Kao što je bilo predvidivo, oktobarski opći izbori u Bosni nisu uspjeli donijeti promjenu kojoj su se nadali u svjetlu protesta i učešća pokreta za demokratiju početkom ove godine – nazvanih, možda prerano, Bosansko proljeće.

Teško je pokrenuti temeljnu demokratsku transformaciju kakva Bosni treba bez stvarnog demokratskog izbornog tijela i političke kulture. Ovo je bio neizbježan utisak iz februara, na očaj aktivista sa zajedničkim ciljem, kad su uporedili gomile ljudi (mnogi od njih nezaposleni) u sarajevskim kafićima i terasama od Baščaršije do Maršala Tita sa nekoliko stotina onih koji su se mobilizirali za “revoluciju” blizu Ali Pašine džamije. Kako su neki analitičari prikladno rekli, razočaravajući rezultati izbora su racionalan odraz trulog sistema definiranog – sa ili bez Daytona –neprimjerenim vezama i pokroviteljskom mrežom.

Ali ono što je uobičajeno u Bosni – ako pod tim podrazumijevamo njen dalji put ka imploziji – je loša vijest za Evropu. Evropska Unija i Zapad moraju se pomiriti s nekim neugodnim istinama s obzirom na njihovu politiku u Bosni (i u širem regionu). Te neugodne istine proističu iz prepoznavanja dvije duboko povezane činjenice, koje su očigledne onima na terenu.

Prvo, Bosna (i veliki dio regiona) ostaje zaglavljena u zamrznutom ili latentnom konfliktu koji je nastao iz genocidnog rata. Isti zahtjevi koji su zapalili nasilje još su uveliko tu, uključujući jedinstvenu državu. I nema značajnog pomaka ka pomirenju. Sadašnja politika EU, uglavnom bazirana na razvodnjenom putu integracije i perspektivi proširenja, nastoji da izbjegne ili neutralizira ovu osnovnu činjenicu. Ali izazovi Bosne, kao i oni regiona, tiču se vanjske i bezbjedonosne politike, post-konfliktne konsolidacije i geopolitike.

Drugo, primamljivo je za EU da jednostavno nastavi na sadašnjem kursu, zadržavajući istu diplomatsku inerciju. Ali ovo bi moglo biti štetno kako za evropske ciljeve tako i za regionalnu stabilnost, u vrijeme oživljene geopolitike i ključanja socijalnih frustracija.

1. Uslovljavanje EU ne daje rezultate i institucije Daytona su potrošene

Bosna je uhvaćena u zamku između dva sukobljena pristupa Zapada uspostavi post-konfliktnog mira: kroz proširenje EU uslovljavanjem i podsticanjem, i kroz izvršne strukture, sa kvazi-kolonijalnim ovlastima, uspostavljenim Daytonskim mirovnim sporazumom prije dvije decenije. Bosna je postala žrtva ograničenja i kontradikcija oba pristupa – što lokalne elite vješto koriste. Evropljani zvanično podržavaju i soft power EU – kroz instrumente integracije - i izvršne strukture koje je uspostavio Dayton.

Zapad pretpostavlja da Bosna ne može u potpunosti vladati samostalno a da ne krene prema sukobu.

S jedne strane, Zapad ohrabruje privatno vlasništvo i transformaciju institucija prema Evropi. S druge strane, pretpostavlja da Bosna ne može u potpunosti vladati samostalno a da ne krene prema sukobu. Prešutno, to znači da prihvatanje proširenja samo po sebi nije dovoljno jak poticaj (otud potreba za sigurnosnom podrškom). Međutim, i zbog različitih razloga (ne samo podjela u međunarodnoj zajednici) institucije koje nadgledaju provedbu Daytona (ili barem bonske ovlasti koje omogućuju otpuštanje beskompromisnih dužnosnika, itd) su nedvojbeno potrošene, barem iz perspektive efikasnosti. Ciljane elite jednostavno ignoriraju njihove odluke. U svakom slučaju, van svake sumnje je da nijedan od ova dva pristupa, sami po sebi, ne rješavaju strukturalne probleme u Bosni.

