Veoma mi je drago što sam ovdje i što sam u prilici da se priključim svima vama u razmišljanju o ‘Prošlosti Bosne i njenoj evropskoj budućnosti’. To je tema koja mi je očito bliska i želim da podijelim moju perspektivu o događajima prije i poslije Dejtona. Teško mi je da povjerujem da je 23 godine otkako sam došla u Ujedinjene nacije kao stalna predstavnica Sjedinjenih Država.

Većina, ako ne i svi, moji redovni studenti u Džordžtaunu nisu bili još ni rođeni – te se tako kad govorim o počecima 1990-ih, ponekad osjećam kao da pričam o drevnoj istoriji. Naravno, za mene su sjećanja i te kako živa. Bilo je to vrijeme intenzivne aktivnosti. Hladni rat se završio, ali samo da bi uslijedio niz malih vrućih ratova a svijet je očekivao od UN da ih riješi.

Jedan od tih ratova vodio se u Jugoslaviji koja je uvijek bila dio mog života. Kao dijete, živjela sam tamo, moj brat je rođen tamo, a moj otac – čehoslovački diplomata – služio je tamo dva puta. Kasnije je napisao knjigu o Titovoj Jugoslaviji, koju je posvetio narodu te zemlje.

U vrijeme kad sam stigla u Njujork, počeo je raspad Jugoslavije koju je moj otac poznavao i koju sam ja takođe vidjela i studirala. Trebalo je da to bude vrijeme – u svjetlu raspada Sovjetskog Saveza – proslave novog rođenja slobode u Evropi. Umjesto toga, pune četiri godine, počev 1991, svijet je bio svjedok ubistava civila, paljenja sela, granatiranja stanova, razaranja vjerskih objekata i epizoda masovnog silovanja.

U početku, i Evropa i prva Bushova administracija gledali su na konflikt kao problem koji treba da riješe Evropljani. Ali to se nije desilo.

Umjesto toga diplomati su neumorno jurili tamo amo dogovarajući obustave vatre koje se nisu držale i nagovješćujući mir koji nije dolazio. Ti napori su bili naglašeni teorijom – rasprostranjenoj u cijeloj Evropi – da je besciljno, kad narodi na Balkanu jednom počnu da ubijaju jedni druge, pokušavati zaustaviti ih.

Istorijski, veliki dio Evrope identifikovao se prvo sa katoličkim Hrvatima, drugo sa pravoslavnim Srbima i treće, ako uopšte, sa muslimanima. Nikome se nije dopala ideja da se digne oružje u ime opkoljene muslimanske populacije u Bosni. Kao rezultat, neefikasni diplomatski napori bili su praćeni jednako neefikasnom mirovnom misijom UN. Lako naoružane trupe iz desetina zemalja – ali ne i Sjedinjenih Država - upućene su u region, sa instrukcijama da ne staju ni na čiju stranu ili da nikog ne naljute.

Prisustvo UN pomoglo je da se osigura prolaz humanitarnih konvoja, ali nije ništa učinilo da zaustavi rat. Jedan od prvih koraka Vijeća sigurnosti bio je da uvede embargo na dostavu oružja svim stranama. Namjera je bila da se smanji nasilje, ali je postignut efekat favorizovanja bosanskih Srba koji su imali pristup oružju, i u Bosni i iz Beograda. Embargo je ostavio muslimane pod opsadom i bez sredstava da se zaštite. Ovo je bila situacija koju je zatekla Clintonova administracija kad je došla na vlast.

I am very pleased to be here and to be able to join you all in reflecting on “Bosnia’s Past and Its European Future.” It is a topic that is obviously close to my heart, and I want to begin by sharing my own perspective on events before and after Dayton. It is hard for me to believe that it has been 23 years since I arrived at the United Nations as the permanent representative of the United States.

Most, if not all, of my undergraduate students at Georgetown weren’t even born yet – so when I talk about the early 1990s, I sometimes feel like I am discussing ancient history.

Of course, for me the memories are quite vivid. It was a time of intense activity. The cold war had ended, only to be succeeded by a series of small hot wars that the world expected the UN to settle.

