Dr Florian Bieber:

Sjećanja po nacionalnim linijama: Šta nije u redu sa komemoracijom žrtava bosanskog rata

Mjesta kao Potočari će postojati i imati svoj razlog postojanja i veliki je značaj i važnost da na jednom takvom događaju političari iskreno priznaju zločine koje su počinili pripadnici nečije zajednice (a ne kao što je Vučić učinio prvo zabranivši javne komemoracije u Beogradu a onda se usprotivio rezoluciji Vijeća sigurnosti UN što je dovelo do ruskog veta). Ipak, bez zajedničkih mjesta za komemoraciju postoji opasnost da će sjećanje na prošlost samo pojačati podjele i prihvatiti i naglasiti kategorizaciju žrtava i počinitelja u jasno definisanim etnonacionalnim grupama.

16.07.2015.

Dr Florian Bieber:

Remembering along national lines: What is going wrong with the commemoration the victims of the Bosnian war

Places like Potočari will exist and have their raison d’etre, and there is great significance and importance for honest acknowledgement of crimes committed by members of one’s own community by politicians at such event (not as Vučic did by first trying to block public commemorations in Belgrade and then opposing the UNSC resolution that led to the Russian veto). Yet, without common places of commemoration there is a risks that the remembering of the past will just reinforce divisions and accept and invigorate the categorization of victims and perpetrators into neatly defined ethnonational groups.

16.07.2015.

Kad se dvadeseta godišnjica genocida u Srebrenici pretvorila u spektakl nakon što je ljuta gomila nasrnula ugledavši Aleksandra Vučića na komemoraciji, bilo je jasno da postoji dublji problem sa javnim obilježavanjma rata u Bosni ili Hrvatskoj. Sva mjesta komemoracije spomen su na mjesta – kao što su Potočari ili Vukovar - gdje su posebno stradali pripadnici jedne nacije. Ceremonije, simboli, komemoracije su nacionalnog i često vjerskog karaktera i pojačavaju kategorije ubistava počinjenih nad njihovim žrtvama. Ljudi su umrli kao Hrvati, Bošnjaci ili Srbi, a ne zato što su majke, sinovi, inžinjeri ili ljubitelji životinja. Međutim, da li to znači da ih treba isključivo pamtiti kao takve? Jasna vjerska dimenzija Potočara takođe čini muslimanima muslimane (kao nacionalna kategorija) koji su bili ubijeni zato što su muslimani, ali su mogli biti i ateisti ili agnostici, kao svuda gdje su memorijalna obilježja bivše Jugoslavije.

Ovo ima dvije negativne posljedice. Prvo, ne postoji jedno zajedničko mjesto za sjećanje na civilne žrtve ubijene zbog njihove etničke pripadnosti, bez obzira jesu li bili Srbi, Bošnjaci ili Hrvati. Ovo bi se olakšalo kad bi se našao prostor za zajedničko sjećanje i prihvatanje. Umjesto toga, sjećanje na jednu skupinu žrtava je politička izjava s posebnim tvrdnjama i tako se vidi kao podrška jednoj ili drugoj priči. Drugo, ovo je učinilo da se komemoracija žrtava vidi kao dio nacionalnog projekta i pripovijesti, tako da se ubistvo srpskih civila u Kravici koristi da umanji ili relativizira žrtve Srebrenice. Ali to nije jedini primjer gdje ubistvo civila jedne nacije služi da ojača priču o nacionalnoj nevinosti i stradanju.

As the 20th anniversary of the genocide in Srebrenica has turned into a spectacle over the angry crowd towards the presence of Aleksandar Vučić at the commemoration, there is a deeper problem with the public commemoration of the Bosnian or Croatian war. All sites of commemoration remember places where members of one nation was particularly victimized, by it Potočari or Vukovar. The ceremonies, the symbols, the commemorations are national and often religious and reinforce the categories the murders imposed on their victims. People died as Croats, Bosniaks or Serbs, not for being mothers, sons, engineers or animal lovers. However, does this mean that they should be exclusively be remembered as such? The distinct religious dimension of Potočari also makes Muslims of Muslims (as a national category) who were killed for being Muslims, but who might have been atheists or agnostics, as elsewhere across the memorial landscape of former Yugoslavia.

This has had two negative consequences. First, there is no common space to remember civilian victims killed for their ethnicity, no matter whether they were Serbs, Bosniaks or Croats. This would make it easier to find space for the shared remembering and acknowledgement. Instead, remembering one set of victims is a political statement about particular claims and thus seen as supporting one or the other narrative. Second, it has made the commemoration of victims as part of nationalist projects and narratives, thus the killing of Serb civilians in Kravica is used to downplay or relativize the victims of Srebrenica. But this is not the only example where the killing of ones own civilians serves to reinforce narratives of national innocence and victimhood.

