“Mora se evropeizirati Balkan kako bi se izbjegla balkanizacija Evrope.” Te riječi sam napisao sa francuskim političkim znanstvenikom Jacquesom Rupnikom 1991, upravo kad je buknuo rat među zemljama nasljednicama Jugoslavije. Borbe će trajati do kraja decenije, odnijeti hiljade života i dvaput zahtijevati intervenciju NATO-a (u Bosni 1995. i Srbiji 1999.).

Skoro četvrt vijeka kasnije Balkan i dalje predstavlja prijetnju evropskom miru, baš kao što je to bilo uoči Prvog svjetskog rata i na kraju hladnog rata, kad je implozija u Jugoslaviji dovela ne samo do prvog rata u Evropi nakon 1945, nego i povratak genocida. Nedavni sukobi u Makedoniji, koji su ostavili osam ubijenih policajaca i 14 albanskih militanata, bude avet obnovljenog nasilja. Teško je znati da li krvoproliće predstavlja gnoj stare, nezaliječene rane ili nešto novo, reakciju protiv većinske slavenske vlade koja je izgleda sklona prihvatanju etničkog šovinizma.

Jasno je da region ostaje eksplozivna i zbunjujuća realnost, u stanju da zaprijeti stabilnosti Evrope koja je na ivici noža nakon avanturizma Rusije u Ukrajini. Region je nestalna mješavina rastućeg nacionalizma, duboke ekonomske frustracije i razočarenja u vezi napretka prema članstvu u Evropsku uniju. Mogućnost da se može upasti u haos obavezuje nas da još jednom promislimo kako najbolje da riješimo balkansku zapaljivu situaciju.

Kad sam nedavno boravio u Beogradu, glavna priča u gradu bila je pucnjava u Makedoniji. Neki moji srbijanski sagovornici osudili su sljepilo Zapada. Posebno su kritikovali EU, NATO i Organizaciju za sigurnost i saradnju u Evropi što porast nasilja opisuju kao niz ‘izolovanih incidenata’. Iz perspektive Srba napadi albanskih nacionalista najvjerovatnije su bili početak pokušaja da prošire svoju teritoriju na račun njihovih hrišćanskih susjeda, počev od najslabijih.

Ovakvi stavovi, zajedno s nasiljem, rizikuju jačanje duboke ambivalentnosti unutar EU o izgledu za ikakvo novo proširenje. Grčki presedan, jedva klasičan primjer za pristupanje Evropi, čini se posebno bitan kad se primijeni na njene sjeverne susjede, koji su slično zaraženi visokim stopama korupcije i nezaposlenosti. A neki u EU su suzdržani zbog očite privrženosti Pravoslavne crkve i njenih pristaša prema Rusiji Vladimira Putina ili zbog brojne muslimanske populacije u regonu.

Ta evropska poimanja djelimično odražavaju neuspjeh lidera na kontinentu da kapitalizuju ponekad spektakularne uspjehe proširenja, za što je Poljska najistaknutiji primjer. Umjesto toga, potrebe domaće politike su navele mnoge evropske lidere da naglase teškoće i istaknu nesupjehe proširenja.

Sa tako hladnim vjetrom sa Zapada malo čudi što je eurofilija počela da popušta u mjestima kao što je Beograd prema nostalgiji za jugoslovenskom erom. “U to vrijeme bili smo poštovani”, rekao mi je jedan srbijanski diplomata u penziji. “Bili smo jedna od velikih zemalja u pokretu nesvrstanih.”

Slični osjećaji očiti su u Bosni, pa čak i u Hrvatskoj, članici EU od 2013. Za vrijeme komunističke ere Jugoslavija je predstavljala oštar kontrast sovjetskom bloku. Ekonomski i socijalno, njenim građanima bilo je daleko bolje nego onim u centralnoj Evropi. Danas, njihova sreća je nestala. Poljska cvjeta, dok se zemlje nasljednice Jugoslavije (sa izuzetkom Slovenije) bore, žrtve nezaliječenih rana iz daleke i nedavne prošlosti – uključujući i cinični atavizam bivšeg jugoslovenskog i srbijanskog predsjednika Slobodana Miloševića u pobjedi i održanju moći.

Prošlo je doba kad je EU izgledala tako daleko, tako nedostižno. Odluka predsjednika Evropske komisije Jean-Claude Junckera da ukine položaj komesara za proširenje vidi se kao uveliko simbolična, ostavljajući mnoge u potrazi za alternativnim modelom. Rusko osvajanje Krima nudi poželjnu temu za ultranacionalističke Srbe koji oplakuju gubitak Kosova u kome je albanska većina. U međuvremenu, ured Gazproma u centru Beograda nudi itekako vidljiv dokaz prisutnosti ruske energije u zemlji.