One of these was in Yugoslavia, which had always been part of my life. As a child, I had lived there, my brother was born there, and my father – a Czechoslovak diplomat – served there twice. He later wrote a book about Tito’s Yugoslavia, which he dedicated to the people of that country.

By the time I arrived in New York, the disintegration of the Yugoslavia my father had known, and that I had also seen and studied, was well under way. This should have been a time – in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union – to celebrate a new birth of freedom in Europe. Instead, for four years, beginning in 1991, the world bore witness to the murder of civilians, the burning of villages, the shelling of apartments, the destruction of religious sites, and episodes of mass rape.

Initially, the conflict was viewed both in Europe and by the first Bush administration as a problem that Europeans alone should solve. But it didn’t happen.

Instead, diplomats shuttled fecklessly back and forth arranging ceasefires that didn’t stick and predicting a peace that didn’t come. These efforts were undercut by the theory – widespread in Europe – that once people in the Balkans started killing each other it was pointless trying to stop them.

Historically, much of Europe had identified first with the Catholic Croats, second with the Orthodox Serbs, and third, if at all, with the Muslims. The idea of taking up arms on behalf of Bosnia’s beleaguered Muslim population went against the grain. As a result, the ineffective diplomatic efforts were accompanied by an equally ineffective UN peacekeeping mission. Lightly armed troops from dozens of countries – but not the United States – were sent to the region, with instructions not to take sides or to get anybody upset.

The UN presence helped to secure passage for relief convoys, but did nothing to stop the war. One of the Security Council’s first steps had been to approve an embargo on weapons deliveries to all sides. This was intended to reduce the violence, but it had the effect of favoring the Bosnian Serbs who had access to arms, both in Bosnia and from Belgrade. The embargo left the Muslims under siege and without the means to protect themselves. This was the situation when the Clinton administration came to office.

Za vrijeme kampanje 1992. kandidat Clinton je zatražio snažniju akciju u Bosni, ali kad je stupio u Bijelu kuću suočio se sa i drugim zahtjevima – uključujući trenutnu krizu oko njegovog zalaganja da se dozvoli homoseksualcima i lezbijkama da služe u vojsci i potrebu da se prvo fokusira na to da izvede zemlju iz recesije. Uostalom, on je vodio kampanju s porukom ‘to je ekonomija, budalo’.

Tako je naš vanjskopolitički tim držao brojne sastanke o Balkanu, tokom kojih smo diskutovali u krugovima. Većina naših vojnih lidera nije željeli da se uključe u Bosnu jer su strahovali da bi se rat tamo mogao razviti pretvoriti u živo blato u stilu Vijetnama. Moj stav je bio drukčiji, možda zato što je i moje porijeklo bilo drukčije. Za mene, najvažniji istorijski presedan nije bio Vijetnam nego Minhen. Kao neko rođen u Čehoslovačkoj, lekcija koja mi je bila usađena jeste da se zlo ne može ublažiti; mora mu se suprotstaviti.

Osjećala sam da naša strategija treba da počne s premisom da je etničko čišćenje neprihvatljivo i da smo obavezni da uradimo sve što je potrebno da se to okonča. Takođe sam osjećala da je Milošević siledžija koji će pasti ako mu se suprotstavi. Problem za mene je što, kao ambasador UN, nisam imala isti stav kao državni sekretar i sekretar za odbranu. Osim toga, bila sam relativno nova u poslu, civil i, povrh svega, žena.

Tokom sedmica, matrica se razvijala. Bosanski Srbi će uraditi nešto nečuveno. Tražila bih vojnu akciju, često uz podršku podpredsjednika Gorea. Administracija bi se nerado složila, ali bi Pentagon preporučio ograničen odgovor, koji su dalje slabili naši saveznici a onda i Ujedinjene nacije kao dio aranžmana dvostrukog ključa sa NATO-om koji je uspostavilo Vijeće sigurnosti. Kao rezultat, reagovali smo na ukupne zločine, ako i uopšte, s ograničenim vojnim akcijama, uključujući zračne napade na skladišta oružja, komandna mjesta i avione bosanskih Srba.

Po mom sudu, to je bilo beskorisno. To nije ni zaustavljalo ubijanja, niti završavalo rat. Tako smo se borili s velikim brojem fundamentalnih dilema u našoj politici. Nismo imali glasove u Vijeću sigurnosti za podizanje embarga na oružje. Nismo željeli da prihvatimo nagodbu o miru koja bi nagradila etničko čišćenje.