Naravno, neki bi mogli reći kako postoji rizik da bi zajedničko sjećanje na civilne žrtve moglo dovesti do zaborava ili umanjilo činjenicu da su najveće žrtve u bosanskom ratu bili bosanski muslimani i podržati priču o jednakoj odgovornosti svih strana u sukobu. Ovo bi svakako bilo pogrešno. Prema Bosanskoj knjizi mrtvih, od blizu 40.000 civilnih žrtava, oko 83 % su bili muslimani-Bošnjaci, oko 10 % Srbi i 5.5 % Hrvati. Jasno je da primarnu odgovornost za ratne zločine i civilne žrtve snosi vojska bosanskih Srba, ali to ne treba da isključi priznanje i drugih civilnih žrtava u sukobu od kojih su mnoge bile izložene etničkom čišćenju.

Mjesta kao Potočari će postojati i imati svoj razlog postojanja i veliki je značaj i važnost da na jednom takvom događaju političari iskreno priznaju zločine koje su počinili pripadnici nečije zajednice (a ne kao što je Vučić učinio prvo zabranivši javne komemoracije u Beogradu a onda se usprotivio rezoluciji Vijeća sigurnosti UN što je dovelo do ruskog veta). Ipak, bez zajedničkih mjesta za komemoraciju postoji opasnost da će sjećanje na prošlost samo pojačati podjele i prihvatiti i naglasiti kategorizaciju žrtava i počinitelja u jasno definisanim etnonacionalnim grupama.

Of course, the risk, some might argue, of a common commemoration of civilian victims might risk forgetting or downplaying that most victims in the Bosnian war were Bosnian Muslims and support a narrative of equal responsibility of all parties to the conflict. This certainly would be a mistake (according to the Bosnian Book of the Dead, of the nearly 40,000 civilian victims, around 83% were Muslims-Bosniaks, around 10% Serbs and 5.5% Croats) . There is a clear primary burden for war crimes and civilian victims with the Bosnian Serb army, but that should not preclude the ability to acknowledge the other civilian victims of the conflict of which many were also subject of ethnic cleansing.

Places like Potočari will exist and have their raison d’etre, and there is great significance and importance for honest acknowledgement of crimes committed by members of one’s own community by politicians at such event (not as Vučic did by first trying to block public commemorations in Belgrade and then opposing the UNSC resolution that led to the Russian veto). Yet, without common places of commemoration there is a risks that the remembering of the past will just reinforce divisions and accept and invigorate the categorization of victims and perpetrators into neatly defined ethnonational groups.

Florian Bieber je professor studija za jugoistočnu Evropu i direktor Centra studija za jugoistočnu Evropu na Univerzitetu Graz, u Austriji. Studirao je na Trinity Collegeu (USA), Univerzitetu u Beču i Centralno-evropskom univerzitetu i doktorirao na političkim naukama na Bečkom Univerzitetu. Između 2001. i 2006. radio je u Beogradu (Srbija) i Sarajevu (Bosna i Hercegovina) za Evropski centar za pitanja manjina. On je gostujući professor na Programu za studije nacionalizma na Centralno-evropskom univerzitetu, a predavao je na Univerzitetu Kent, Cornell Univerzitetu, Univerzitetu u Bolonji i Univerzitetu u Sarajevu.

Florian Bieber is a Professor of Southeast European Studies and director of the Centre for Southeast European Studies at the University of Graz, Austria. He studied at Trinity College (USA), the University of Vienna and Central European University, and received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Vienna. Between 2001 and 2006 he worked in Belgrade (Serbia) and Sarajevo (Bosnia & Hercegovina) for the European Centre for Minority Issues. He is a Visiting Professor at the Nationalism Studies Program at Central European University and has taught at the University of Kent, Cornell University, the University of Bologna and the University of Sarajevo.

Ovaj tekst je prvobitno objavljen na Florian Bieber blogu (11.07.2015).

[prevod: Dijalog BiH2.0]

This article was originally published on Florian Bieber blog (11.07.2015).

Odgovornost za informacije i gledišta iznesena u ovom članku, isključivo leži na autorima i nužno ne odražavaju mišljenje urednika Dialogue - BiH2.0 – Dijalog, njegovog savjetodavnog odbora, Tufts univerziteta, partnera, pobornika i donatora.

Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Dialogue - BiH2.0 - Dijalog Editors, its Advisory Board, Tufts University, Partners, Supporters and Donors.}

DIALOGUE - BIH2.0 - DIJALOG je posvećena promociji otvorenog pristupa politici, informacijama i djelovanju vlasti, na prostoru Bosne i Hercegovine.
DIALOGUE - BIH2.0 - DIJALOG is committed to promoting Open Policy, Open Information, and Open Government across Bosnia-Herzegovina.

© DIALOGUE - BIH2.0 - DIJALOG (2015)