2. Gore od “zastoja” – EU je dopustila političku neprimjetnost

Bosna treba više od pristupa proširenju EU. Strukturalni rascjep koji je doveo do sukoba uglavnom je van uticaja međunarodne uprave i evropskog mentorstva. Izvještaj Evropske Komisije o napretku, iz 2014. kaže da je evropski napredak Bosne u zastoju. Ali problem premašuje potrebu za implementacijom presude Evropskog suda za ljudska prava u slučaju Sejdić-Finci, zbog odredbi zajedničke vlasti koje omogućavaju mjesta u institucijama samo za članove tri konstitutivna naroda. Sadašnje stanje nije samo privremena politička zapreka. To je slučaj strukturalne političke neprimjetnosti: osnovni uvjeti za evropski uspjeh ne postoje. U najboljem slučaju ta politika će odvesti do promjenjivog napretka na marginama, dok je nemoćna da zaustavi imploziju zemlje.

3. Ni diplomatija pritiska u stilu Holbrookea ne može biti rješenje

Takođe je nejasno da li bi Holbrookeova interventna, diplomatija pritiska iz 1990-ih mogla donijeti rješenje za sadašnje izazove. Bosna je žrtva sve dublje krize evropskog sigurnosnog poretka. Svijet u kome je Dayton stvoren više ne postoji, kao ni Pax Americana koji je garantirao moć potrebnu da se održi red u Bosni i drugim mjestima. Dayton i njegovi dogovori o podjeli moći su atrofirali.

Evropljani, fokusirani na druge međunarodne frontove, nemaju ni želje ni zajedničke vizije da pokrenu smjele diplomatske inicijative prema nekoj vrsti Daytona II.

Ali dosad Evropljani, fokusirani na druge međunarodne frontove, ne pokazuju ni želju ni zajedničku viziju da pokrenu smjele diplomatske inicijative prema nekoj vrsti Daytona II. To bi zahtijevalo stalni pritisak na lokalne aktere i privođenje regionalnih aktera (uključujući Srbiju, ali i druge) – drukčiju vrstu diplomatije od one koju podržava EU. To bi značilo uključiti mjere kao što su moguće sankcije za neposlušne, i tako dalje.

Ali problem je što, suprotno konvencionalnoj mudrosti, Dayton II (nevjerojatno da bi do njega skoro i došlo) ne bi mogao sam po sebi biti rješenje za bolesti Bosne kao što su neprimjerene veze i neuređeni odnosi– iako bi mogao ograničiti njihov preovlađujući uticaj.

4. EU soft power često rezultira kozmetičkim promjenama

Politika EU i diplomatija oko proširenja često visi na ideji o transformativnoj moći Evrope. Demokratizacija, dobra vlast, vladavina prava i sveukupno jačanje društva je moguće ostvariti kroz inicijative koje za sobom povlači integracija EU. Ovo objašnjava tendenciju EU da koristi mrkvu (na primjer, status kandidata za Albaniju 2014) ili da snizi standarde kako bi pogurala proces pristupa. Osnovna pretpostavka jeste da će promjena doći, ako ne u predulaznoj EU fazi, onda unutar EU.

U praksi, ovo je ono što se ne dešava često, posebno u neliberalnim društvima, novim državama i/ili post-totalitarnim sistemima. Stari rascjepi i stare vladajuće elite prilagođavaju se novim formama i reafirmiraju. Demokratske politike u državama članicama EU kao što su Mađarska ili Bugarska predstavljaju izazov za ovo temeljno načelo politike EU. EU bi mogla doprinijeti unaprijeđenju liberalnih reformista svuda, čak i u partnerstvu sa istočnim zemljama. Ali je na Zapadnom Balkanu ovaj rezultat u najmanju ruku nejasan, a aktivisti civilnog društva kažu da je istina drugačija.

Umjesto toga, ono što se često dešava je kozmetička promjena: elite se prilagođavaju jeziku i okvirima “Evrope” i “reformistima”, dok ne uspijevaju da se izbore sa mrežama moći, pokroviteljstva i loše vlade. EU drži izvjesnu transformativnu moć u jugoistočnoj Evropi, ali je nestabilnija nego što se obično uvjerava. Evropski zvaničnici ne treba da se zavaravaju da će se te neliberalne podjele promijeniti samo ako se nereformisane elite pridruže briselskom klubu Rue de la Lois sa njegovim razmetanjima i koktel partijima.