I nismo bili voljni da preduzimamo veće akcije protiv Srba iz straha da bi se mogla prekinuti obustava humanitarne pomoći i intenzivirati nasilje protiv opkoljenih gradova kao Sarajevo, Goražde i Srebrenica. Ovo se desilo 1994 . i ponovo u proljeće 1995. kad su Bosanski Srbi zarobili mirovnjake UN i vezali ih za bandere kao štit protiv napada NATO-a.

S ulaskom u ljeto 1995. suočili smo se s razvojem situacije na terenu. Prvo, hrvatske snage – potpomognute američkim programom obuke i opreme – povratile su dio teritorije koju su bile uzele lokalnie srpske snage potpomognute Beogradom. Drugo, američki diplomatski napori počeli su da stvaraju podjele između režima u Beogradu koji je htio da se oslobodi sankcija, i bosanskih Srba. Ali treće – u neželjenom razvoju – mirovna misija UN bila je pod ogromnim stresom. Zaključila sam da neće preživjeti još jednu bosansku zimu. Tako smo se suočili sa izgledom da američke trupe uđu u Bosnu kako bi pomogle mirovnjacima da odu – što bi značilo da će narod u Bosni ostati bez međunarodnog prisustva.

During the 1992 campaign, candidate Clinton had called for stronger action in Bosnia, but once in the White House he faced competing demands – including an immediate crisis over his pledge to allow gay and lesbian individuals to serve in the military and the necessity of focusing first on getting the country out of recession. After all, he had campaigned on a message of “it’s the economy, stupid.”

So our foreign policy team held numerous meetings on the Balkans, during which we argued in circles. Most of our military leaders didn’t want to get involved in Bosnia because they feared that it might develop into a Vietnam-style quagmire. My attitude was different, perhaps because my background was different. To me, the historical precedent that mattered most was not Vietnam, but Munich. As a native of Czechoslovakia, the lesson had been drilled into me that evil could not be appeased; it must be opposed.

I felt that our strategy should begin with the premise that ethnic cleansing was unacceptable and that we had an obligation to do what was necessary to bring it to an end. I also felt that Milosevic was a bully who would back down if confronted. The problem for me is that, as UN ambassador, I did not have quite the same standing as the Secretaries of State and Defense. In addition, I was relatively new in the job, a civilian and, on top of that, a woman.

As the weeks passed, a pattern developed. The Bosnian Serbs would do something outrageous. I would press for military action, often with the support of Vice-President Gore. The administration would reluctantly agree, but the Pentagon would recommend a limited response, which was further weakened by our allies, and then by the United Nations as part of the dual key arrangement with NATO established by the Security Council. As a result, we reacted to wholesale atrocities, if at all, with limited military actions –including strikes on ammunition dumps, command outposts, and Bosnian Serb aircraft.

In my judgment, this was useless. It wasn’t putting a stop to the killing or ending the war. So we were struggling with a number of fundamental dilemmas in our policy. We didn’t have the votes in the Security Council to lift the arms embargo. We didn’t want to accept a peace settlement that would reward ethnic cleansing.

And we were reluctant to take strong action against the Serbs for fear that deliveries of humanitarian aid would be disrupted and that violence against encircled cities like Sarajevo, Goradze, and Srebrenica would intensify. This happened in 1994 and again in the spring of 1995, when UN peacekeepers were captured by Bosnian Serbs and chained to light posts as shields against NATO attacks.

Entering into the summer of 1995, we were facing an evolving situation on the ground. First, Croatian forces – aided by a U.S.-backed train and equip program – had recaptured some territory that had been taken by local Serb forces backed by Belgrade. Second, U.S. diplomatic efforts had started to create divisions between the Belgrade regime, which wanted out from under sanctions, and the Bosnian Serbs. But third – in a troubling development – the UN peacekeeping mission was under enormous stress. I had concluded that it would not survive another Bosnian winter. This left us facing the prospect of U.S. troops having to enter Bosnia in order to help the peacekeepers leave - which would mean the people of Bosnia would be left with no international presence at all.

