadays prioritises macro geopolitics, whether it be war in Ukraine or the so-called Islamic State, over nitty-gritty micro dilemmas of state-building and peace consolidation in countries that have become old news. Rotating international officials want quick and dramatic results, at the pace of twitter – a bad recipe for the transformational diplomacy that the EU sees as part of its foreign policy.
However, the Balkans represent the one region where the EU is officially in the lead, and Europeans have to mean business about democratisation and peace consolidation there. Geopolitics are at play too: unfinished business at the heart of Europe is increasingly becoming intertwined with post-Crimea geopolitical balancing and with the emergence of political models that test liberal democracy. Europeans would be foolish to wait for a clear conflict threshold or other visible forms of deterioration to reassess policies launched in a very different context. Challenges to European interests and stability take subtler forms than simply newsy wars.
In this context, Germany and the UK now advocate for a “readjusted sequencing” of the EU’s approach, deferring the constitutional reform required by the European Court of Human Rights’ Sejdić and Finci ruling in 2009, which said that institutional posts in the collective Presidency and House of Peoples must not be restricted to members of Bosnia’s three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs).
Instead, the German and UK foreign ministers argue, a broader reform agenda is needed, which is to be essentially defined by Bosnian leaders and which should encompass socio-economic issues, good governance, rule of law, and “selected” institutional questions.
Bosnian leaders will sign a “long-term, irrevocable written commitment” to establish functionality at all state levels and to implement the reforms, with the EU then unblocking the entry into force of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) and the next stages generally following established accession procedures.
The proposal is based on a number of grand policy assumptions, several of which also shape the EU’s foreign policy approach to the neighbourhood, to peace consolidation and European integration in general.
Assumption 1: Enlargement process, through conditionality, brings about deep democratic transformation
The proposal’s main assumption (and hope) is that the enlargement process and its conditionality are a major “driver for true reform and stability in the region”, with the ministers’ joint letter citing Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania as examples. Bosnia’s problem is that this tool never had the chance to perform. The EU’s emphasis on Sejdić-Finci’s implementation meant tackling “intractable issues too early in the process”, leading to an impasse that prevented other necessary reforms, especially socio-economic ones. As it does elsewhere across the globe, the EU should pursue a bottom-up, incremental approach to transformation, with a particular focus on economics.
Assumption 2: Committed elites and a civic constituency for change can be found
This normative approach to illiberal, post-conflict societies is typical of the EU and also reflects Germany’s leading stance for the Balkans. It presumes the pre-existence of two basic factors. The first is that key leaders will assume ownership for change, if the right mix of incentives is provided, and honour commitments. Specifically in Bosnia, this would require a critical mass of leaders with certain ethics of responsibility and statesmanship, subscribing to a culture of compromise that has been fundamental for European integration. The second is that there is an untapped constituency for change within Bosnian society that will eventually rally behind this agenda and exert internal pressure to transform the system.
Assumption 3: Bosnia can be Switzerland
For the advocates of Steinmeier and Hammond’s approach, Bosnia, through enlargement, can, should, and eventually will become like Switzerland or Belgium, with a decentralised but functional state. The ethnic foundations of the Dayton state and its labyrinthine system are no problem, as they resemble some EU member states’ constitutions. In their view, Republika Srpska leaders want European integration, as long as the process does not hinder the entities’ prerogatives. Hence Bosnia must be treated like any other country in the throes of EU accession, without “special conditions”, and put firmly into a post-Dayton phase.
Some of these grand policy assumptions are shaky when viewed in terms of the actual experience of current and previous enlargement rounds, as well as of the Bosnian context itself.
It is one thing to argue that the enlargement process can be a catalyst for reforms and a source of leverage. It is a very different thing to trumpet enlargement and EU integration – which EU leaders and institutions invariably do – as synonymous with linear, deep democratic transformation and as a panacea for conflict resolution. Transformative power through conditionality has acquired a quasi-theological status in EU policymaking, in spite of evidence that shows the limits of the policy – not only in the Western Balkans.
Alongside the accession path, other political narratives, inspired by Viktor Orbán-style illiberal democracy and Putinism, challenge the European model in areas where its leverage should be greater. It is sometimes unclear whether the EU is empowering societies and individuals, or whether a mostly ceremonial adaptation is at work. Tellingly, monitors such as Bertelsmann Transformation Index or Freedom House classify most EU candidate countries as “semi-consolidated democracies” or “hybrid regimes”. Rollbacks on freedom of media and other criteria show that “progress” can be superficial and easily reversible.