5. EU mentorstvo bez definiranih rokova ili načina predstavlja rizik

U svjetlu ovih izazova zvaničnici EU i angažovane zemlje članice nastoje da udvostruče svoju uključenost i napore mentorstva, odmjeravajući inicijative za gradnju institucija i resurse. Radije nego da se oslanja da soft power taktiku privlačenja i uvlačenja, EU ustvari radi na “tvrdom mentorstvu” brzoj uspostavi temelja tako da zemlje slijede njen model i ne gube momentum – iako EU pokušava da nametne korak koji nije standard u Zapadnoj Evropi. Mnoge od ovih inicijativa su pohvalne, unutar sveukupnog procesa standardne asimilacije.

Intenzivni evropski mentoring ponekad završava jačanjem neposlušnih.

Ali ova vrsta mentorstva ili podučavanja rizikuje jačanje zavisnosti od međunarodne pomoći koja, u Bosni, često postaje opravdanje za paralizu. Još gore, intenzivno evropsko mentorstvo ponekad završava jačanjem neposlušnih, umjesto povećanju njihove odgovornosti prema javnosti (ključni zahtjev u bosanskim protestima) ili gradnji kulture političke odgovornosti. I tako neki tvrdokorni lokalni političari, koje savjetuju zapadne firme bliske evropskim strukturama, vješto maksimiziraju nasuglasja unutar EU (na primjer, insistirajući na nekim standardima koje ne zadovoljavaju ni same zemlje članice).

Šta više, ovo intenzivno evropsko mentorstvo rizikuje da zamijeni domaće procese, na primjer, da im zvaničnici EU crtaju zakone koji se ne provode, a na koje se stavlja pečat na skupštinama. Ovo nije problematično samo iz demokratske perspektive – nego nije dobro ni za buduću vlast uključenih zemalja.

6. Proširenje EU nije obavezno “najuspješnija” bezbjedonosna politika

Druga mantra evropske politike je da je proširenje EU, bez sumnje, najbolja bezbjedonosna politika za regiju i pouzdan recept za stabilnost. Ali je žalosna istina da se sadašnja stabilnost na Zapadnom Balkanu uglavnom pripisuje ravnoteži snaga na terenu, što je rezultat sukoba iz 1990-ih. Ova ravnoteža snaga je uklopljena u relevantne mirovne okvire, kao u Bosni.

Perspektiva proširenja EU doprinosi toj stabilnosti, pružajući zajedničku perspektivu za budućnost. Kao takva ostaje vrijedan cilj. Međutim, ta stabilnost je krhka, kao što se može vidjeti kad god neki političar krene s nacionalističkom retorikom, u kontekstu loše ekonomije, gigantskih socijalnih potreba i proključale frustracije. Nedavno nasilje na fudbalskoj utakmici između Srbije i Albanije za klasifikacije na Euro 2016 samo je vrh ledenog brijega. Bezbjednost, strogo uzevši, ne stoji isključivo na proširenju, nego na širem nizu faktora, kao što su neujednačena taktika zastrašivanja međunarodnog prisustva i taktičke kalkulacije vladajućih elita. Ali, rastuća percepcija da se perspektiva EU sužava predstavlja potencijalni faktor nesigurnosti. To povećava nekontrolisani, neodgovorni nacionalizam ili priklanjanje drugim akterima kao što su Rusija ili Turska.

7. Članstvo u EU ne može biti rješenje za zamrznute konflikte

Još jedna diskutabilna premisa – koja se primjenjuje i na Bosnu – je ideja da su “Evropa” i “zajednička evropska kuća” tako snažan zajednički cilj da će neutralizirati ili čak riješiti višegodišnje zamrznute konflikte u regionu.

Bez podržanih diplomatskih napora da se riješi korijen uzroka sukoba, ono što je uobičajeno u Bosni nastoji da se samo reafirmira.

