EU je poduzela novu BiH inicijativu koja obećava “konkretne poteze i prijedloge” u narednim sedmicama kako bi pomogla liderima u zemlji da organizuju vladu koja govori “jednim glasom” o pitanjima integracije u EU. Bez puno riječi ovo je poziv vlastima u BiH da započnu reforme pod uvjetima Daytonskog ustava, Annex 4, Član III. 5 koji kaže:

“Bosna i Hercegovina će preuzeti odgovornost za pitanja za koja se dogovore entiteti … ili su potrebna da se sačuva suverenitet, teritorijalni integritet, politička nezavisnost i međunarodni karakter Bosne i Hercegovine, u skladu sa podjelom odgovornosti između institucija Bosne i Hercegovine. Ako je potrebno mogu se uspostaviti dodatne institucije da sprovedu takve dužnosti.”

Sa traženjem “jednog glasa” pokušalo se i prije Aprilske i Butmirske inicijative o reformi ustava. Ovog puta se, međutim, radi o tome da EU poziva BiH da preduzme takav napor bez direktnog angažmana EU ili međunarodne zajednice u lokalnom procesu reforme. Kao što je komesar Johannes Hahn izjavio na prošlonedjeljnoj press konferenciji EU u Sarajevu, “princip EU je o suverenosti svake države da odluči o svom uređenju. Ali mora biti jasno – da bi sarađivali sa nama znači da postoji jedan glas. Međutim, vi se slažete o ovom jednom glasu, ali mi očekujemo jedan glas … I stoga, kako god da se organizujete to je do vas, ali što se tiče nas, da bismo napredovali u našem uzajamnom kretanju jedni prema drugima, trebamo strukturu koja odlučuje u zemlji koja dozvoljava da se donesu potrebne odluke i postigne potreban napredak.”

Uz “konkretne poteze i prijedloge” EU nudi raspored za ispunjenje ove strukturalne reforme, uz cijenu i korist zavisno od ishoda. EU se takođe povezala sa nevladinim organizacijama u nadi da će podstaći veće učešće civilnog društva u cilju reformi.

U svjetlu toga inicijativa EU izgleda kao veoma pažljivo zaokružena jump-start inicijativa smišljena da pokrene neprekidan reformski proces u zemlji unutar SAA okvira. Vrijedi pokušati. Pitanje je, ako je ovo plan A, da li postoji i plan B ako predhodni ne uspije? Postavljam ovo pitanje zato što je jasno da će EU uraditi svoj dio da pokrene plan A – posebno s toliko obećanih poteza i prijedloga. Ali zašto EU vjeruje da su političke partije u BiH spremne da urade svoj dio, čak i ako je uključeno civilno društvo? Zar nisu prepoznali staru matricu po kojoj se politički lideri sastaju sa zvaničnicima EU i kažu sve prave stvari, samo da bi vratili status quo bez rezultata politiku čim se sastanak završi? (Desilo se to prošle nedjelje poslije press konferencije.) I zašto EU vjeruje da će cijena i korist koje iznosi biti dovoljno snažni da se pokrene nova dinamika traženja konsenzusa među političarima u BiH? Tačno je da smo na ovom putu bili i ranije: to je put gdje EU izražava nadu i optimizam da će politički lideri djelovati odgovorno i preuzeti “vlasništvo” nad toliko potrebnim naporom za reformu.

Sigurno postoji iskrena potreba za manje cinizma i više optimizma o političkojiI ustavnoj kulturi BiH. Izborni rezultati, uključujući nisku izlaznost, pokazali su da narod u BiH nije sretan sa radom njihovih izabranih dužnosnika i da želi stvarnu društvenu, ekonomsku i političku promjenu. I da, moramo priznati, političke partije to vide. Narod u BiH takođe želi veći angažman EU i ulaganje u gradnji bolje i svjetlije budućnosti njihove zemlje.

Problem, kao i uvijek, jeste da strukture u BiH obeshrabruju stvarnu promjenu, što znači da čak i najmanje reforme, da bi bile efikasne, moraju biti više od onog što će minimalno zadovoljiti EU. Znamo da EU želi da BiH bude ekonomski stabilnija, demokratska i manje etnički ispresijecana nego što je danas; samo što nema isti osjećaj hitnosti o tim stvarima kao što ima narod u BiH. Ima mudrosti u tome što se ide pažljivo i polako, ali EU treba da prepozna kad korak može biti suviše oprezan da bi postigla svoje političke ciljeve, jer nema mnogo vremena za gubljenje sa BiH.

Stoga, kad EU ističe svoje konkretne poteze i prijedloge treba da ima na umu sljedeće:

• Nije vjerovatno da će se postići stvaranje strukturalnog mehanizma koji će dozvoliti BiH da govori jednim glasom jednim jednostavnim ili brzim potezom. Skoro svaki prijedlog koji se ponudi imaće indirektne posljedice na vladajuće institucije u cjelini. Ono što je nekolicina prepoznala – uključujući i one koji su glasali protiv – sa Aprilskim paketom iz 2006 (kao i sljedećim, Butmirskim) da je prošao, uticao bi na cijeli Daytonski sporazum.