Entrenched cleavages and interests and frozen conflicts do not per se vanish inside the EU, although they might be loosely neutralised. They can actually reassert themselves – but then ruling elites have fewer incentives to reform, and the EU has fewer tools to stem such rollbacks. The path advocated for Bosnia is therefore not unassailable. And it hinges on the attractiveness of a model that has lost much leverage due to the EU’s weakened reputation and contradictions (including the backsliding of both “old” and “new” member states), as well as on the credibility of the promise of enlargement, which looks too distant for the urgency of the Balkans’ current situation –and for influencing power struggles in the region.
The re-sequencing of Sejdić-Finci’s implementation (postponing constitutional reform to abolish ethnic discrimination in the collective Presidency and House of Peoples) might be justified from the pragmatic perspective of diplomacy and negotiation. But this should not mean scapegoating Sejdić-Finci as the main factor for the current stalemate of the EU path (the new conventional wisdom). To do so misrepresents a culture of blockage that pervades almost everything – not just constitutional reform – in a country where the silliest item can be political and thus paralyzed, even when benefits of common action should be obvious (i.e. agriculture). Moreover, this narrative overlooks the responsibilities of the international community in failing to stem obstruction and state erosion, as well as open questions on some aspects of the EU’s approach to negotiation and mediation.
Even if Germany and Britain are genuine about conditionality, this re-adjustment follows previous re-adjustments of the EU’s conditionality (Sejdić-Finci’s implementation was itself a Plan B). On the ground, many interpret this as yet more evidence that the EU’s red lines are not that red and can be circumvented, as can Bosnia’s international obligations. This might come back to haunt the EU when a more assertive approach is warranted.
Lastly, the ruling was no minor point, as some contend, but inherent in the same rule of law that the proposal wants for the new reform agenda. Sejdić-Finci was a victory for Bosnians’ individual rights, redressing the disenfranchisement not just of minorities, but also of every Bosnian keen on scrapping ethnic self-identification. The ministers’ proposal is rightly intended to move Bosnia past Dayton. Sejdić-Finci could contribute to this, through a relatively modest constitutional reform. The fact that few other EU countries may have somewhat similar restrictions is a case for change inside the Union too – not for accepting more exceptions to the civic citizenship on which it was once based.
The proposal’s focus on socio-economic issues is welcome, since these issues were also driving factors behind February’s protests and are a source of instability. But such reforms will also affect the system of power and patronage preventing change. And evidence disputes that in illiberal, kleptocratic systems, economic reform leads to political reform.
The proposal is based on the same policy of ownership that the EU has pursued since 2006. The same leaders who benefit from the Bosnian system are called on to define the specifics of a reform agenda that would alter that system (and its perks), and achieve compromises for the common good. Such a hands-off approach is thus problematic. In the Western Balkans, compromise is still often seen as a sign of weakness and defeat, not as a virtue.
In a way, the proposal mirrors the German perspective for the eurozone, based on commitments and rules – but with none of its sticks and benchmarks to police implementation. If this approach is challenged in the close-knit environment of the eurozone, in which stakeholders share interests in the success of the project, can it deliver in a wholly different context lacking any such factors?
Ultimately, if Bosnia is ever to become like Switzerland or Belgium, all its constituent parts and political leaders must accept Bosnian statehood –and wish for “normalcy”. This is not yet the case, and thus the systematic policy pursued by some leaders of hollowing out the very functionality to which the EU would ask them to commit. That institutional normalcy called for in the Ministers’ proposal goes against these elites’ perceived existential interests. There is a fine line between intractable and “easily resolvable institutional questions”, as anyone involved in institution-building can confirm.
Ideally, the proposal could enhance accountability and facilitate the naming and shaming of those who would spoil Bosnia’s EU path. At that point, an active civic constituency could be a game-changer. Whether there is or could be such constituency for change is anyone’s guess. Examples exist of non-ethnic civic mobilisation, but the rottenness of the system is pervasive, and the constituency for the status quo is strong.
Steinmeier and Hammond’s initiative will probably become EU policy, even if there is profound scepticism about its fundamentals. That Europeans show signs of willingness to re-engage with Bosnia is good, though. A determined re-engagement with the region is in their interest; it would help to shore up European power, given Russian re-balancing and the end of Pax Americana of the 1990s. It is an opportunity for High Representative Federica Mogherini’s untested diplomacy.