Okolnosti Francuske i Njemačke nisu lako primjenjive na druge slučajeve. Kipar kao članica EU pokazuje neadekvatnost ove jednačine članstva u EU sa krajem zamrznutih konflikta i njihovim negativnim dinamikama. Da, EU integracija, potpomognuta drugim faktorima (na primjer, medijacijom na visokom nivou) može biti instrument za gradnju mira u nekim slučajevima i može napraviti prekretnicu, kao što je Sporazum iz 2013. između Srbije i Kosova. Ali bez podržanih diplomatskih napora da se riješe korjeniti uzroci sukoba, ono što je uobičajeno u Bosni nastoji da se samo reafirmira. Zamrznuto stanje implementiranja Sporazuma između Srbije i Kosova ovo potvrđuje. U svakom slučaju, ovaj pristup postaje neodrživ, pošto je EU zvanično zaledila proširenje.

Čak i ako bi EU odlučila da napravi iskorak ka proširenju, što neki predlažu kao jedini način da se krene naprijed, nejasno je da li će se Bosna ili Kosovo svrstati unutar EU. Gledajući sadašnju situaciju EU bi uvela u svoj prostor neliberalne sisteme i latentne sukobe – na štetu EU aspiracija ka strateškom planiranju prostora i moći.

8. Geopolitika se ne može ignorirati

Glavna politika EU prema Bosni, regionu i Istočnoj Evropi uopće je uglavnom normativna. U liberalnom kontekstu, sa faktorima koji to omogućuju, ovo bi moglo imati smisla i djelovati vremenom. Ali u sadašnjem trenutku, dok Rusija (zajedno sa drugim akterima) povećava svoje poluge moći širom regiona i balansira evropske interese, normativni pristup nije dovoljan. Suptilni efekti prelijevanja ukrajinske krize na Balkan postaju sve jasniji. I dok je EU zaokupljena drugim međunarodnim krizama (a i vlastitom) Rusija vješto širi svoju mrežu uticaja u regionu gdje drži značajne poluge (kao što su lične veze, energija, pozajmice itd). Nedavna visoka posjeta Vladimira Putina Beogradu je pokazatelj ove strategije. U Bosni, njegova lična podrška Miloradu Dodiku (koji se igra sa krimskim scenarijem u Bosni) i rusko odbacivanje standardnog jezika Vijeća za implementiranje mira o teritorijalnom integritetu Bosne i evropskih aspiracija nudi razloge za zabrinutost.

Htjeli ili ne htjeli, Evropljani će se takođe morati angažirati u nekim pametnim formama balansiranja i izaći – vrlo brzo – sa strategijom koja će popuniti sadašnji vakum moći što definira Zapadni Balkan.

Veliki dio sadašnjeg evropskog pristupa Zapadnom Balkanu može se sažeti kao neka vrsta “molimo – bez – politike problema”. Šta više, ova politika se bazira na pretpostavkama koje su, u najmanju ruku klimave. Međutim, okolnosti se mijenjaju nagore, dovodeći u opasnost napredak postignut ranijih godina. Johannes Hahn, novi komesar za proširenje EU, rekao je prave stvari pred Evropskim parlamentom o vladavini prava, borbi protiv korupcije i tako dalje. Ali ovaj pristup neće biti dovoljan.

Evropljani treba da prihvate politiku promijenjenih okolnosti umjesto da stoje na kursu potopa u stilu Titanika.

Za početak, Evropljani, poštujući svoju bezbjedonosnu strategiju, treba da prihvate politiku promijenjenih okolnosti umjesto da stoje na kursu potopa u stilu Titanika. Novo vođstvo EU, sa visokim predstavnikom na kormilu i sa angažmanom jezgre zemalja članica kao što je Njemačka, treba pokrenuti smjelu politiku angažmana EU na Zapadnom Balkanu. Ova resetovana politika će trebati jasno obuhvatiti sve uglove: geopolitiku, konsolidaciju mira, bezbjedonosnu politiku, diplomatiju i proširenje. I s obzirom na izazove u svijetu, od Ukrajine do Islamske države do tenzija u Aziji, ovakva promjenjena politika će doprinijeti itekako potrebnoj raspravi 2015. prema globalnoj strategiji EU.