U julu 1995. bosanski Srbi su riješili ova pitanja za nas podižući nivo nasilja na novi nivo. Jednog jutra, početkom tog mjeseca, počeli smo da dobijamo uznemirujuće izvještaje. Ispostavilo se da srpske snage napadaju grad Srebrenicu, navodno zaštićenu zonu za lokalne muslimane. U to vrijeme nismo bili sigurni šta se tačno dešava. Zatim smo saznali da je holandski mirovni bataljon bio ubijeđen da napusti Srebrenicu i da su žene i djeca iz tog kraja počeli da stižu u izbjegličke kampove. Ali šta se desilo s muškarcima?

Plašili smo se najgoreg, ali su Srbi rekli da su muslimani oslobođeni i vjerovatno lutaju šumama ili se možda kriju kod rodbine u drugom gradu. Nakon višednevnog istraživanja, jedan analitičar je došao do slika na kojima se vidi grupa zatočenika kako stoji u polju. Slike istog polja snimljene nedugo kasnije pokazivale su svježe tragove guma i velike gomile nedavno prekopavane zemlje. Skinuli smo oznaku povjerljivosti sa fotografija i uporedili informaciju sa izjavama preživjelih. Nije prošlo dugo kad smo sklopili priču da je ispričamo svijetu. Što sam i učinila, u Vijeću sigurnostu UN, 10. avgusta 1995.

Bila je to priča o tome kako je više od 7.000 muslimana pobijeno i zakopano u masovnim grobnicama. Razaranje Srebrenice bilo je ubilačko; a za stvar bosanskih Srba pokazalo se kao samoubilačko. Jer su napadi promijenili dinamiku debate unutar naše administracije.

Ministarstvo odbrane, na čelu sa Williamom Perrijem, složilo se da moramo zauzeti čvrst stav. Al Gore, Tony Lake i ja zauzeli smo se za strategiju koja je bila kombinacija diplomatije i prijetnje silom. Prvo smo morali učiniti posljednji napor da ubijedimo bosanske Srbe da pregovaraju o miru na fer osnovama. Drugo, jasno smo dali na znanje da će se Srbi suočiti s vojnim posljedicama ako odbiju da pregovaraju u dobroj vjeri. Hrvatske i bosanske ofanzive vraćale su već teritorije koju su držali Srbi. Odlučili smo da ih NATO ne smije ograničiti nego se pripremiti da interveniše.

Predsjednik Clinton je snažno podržao ovaj pristup i uputio pozive francuskom predsjedniku Chiracu i drugim savezničkim liderima da osigura njihovu podršku. Na dan kad su naši pregovarači stigli u Evropu, Srbi su još jednom prekardašili, granatirajući pijacu u Sarajevu, kad je ubijeno 37 ljudi. Ovog puta nije dolazilo u pitanje kako ćemo reagovati.

30. avgusta, više od 60 aviona, koji su poletjeli sa položaja u Italiji i Jadranu, napali su položaje bosanskih Srba. Pridružila nam se francuska i britanska artiljerija. Ovo je bila do tada najveća NATO borbena akcija. Očito se psihološka ravnoteža pomjerila.

In July 1995, the Bosnian Serbs settled these issues for us by raising the level of violence to a new level. One morning, early that month, we began receiving disturbing reports. It appeared that Serb forces were attacking the town of Srebrenica, supposedly a safe haven for the local Muslims. At the time, we weren’t sure exactly what was happening. Then we found that the Dutch peacekeeping force had been persuaded to leave Srebrenica, and that women and children from the area had begun to arrive in refugee camps. But what had happened to the men?

We feared the worst, but the Serbs said the Muslims had been released and were probably wandering in the woods or perhaps hiding with relatives in another town. After days of searching, a single analyst came across images that appeared to show a group of detainees standing in a field. Pictures of the same field taken not long after showed fresh tire tracks and large areas of recently disturbed earth. We declassified the photos and matched the information to interviews of survivors. Within days, we had a story to tell the world. Which I did, at the UN Security Council, on August 10, 1995.

It was the story of how more than 7,000 Muslims were shot and buried in mass graves. The destruction of Srebrenica was homicidal; for the Bosnian Serb cause, it proved to be suicidal. For the attacks changed the dynamic of debate within our administration.