No single track will do, though. This initiative must thus be part of a broader and regional European strategy, employing diplomacy and some smart forms of balancing too. Firstly, Europeans should use their levers with regional actors, chiefly EU member Croatia and EU candidate Serbia, to support different political dynamics in Bosnia – including by cajoling their own protégés and spoilers.
Secondly, a Big Bang through re-opening Dayton and rebuilding the system from the ground up, though desirable, might not be feasible now (and might not change other damaging patterns, such as contactocracy or stela). But other measures (or smaller Big Bangs) should be on the table, parallel to the main EU reform agenda. Constitutional reform of the Federation is a case in point, even if previous efforts have failed. And Europeans should be firm in stemming the erosion of common institutions.
Thirdly, the country needs a fundamentally different political discourse. This is more than EU funds, projects and statements of “concern”. It requires a dynamic, but consistent blend of political engagement and tough diplomacy, including measures against the poisonous hate speech used by media and leading actors, which is a source of division – and which many EU countries (certainly Germany) would never tolerate domestically. By the same token, and following its own Enlargement Strategy, the EU and its Member States should also increase their encouragement of top-to-bottom and bottom-up reconciliation, uphill as this is. The prevailing bilo pa prošlo(let bygones be bygones) approach bodes ill for the future.
Fourthly, Europe needs sticks, not just carrots. Europeans and Americans should at the very least agree on leveraging financial conditionality, tying progress in EU structural reforms to the IMF’s programmes.
Bosnians have seen it all and have little trust in internationals that come and go. And a certain scepticism to their leverage (in Bosnia and other troubled contexts) is healthy. Ultimately, it is up for Bosnians themselves to try change things. But if Europeans really mean business, they will have to truly engage and unite behind a common agenda. Otherwise, Bosnia’s spoilers will just wait them out, biding their time until the initiative flounders, as others before. If this happens, in a few years, while Ministers Hammond and Steinmeier write books about their international stint, the same clans will continue to rule a rump state, maybe within the EU, prone to outbursts of instability, with massive human capital flight and sustained by dwindling international care.
Francisco de Borja Lasheras stupio je u Evropsko vijeće za vanjske odnose u septembru 2013. kao pomoćnik direktora Ureda u Madridu i Policy Fellow. Između 2007. i 2009. radio je za Fundación Alternativas Observatory of Spanish Foreign Policy (Opex), kao koordinator za politiku o sigurnosti i odbrani, i predavao komparativne evropske politike na George Washington University Study Center. Poslije službe u stalnoj španskoj misiji OSCE-a, Borja je proveo nekoliko godina na Zapadnom Balkanu, kao Seconded National Expert pri misijama OSCE-a u Bosni i Hercegovini, na terenu, kao oficir za ljudska prava, i Albaniji, na čelu Misije. Borja je diplomirao summa con laude na Deusto University’s Faculty of Law i magistrirao na Harvard University, gdje je studirao međunarodne odnose i politiku. Pisao je o Zajedničkoj sigurnosti EU i politici odbrane, strateškim razmišljanjima, međunarodnim intervencijama, NATO-u i multilateralnim trendovima.
Francisco de Borja Lasheras joined the European Council on Foreign Relations in September 2013 as Associate Director of the Madrid Office and Policy Fellow. Between 2007 and 2009 he worked for the Fundación Alternativas´ Observatory of Spanish Foreign Policy (Opex), as Coordinator on Security and Defence Policy, and taught comparative European politics at the George Washington University Madrid Study Center. After serving at the Spanish Permanent Representation to the OSCE, Borja spent several years in the Western Balkans, as Seconded National Expert to the OSCE Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the field, as human rights officer, and Albania, with the Head of Mission. Borja graduated summa cum laude at the Deusto University´s Faculty of Law and holds a Master’s Degree at Harvard University, where he studied international relations and politics. He has published on the EU´s Common Security and Defence Policy, strategic thinking, international interventions, NATO and multilateral trends.
Ovaj tekst je objavljen na web stranici European Council on Foreign Relations i objavljuje se uz dozvolu autora (04.12.2014). [Prevod: Dijalog BiH2.0]
This article was originally published on the European Council on Foreign Relations website and is re-published with the permission from the author (04.12.2014).
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