Na kraju, takva promijenjena politika treba ići paralelno sa raspravom o budućem obliku evropskog projekta, opcijama za njegovo ponovno promišljanje i dobrobiti daljeg proširenja – umjesto da se omogući anti-imigracionim snagama da prevladaju njihove vizije. Moć Evrope i njen spoljnji uticaj duboko zavisi od njene sposobnosti da kod kuće obnovi svoj politički model liberalne demokratije i otvorenog društva – mora svojim primjerom dokazati ono što propovijeda vani.

Predictably, Bosnia’s October general elections have so far failed to deliver the change hoped for in the wake of the protests and participatory democracy movements of earlier this year – dubbed, perhaps prematurely, the Bosnian Spring.

It is hard to set in motion a fundamental democratic transformation of the sort that Bosnia needs without a real democratic constituency and political culture. This was the inevitable impression produced in February, to the despair of grass-root activists, when they compared the throngs of people (many of them unemployed) crowding Sarajevo’s cafés and terraces from Baščaršija to Marshala Tita with the few hundreds who mobilised for “revolucija” near Ali Pasha’s mosque. As some analysts have aptly said, the disappointing results of the elections make rational sense in a rotten system defined by – with or without Dayton – contactocracy (stela) and patronage networks.

But business as usual in Bosnia – if by that we are to understand its continued path towards implosion – is bad news for Europe. The European Union and the West have to come to terms with a number of inconvenient truths regarding their policy in Bosnia (and in the broader region). These inconvenient truths stem from the recognition of two deeply related facts, which are obvious to those on the ground.

Firstly, Bosnia (and much of the region) remains stuck in a frozen or latent conflict that resulted from a genocidal war. The same claims that set off the violence are largely still there, including Bosnia’s claim to statehood. And there has been no meaningful reconciliation. The EU’s current policy, mainly based on a watered-down integration track and the perspective of enlargement, attempts to dodge or neutralise this basic factor. But Bosnia’s challenges, and those of the region, are about foreign and security policy, post-conflict consolidation, and geopolitics.

Secondly, it is tempting for the EU to simply continue on its current course of action, maintaining the same diplomatic inertias. But this would be detrimental to Europe’s goals and regional stability, at a time of revived geopolitics and simmering social frustrations.

1. EU conditionality is failing and the Dayton institutions are spent

Bosnia is trapped between two conflicting Western approaches to post-conflict peace consolidation: EU enlargement through conditionality and incentives, and the executive structures, with quasi-colonial powers, set up by the Dayton Peace Agreement two decades ago. Bosnia has become a casualty of the limits and contradictions of both approaches – deftly leveraged by local elites. Europeans officially endorse both the EU’s soft power – exercised through the tools of integration – and the executive structures set up by Dayton.

The West assumes that Bosnia cannot completely govern itself without heading for conflict.

On the one hand, the West encourages domestic ownership and institution-led transformation towards Europe. On the other, it assumes that Bosnia cannot completely govern itself without heading for conflict. Implicitly, that means accepting that enlargement on its own is not a sufficiently strong game changer (hence the need for security back-up).

However, and for various reasons (not least the international community’s divisions), the institutions overseeing Dayton (or at least the Bonn Powers, which enable the dismissal of intransigent officials, etc.) are arguably spent, at least from an effectiveness perspective. The elites who are targeted simply ignore their decisions. In any event, beyond their merits, neither of these two approaches, on their own, work to solve Bosnia’s structural problems.

2. Worse than a “standstill” – the EU has allowed policy creep

Bosnia needs more than just the EU’s enlargement approach. The structural cleavages that drove the conflict have been largely unaffected by international rule and European mentoring. The 2014 European Commission Progress Report said that Bosnian European progress is at a standstill. But the problem goes beyond the need for implementation of the European Court of Human Rights’ Sejdić and Finci case, which challenged the power-sharing provisions that limited some institutional posts to members of the three constituent peoples. The present issue is not just a temporary policy setback. It is a case of structural policy creep: the underlying conditions for European success do not exist. At best, bar several game-changers, the policy will lead to fitful progress in the margins, while being powerless to stem the country’s implosion.