The Defense Department, headed by William Perry, agreed that we had to take a firmer position. Al Gore, Tony Lake, and I pushed a strategy that combined diplomacy with the threat of force. First, we would make one last effort to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate peace on fair terms. Second, we would make clear that the Serbs would face military consequences if they refused to negotiate in good faith. Croatian and Bosniac offensives were taking back Serb-held land already. We decided that NATO should not constrain them and instead prepare to intervene.

President Clinton strongly endorsed this approach and made calls to French President Chirac and other allied leaders to ensure their support. On the day our negotiators arrived in Europe, the Serbs over-reached one more time, shelling a fresh air market in Sarajevo, killing 37 people. This time, there was no question about how we would react.

On August 30, more than 60 aircraft, flying from positions in Italy and the Adriatic, pounded Bosnian Serb positions. French and British artillery joined in. This was, to that date, the largest NATO combat action ever conducted. Obviously, the psychological balance had shifted.

Naša predstava sile olakšala je diplomatiju, baš kao što je i naša nevoljkost da ranije koristimo silu onemogućila diplomatski uspjeh. Savez je sada bio jednoglasan, predsjednik Clinton odlučan a prepreke da se upotrijebi sila prevaziđene. U isto vrijeme Milošević s brinuo oko popuštanja ekonomskih sankcija koje smo nametnuli Jugoslaviji.

Nakon što je godinu govorio da zahtijeva od bosanskih Srba da se nagode Milošević je stao na čelo srpskog pregovaračkog tima. Sada je on bio odgovoran za ishod. Tokom sedmica naši pregovarači dobili su pristanak za princip da Bosna treba biti sačuvana kao jedinstvena i nezavisna zemlja. NATO će održavati mir a biće uspostavljena međunarodna civilna administracija da bi se uspostavila vlast i ekonomija.

Formalni sporazum o miru dogovoren je u Dejtonu, Ohajo. Desilo se to baš u vrijeme proslave Dana zahvalnosti. Iako je Dejton potvrdio princip jedinstvene Bosne, nikakav komad papira nije mogao brzo zaliječiti ožiljke prošlog sukoba, bilo novijeg ili dalekog. Dejtonski sporazum postavio je ambiciozne ciljeve za održavanje izbora, povratak izbjeglica i ujedinjenje zemlje.

Nažalost, bosanski ratni lideri tražili su da svoju vojnu silu pretvore u političku vlast, tako da je napredak bio krajnje ograničen u prvim mjesecima poslije Dejtona. Vladao je mir, ali ne i rješenje. Očekivanja su dalje bila zamagljena našim obećanjima.

U vrijeme Dejtona Bijela kuća je nastojala da razbije ideju – što su naši kritičari trubili na sav glas – da će Bosna biti drugi Vijetnam, sa otvorenim učešćem američkih vojnika. Tako je administracija najavila da će međunarodne mirovne snage okončati svoju misiju u toku godine i povući se do decembra 1996. Ispostavilo se da je to bilo potpuno nerealno.

Jedan od deset predratnih stanovnika Bosne bili su ranjeni ili ubijeni. Preživjeli, pet od deset raseljeni iz njihovih domova – i njihov povratak neće biti jednostavan; njih osam od devet oslanjalo se na UN za hranu; a devet od deset bili su nezaposleni. Biće potrebno duže od godinu da se Bosanci oporave i krenu sa izgradnjom. Administracija je ovo brzo shvatila i postavila novi rok – juni 1998.

Ovo je bila politika kad sam u januaru prethodne godine postala državni sekretar. Dali smo sebi 18 mjeseci da se završi posao za koji će trebati generacije. Po preuzimanju dužnosti takođe sam znala da ni Jugoslavija ni Hrvatska ne poštuju obaveze. I da našim evropskim saveznicima nedastaje svaki osjećaj hitnosti.

Bilo je sve više promatrača koji su ocijenili da je jedina realna opcija da se Bosna podijeli, da se jedan dio pripoji Srbiji, drugi Hrvatskoj a da treći postane međunarodni protektorat. Po mom mišljenju, nije imalo nikakvog smisla podijeliti Bosnu da bi se sačuvala. To neće stvoriti stabilnost, samo otvoriti novu bitku oko granica. Bilo je odlučeno da učinimo sve što je moguće da se realizuje puno obećanje Dejtonskog sporazuma.