Istina je, naravno, da ne postoji ‘ruski model’ za Balkan izvan upotrebe brutalne sile. Sve bliže veze sa Evropom ostaju najbolji način da stanovnici regiona i kao i EU da krenu neprijed. U vrijeme oštre ekonomske krize evropski ideali ostaju, uprkos svemu, jedini efikasan protuotrov za zarazni nacionalizam. Za Balkan, kao i za ostatak Evrope, EU je jedina alternativa za budućnost da ne bude gora od najgore prošlosti.

“One must Europeanize the Balkans, in order to avoid the Balkanization of Europe.” I wrote those words with the French political scientist Jacques Rupnik in 1991, just as war was breaking out among Yugoslavia’s successor states. The fighting would last until the end of the decade, claim thousands of lives, and twice require the intervention of NATO (in Bosnia in 1995 and Serbia in 1999).

Nearly a quarter-century later, the Balkans continue to constitute a threat to European peace, just as they did on the eve of World War I and at the end of the Cold War, when Yugoslavia’s implosion led not only to Europe’s first war since 1945, but also to the return of genocidal murder. The recent fighting in Macedonia, which left eight police officers and 14 Albanian militants dead, raises the specter of renewed violence. It is difficult to know whether the bloodshed represents the festering of an old, unhealed wound or something new, a backlash against a majority-Slav government that seems bent on embracing ethnic chauvinism.

What is clear is that the region remains an explosive and confused reality, one capable of threatening Europe’s stability, already on a knife’s edge following Russia’s adventurism in Ukraine. The region is a volatile mix of rising nationalism, deep economic frustration, and disillusionment about progress toward membership in the European Union. The potential for a plunge into chaos obliges us to consider once again how best to handle the Balkan tinderbox.

When I was in Belgrade recently, the gunplay in Macedonia was the talk of the town. Some of my Serbian interlocutors decried the West’s blindness. In particular, they criticized the EU, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe for describing the upsurge in violence as a series of “isolated incidents.” From the Serbs’ perspective, attacks by Albanian nationalists were more likely the beginning of an attempt to enlarge their territory at the expense of their Christian neighbors, beginning with the weakest.

It is views like these that, along with the violence, risk reinforcing the deep ambivalence within the EU about the prospect of any new enlargement. The precedent of Greece, hardly a poster child for European accession, seems especially relevant when applied to its northern neighbors, which are similarly plagued with high rates of corruption and unemployment. And some in the EU are put off by the seeming affinity of the Orthodox Church and its adherents toward Vladimir Putin’s Russia, or by the region’s large Muslim population.

These European apprehensions partly reflect failure by the continent’s leaders to capitalize on the sometimes-spectacular successes of enlargement, Poland being the most notable example. Instead, the exigencies of domestic politics have induced many European leaders to underscore the difficulties and accentuate the failures of expansion.

With such a cold wind blowing from the West, it is little wonder that Europhilia has begun to give way in places like Belgrade to a pining nostalgia for the Yugoslav era. “At that time, we were respected,” was how a retired Serbian diplomat put it to me. “We were one of the Great countries of the Non-Aligned Movement.”

Similar sentiments are evident in Bosnia, and even in Croatia, an EU member since 2013. During the communist era, Yugoslavia provided a sharp contrast with the Soviet bloc. Economically and socially, its citizens were far better off than those of Central Europe. Today, their fortunes have flipped. Poland is booming, while Yugoslavia’s successor states (with the exception of Slovenia) are struggling, victims of the unhealed wounds of the distant and recent past – including former Yugoslav and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević’s cynical atavism in winning and maintaining power.

It has been years since the EU looked so distant, so aloof. The decision by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker to abolish the post of Commissioner for Enlargement has been seen as highly symbolic, leaving many in search of an alternative model. The Russian re-conquest of Crimea provides a gleeful talking point for ultra-nationalist Serbs bemoaning the loss of Albanian-majority Kosovo. Meanwhile, the Gazprom office in central Belgrade offers a large, visible proof of Russia’s energy presence in the country.

The truth, of course, is that there is no “Russian model” for the Balkans beyond the use of brute force. Ever-closer ties with Europe remain the best way forward for the region’s residents and the EU alike. In a time of severe economic crisis, European ideals remain, in spite of everything, the only efficient antidote to virulent nationalism. For the Balkans, as for the rest of Europe, the EU is the only alternative to a future as bad as the worst of the past.