3. Holbrooke-style forceful diplomacy might not be a panacea either

It is also unclear that the Holbrooke-style interventionist, forceful diplomacy of the 1990s would provide a panacea for the current challenges either. Bosnia is a victim of the deepening crisis of the European security order. The world in which Dayton was created is gone, as is the Pax Americana that guaranteed the might necessary to sustain that order in Bosnia and elsewhere. Dayton and its power-sharing arrangements have atrophied.

Europeans, focused on other international fronts, have had neither the appetite nor the shared vision to launch any bold diplomatic initiatives towards a sort of Dayton II.

But, so far, Europeans, focused on other international fronts, have had neither the appetite nor the shared vision to launch any bold diplomatic initiatives towards a sort of Dayton II. This would require sustained pressure on local actors and bringing along regional actors (including Serbia, but also others) – a different kind of diplomacy to that generally favoured by the EU. It would have to include measures such as possible sanctions on spoilers, and so on.

Yet the trouble is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, a Dayton II (unlikely any time soon) might not be by itself a solution to Bosnia’s ills such as contactocracy – even if it might limit their pervasive impact.

4. EU soft power often results in ceremonial adaptation

EU politics and diplomacy around enlargement often hinge on the idea of the transformative power of Europe. Democratisation, good governance, rule of law, and overall societal empowerment will eventually materialise through the incentives that EU integration entails. This explains the EU’s tendency to use carrots (for example, 2014 candidate status to Albania) or to lower standards in order to boost the accession process. The underlying assumption is that change will come, if not at the pre-EU stage, then within the EU.

In practice, this is often not what happens, particularly in illiberal societies, new states, and/or post-totalitarian systems. Old cleavages and old ruling elites adapt to new forms and reassert themselves. Democratic politics in EU member states such as Hungary or Bulgaria challenge this fundamental tenet of EU policy. The EU might contribute to fostering liberal reformists elsewhere, even in Eastern Partnership countries. But, in the Western Balkans, this effect is at least unclear, and civil society activists say the truth is otherwise.

Instead, what often takes place is ceremonial adaptation: elites adapt to the language and frames of “Europe” and “reformists”, while failing to tackle underlying networks of power, patronage, and bad governance. The EU retains some transformative power in South-Eastern Europe, but it is shakier than is usually asserted. European officials should not delude themselves that these illiberal cleavages will change just by having unreformed elites join Brussels’ Rue de la Loi club with its perks and cocktail parties.

5. Open-ended EU mentoring poses risks

In view of these challenges, EU officials and engaged member states tend to redouble their involvement and mentoring efforts, leveraging more institution-building initiatives and resources. Rather than relying on the soft power of attraction, the EU actually works on “hard mentoring” at ground-breaking speed so that countries follow will its model and not lose momentum – although the EU tries to force a pace that is not standard in Western Europe either. Many of these initiatives are laudable, within an overall process of standard assimilation.

Intensive European mentoring sometimes ends up empowering spoilers.

But this kind of mentoring or coaching risks fostering the dependency on international assistance that, in Bosnia, has often become an excuse for paralysis. Worse, intensive European mentoring sometimes ends up empowering spoilers, instead of increasing their accountability to the public (a key demand in the Bosnian protests) or building a culture of political responsibility. And some obdurate local politicians, counselled by Western firms familiar with European structures, skilfully maximise the EU’s inconsistencies (for example, insisting on some standards not met by member states themselves).

Moreover, this intensive European mentoring risks substituting for domestic processes, for instance, by having EU officials drafting laws by default, which are then rubberstamped in the assemblies. This is not only problematic from a democratic perspective – it also bodes ill for the future governance of the countries involved.

6. EU enlargement is not necessarily the “most successful” security policy

Another mantra of European policy is that EU enlargement is, without caveats, the best security policy for the region and a surefire recipe for stability. But the sad truth is that the current stability in the Western Balkans is largely attributable to the balance of forces on the ground resulting from the conflicts in the 1990s. This balance of forces was enshrined in the relevant peace frameworks, as in Bosnia.

The EU enlargement perspective does contribute to that stability, providing a shared perspective for the future. As such, it remains a worthy goal. However, that stability is frail, as can be seen whenever a politician goes nationalistic, in the context of a depressed economy, gigantic social needs, and simmering frustration. The recent violence triggered by the Serbia-Albania Euro 2016 classifying soccer match is but the tip of the iceberg.