• Vrijeme je za sve političke partije u BiH da priznaju ono što su razumni i obazrivi ljudi izvan politike već odavno prepoznali: da se u Bosni ne može efikasno vladati u sadašnjem obliku i da nikad neće biti tretirana kao funkcionalna suverena država sve dok ostaje ovakva kakva jeste - i što je čak važnije, dalje rasparčavanje ili razbijanje BiH učiniće stvari još gorim. EU treba da sve ovo učini jasnim i prema tome djeluje u oblikovanju svoje politike prema BiH.

• BiH nije u potpunosti suverena a EU i međunarodna zajednica su umiješane u tu realnost s dobrim razlogom. I tako svaki argument kojim se tvrdi da se EU ne angažuje u definisanju struktura suverene zemlje ograničava relevantnost EU odnosa sa BiH.

• BiH više nije samo regionalno pitanje nego je u prvom planu novog geo-političkog prestrojavanja između Istoka I Zapada.

Nova EU inicijativa o BiH je dobrodošla. Nadajmo se da zbir njenih dijelova odgovara stepenu problema koji dotiče. Traženje “jednog glasa” se nastavlja.

The EU has launched a new BiH initiative which promises “concrete steps and proposals” in the coming weeks to assist the country’s leaders in organizing a government that speaks with “one voice” on matters of EU integration. Without saying as much, this is a call for BiH authorities to enact reforms under the terms of the Dayton Constitution, Annex 4, Article III.5 which states that:

“Bosnia and Herzegovina shall assume responsibility for such matters as are agreed upon by the entities…or are necessary to preserve the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with the division of responsibilities between the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additional institutions may be established as necessary to carry out such responsibilities.”

The search for “one voice” has been attempted before with the April and Butmir constitutional reform initiatives. The difference this time round is that the EU is calling on BiH to undertake such an effort without direct EU or international community engagement in a local reform process. As Commissioner Johannes Hahn put it in last week’s EU Sarajevo news conference, “it’s a principle of the EU that is also about [the] sovereignty of each state to decide its own structures. But it must be clear - to interact with us means that there is one voice. However, you agree on this one voice, but we expect one voice… So however you organise yourself it’s up to you, but for us, in order to make progress in our mutual move towards each other, we need a decision making structure in the country which allows to take the necessary decisions and to make the necessary progress.”

In addition to “concrete steps and proposals,” the EU is putting forward a timetable for the completion of this structural reform, and attaching both costs and benefits depending on the outcome. The EU has also engaged with NGOs in hopes of encouraging greater civil society participation in the reform effort.

On the face of it, the EU initiative looks like a very carefully circumscribed jump-start initiative designed to launch a sustained domestic reform process within the SAA framework. It is worth a try. The question is, if this is Plan A, is there a Plan B if the former doesn’t work? I raise the question because while it is clear that the EU will do its part to make Plan A work—especially with the much welcomed promised steps and proposals. But why does the EU believe that the BiH political parties are prepared to do their part, even with the inclusion of civil society? Haven’t they recognized the past pattern in which political leaders meet with EU officials and say all the right things, only to return to the status quo zero-sum politics once the meeting has ended? (It happened last week after the news conference). And what makes the EU confident that the costs and benefits it is putting forward are sufficiently robust to foster a new consensus-seeking dynamic among BiH politicians? In truth, we’ve been down this path before: it’s the one where the EU expresses hope and optimism that the political leaders will act responsibly and take “ownership” of a much needed reform effort.

To be sure, there is a genuine need for less cynicism and more optimism about the political and constitutional culture of BiH. The election results, including the low turnout, demonstrated that the people of BiH are unhappy with the performance of their elected officials and want real social, economic, and political change. And, to be fair, the political parties were not blind to this. The people of BiH also want more EU engagement and investment in building a better and brighter future for their country.

The problem, as ever, is that the structures of BiH discourage real change, which means that even the most minimal reforms, to be effective, have to be more than about what will minimally satisfy the EU. We know that the EU wants BiH to be more economically stable, democratic and less ethnically crisscrossed than it is today; it just doesn’t have the same sense of urgency about these things that the people of BiH do. There is wisdom in moving carefully and slowly, but the EU needs to recognize when the pace might be too cautious to achieve its policy objectives, not least because there is no longer much time to waste with BiH.

Hence, when the EU puts forward its concrete steps and proposals for BiH, it should keep in mind the following:

• Creating a structural mechanism that will allow BiH to speak with one voice is not likely to be achieved by a simple or quick fix. Almost any proposal that’s put forward will have a knock-on effect on the governing institutions as a whole. What few people recognized—including those who voted against it—with the April 2006 Package (and its successor, Butmir) is that, if passed, it would have had an impact on the entire Dayton Agreement.

• It is time for all the political parties in BiH to recognize what rational and thoughtful people outside of politics have recognized for a long time: that BiH is not effectively governable in its present form, and will never be treated as a functional sovereign state as long as it remains as it is. Even more importantly, further atomizing or breaking up BiH will make things worse. The EU needs to make all this clear and act accordingly in shaping its policy toward BiH.

• BiH is not fully sovereign, and the EU and IC generally is implicated in that reality for good reason. So any argument claiming that the EU does not engage in defining the structures of a sovereign state has limited relevance for the EU’s relations with BiH.

• BiH is no longer just a regional issue but at the forefront of a new Geo-Political realignment between East and West.

The new EU initiative on BiH is welcome. Let us hope that the sum of its parts is appropriate to the scale of the problem it is tackling. The search for “one-voice” continues.