Ovo je nedvojbeno dobra vijest za svakog čiji je stav da će demokratija, prosperitet i etnički sklad uzeti posljednje ostatke iz bivše Jugoslavije tek kad sve zemlje koje su nastale iz njenog pada, kao i susjedna Allbanija, budu punopravne članice EU.

Ali odluka EU da odobri pristupanje Bosne, donesena 16. marta, mora se sagledati spram krize u Ukrajini. Sa rusko-zapadnim odnosima u njihovom najgorem obliku od kraja komunizma, Kremlj je jasno pokazao tokom protekle godine da namjerava ojačati svoj uticaj na Balkanu. Inicijativa EU je signal da to evropske vlade potiskuju.

Prirodno, trebaće dugo vremena prije nego što Bosna bude u poziciji, u okviru ekonomskog učinka i administrativnog kapaciteta, da se pridruži EU. Osim toga, Jean-Claude Juncker, predsjednik Evropske komisije, je isključio svako proširenje EU tokom njegovog petogodišnjeg mandata, koji će se okončati 2019.

Ali ako bude dugoročnog napretka u Bosni prema političkom I etničkom pomirenju između Bošnjaka, bosanskih Srba i bosanskih Hrvata, mogućnost za članstvo u EU mora izgledati stvarna, ne vječna fatamorgana, ljudima sve tri nacionalnosti. Kad je najavljivao pauzu u proširenju, Juncker je trebao više učiniti da naglasi pozitivnu viziju EU za Bosnu.

Desilo se da je palo na britansku i njemačku vladu da se potrude da ubijede stranačke političare u Bosni da se opredijele za paket reformi koji će dopustiti da EU odobri sporazum o pridruživanju. (Ovo je, uostalom, pokazalo da britanska diplomatija u Evropi nije sasvim paralizovana, kako to neki kritičari ističu.) Bosanske reforme obuhvataju područja kao što su antikorupcijske mjere, efikasnost vlade, pomirenje među ratnim neprijateljima, ekonomska stabilizacija i otvaranje radnih mjesta.

Neizbježno je da se pojave sumnje u to koliko su neki političari u Bosni spremni za implementaciju tih reformi. Kao što je Edward Ferguson, britanski ambasador u Sarajevu, napisao u svom blogu prošle sedmice: “Nisam naivan. Znam da je bilo mnogo inicijativa u prošlosti koje su propale. Neki ljudi su uveliko investirali u status quo.”

Istakao bih da se ovo posebno odnosi na Milorada Dodika, lidera bosanskih Srba. Godinama je posvećen diskreditovanju kompleksnog sistema decentralizovane vlade, balansirajući interese tri nacionalnosti, kako je to uspostavljeno Dejtonskim sporazumom.

Ne zaboravimo da je Dodik prošle godine požurio da pozdravi rusku aneksiju Krima u Ukrajini. Na isti način Dodik sanja o secesiji Republike Srpske (entitet bosanskih Srba) od Bosne.

Nijedna vlada u Beogradu sa ambicijama za članstvo u EU ne bi smjela podržati takav korak. Izgleda da je sadašnja srbijanska vlada, iako nevoljka da se priključi EU u nametanju sankcija Rusiji zbog njene intervencije u Ukrajini, snažno opredijeljena u razgovorima o njenom pridruženju u EU.

Što se tiče Rusije, nema sumnje da će učiniti sve da postavi prepreke na putu u EU Bosni, Srbiji i drugim državama u regionu, kao što su Makedonija i Crna Gora.

Ali, ako to ne uspije, Moskva svakako ima Plan B - da razvije ruski uticaj u tim zemljama na takav način da će, kad jednom postanu članice EU, barem neke od njih djelovati, ponekad, promoskovski. Za ovo su primjer Kipar i Grčka.

This is unambiguously good news for everyone who takes the view that democracy, prosperity and ethnic harmony will only take lasting roots in former Yugoslavia once all the states that emerged from its collapse, as well as neighbouring Albania, are full EU members.

But the EU’s decision to approve Bosnia’s association accord, taken on March 16, must be seen against the backdrop of the Ukraine crisis. With Russian-western relations in their worst shape since the end of communism, the Kremlin has made clear over the past year that it intends to ramp up its influence in the Balkans. The EU initiative is a signal that European governments are pushing back.

Naturally, it will be a long time before Bosnia will be in a position, in terms of economic performance and administrative capacity, to join the EU. Besides, Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission president, has ruled out any EU enlargement at all over his five-year term, which will end in 2019.

But if there is to be long-term progress in Bosnia towards political and ethnic reconciliation among Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, the prospect of EU membership must seem real, not an ever-receding mirage, to people of all three nationalities. When announcing his pause on enlargement, Juncker should have done more to emphasise a positive EU vision for Bosnia.

In the event, it fell to the British and German governments to lead the effort to persuade Bosnia’s factious politicians to commit themselves to a reform package that would allow the EU to approve the association accord. (This was a sign, by the way, that British diplomacy in Europe is not quite as paralysed as some critics make out.) The Bosnian reforms cover areas such as anti-corruption measures, government efficiency, reconciliation among wartime enemies, economic stabilisation and job creation.

Inevitably, there will be doubts about how sincere some of Bosnia’s politicians are about implementing these reforms. As Edward Ferguson, the British ambassador to Sarajevo,wrote last week in a blog: “I’m not naïve. I know that there have been many initiatives in the past that have failed. Some people are heavily invested in the status quo.”

I would submit that this point applies with particular force to Milorad Dodik, the Bosnian Serb leader. He has devoted many years to the cause of discrediting the complex system of decentralised government, balancing the interests of the three nationalities, that was set up under the Dayton accord.

Let us not forget that Dodik was quick last year to welcome Russia’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. In much the same way, Dodik dreams of arranging the secession of RepublikaSrpska (the Bosnian Serb entity) from Bosnia.

No government in Belgrade with EU membership ambitions could support such a step. The present Serbian government, though reluctant to join the EU in imposing sanctions on Russia for its intervention in Ukraine, seems strongly committed to its EU accession talks.

As for Russia, it will no doubt do its best to put obstacles on the EU entry route for Bosnia, Serbia and other states in the region, such as Macedonia and Montenegro.

But, if that doesn’t work, Moscow’s Plan B is surely to deploy Russian influence in these states in such a way that, once they are EU members, at least some of them will act, sometimes, in a pro-Moscow manner. For this, there are precedents – Cyprus and Greece.