Security, strictly speaking, does not exclusively hinge on enlargement, but on a broader set of factors, such as the uneven deterrent role played by international presences and the tactical calculations of ruling elites. But, as a self-fulfilling prophecy, the increasing perception that the EU perspective is narrowing represents a potential factor of insecurity. It increases the incentive for free-riding, irresponsible nationalism, or pivoting to other actors such as Russia or Turkey.

7. EU membership may not be a solution to frozen conflicts

Another debatable premise – applied to Bosnia too – is the idea that “Europe” and the “common European home” is so powerful a shared goal that it will neutralise or even solve the region’s perennial frozen conflicts.

Without sustained diplomatic efforts to tackle the root causes of conflict, business as usual tends to reassert itself.

The circumstances of France and Germany are not easily exportable to other cases. EU member state Cyprus shows the inadequacy of this equation of EU membership with the end of frozen conflicts and their negative dynamics. Yes, EU integration, backed by other factors (for example, high-level mediation), can be a peace-building tool in some cases and can deliver breakthroughs, such as the 2013 Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo. But without sustained diplomatic efforts to tackle the root causes of conflict, business as usual tends to reassert itself. The frozen state of the implementation of the Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo confirms this. In any case, this approach is becoming untenable, as the EU has officially frozen enlargement for the near future.

Even if the EU decided on a leap forward to enlargement, proposed by some as the only way forward, it is unclear that Bosnia or Kosovo would sort themselves out inside of the EU. Rather, at the current rate, the EU would be bringing into its midst illiberal systems and latent conflicts – to the detriment of the EU’s aspirations to strategic depth and power.

8. Geopolitics cannot be ignored

The EU’s main policy towards Bosnia, the region, and Eastern Europe in general is mostly normative. In liberal contexts, with enabling factors, this could make sense and work over time. But at the present moment, as Russia (along with other actors) enhances its levers of power across the region and balances European interests, the normative approach is not sufficient. The subtle spill-over effects of the Ukraine crisis into the Balkans are becoming increasingly clear. Indeed, while the EU is absorbed with other international crises (and its own), Russia is deftly spreading its web of influence across a region in which it wields significant levers (such as personal allegiances, energy, loans, etc.). Vladimir Putin’s recent high-level trip to Belgrade is indicative of this strategy. In Bosnia, his personal endorsement of Milorad Dodik (who toys with a Crimea-style scenario in Bosnia) and the Russian rejection of the Peace Implementation Council’s standard language on Bosnia’s territorial integrity and European aspirations offer reasons for concern.

Like it or not, Europeans will also have to engage in some smart forms of balancing and come up – very soon – with a strategy to fill the present power vacuum that defines the Western Balkans.

Much of the current European approach to the Western Balkans can be summarised as a sort of “please-no-problems policy”. Moreover, this policy is based on assumptions that are, at the least, shaky. However, circumstances are changing for the worse, putting at risk the progress achieved in earlier years. Incoming Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Commissioner Johannes Hahn said the right things before the European Parliament about rule of law, the fight against corruption, and so on. But this approach will not be enough.

Europeans should adapt their policy to shifting circumstances instead of staying the course, Titanic-style.

For a start, Europeans, honouring their own security strategy, should adapt their policy to shifting circumstances instead of staying the course, Titanic-style. The new EU leadership, with the High Representative at the helm and with engagement from core member states such as Germany, should set in motion a bold policy reset for the EU’s engagement in the Western Balkans. This policy reset would need to address coherently all the angles involved: geopolitics, peace consolidation, security policy, diplomacy, and enlargement. And, given the challenges across the world, from Ukraine to the Islamic State to the tensions in Asia, this kind of policy shift would contribute to a much-needed discussion in 2015 towards an EU Global Strategy.

Lastly, such a policy reassessment should run parallel to a discussion on the future shape of the European project, options for its reinvention, and the benefits of further enlargement – instead of enabling anti-immigration forces to mainstream their vision. Europe’s power and clout abroad is profoundly dependent on its ability to renovate at home its political model of liberal democracies and open societies – it must prove by its example what it preaches abroad.