To je značilo da moramo biti spremni da ostanemo dok mir ne postane stalan. Po ovom pitanju došlo je do rascjepa u administraciji. Bill Cohen, koji je naslijedio gospodina Perrija kao sekretar odbrane, predložio je u javnim saopštenjima da očekuje da vidi kako se naša vojska povlači po rasporedu, iako bi to dovelo do nastavka rata. Na kraju smo se svi složili da naš fokus ne treba biti na tome kada treba da napustimo Bosnu nego da se uspije u Bosni.

Our show of force made diplomacy easier, just as our reluctance to use force earlier had made diplomatic success impossible. The Alliance was now united, President Clinton was committed, and the obstacles to using force had been overcome. At the same time, Milosevic was anxious to gain relief from the economic sanctions we had imposed against Yugoslavia.

After a year of saying that he was pressing the Bosnian Serbs to compromise, Milosevic became the head of the Serb negotiating team. Now he was accountable for the outcome. Within weeks, our negotiators had won acceptance of the principle that Bosnia should be preserved as a unified and independent state. NATO would enforce the peace, and an international civilian administration would set about rebuilding the government and the economy.

A formal peace settlement was agreed upon in Dayton, Ohio. Fittingly, it happened just in time for Thanksgiving. Although Dayton affirmed the principle of a unitary Bosnia, no piece of paper could quickly heal the scars of past conflict, whether recent or distant. The Dayton Accords had set ambitious goals for holding elections, returning refugees, and uniting the country.

Unfortunately, Bosnia’s wartime leaders sought to convert their military power into political authority, so progress was extremely limited in the first months after Dayton. There was peace, but no settlement. Prospects were further clouded by our own promises.

At the time of Dayton, the White House was anxious to dispel the notion – trumpeted by our critics – that Bosnia would be another Vietnam, with an open-ended commitment of American troops. Thus, the administration announced that the international peacekeeping force would complete its mission within one year, and withdraw by December 1996. This turned out to be totally unrealistic.

Of Bosnia’s pre-war population, one in ten had been wounded or killed. Of the survivors, five in ten had been displaced from their homes – and repatriating them would be no simple matter; eight in ten were relying on the UN for food; and nine in ten were unemployed. It would take far longer than a year for Bosnians to recover and rebuild. The administration soon realized this, and set a new deadline of June 1998.

This was the policy when I became secretary of state in January of the previous year. We had given ourselves 18 months to finish a job that would take generations. I also knew upon taking office that neither Yugoslavia nor Croatia were living up to their obligations. And our European allies lacked any sense of urgency.

More and more observers concluded that the only realistic option was to slice Bosnia into pieces, with one segment joining Serbia, another Croatia and the third becoming an international protectorate. In my view, dismantling Bosnia in order to save it did not make sense. It wouldn’t create stability; only a new fight over borders. I was determined that we do everything possible to realize the full promise of the Dayton accords.

That meant that we had to be willing to stay until peace became irreversible. On this point, there was a split within the administration. Bill Cohen, who succeeded Mr. Perry as secretary of defense, suggested in public statements that he expected to see our military withdraw on schedule, even if this led to a resumption of war. In the end, we all agreed that our focus should not be on when we would leave Bosnia but on succeeding in Bosnia.

U maju 1997. najavila sam naš novi pristup i odmah odletjela u region – prvo u Hrvatsku a onda u Beograd da se sretnem s Miloševićem, licem u lice. Iz Srbije sam otišla u Bosnu, gdje sam posjetila Sarajevo i u duhu pomirenja postala prvi član američkog kabineta koji je otputovao u Republiku Srpsku.

Na osnovu tog putovanja naša politika se usmjerila na tri cilja. Prvo, da se pobrinemo da se implementira Dejton – posebno njegovi dalekosežni ciljevi da se ljudima dopusti povratak kućama i sklone ratni lideri koji su nastojali da izbjegnu međunarodnu zajednicu. Naš drugi cilj bio je da kristalno jasno pokažemo da nećemo napustiti Bosnu. Ispunili smo ovo u decembru 1997. kad je predsjednik Clinton najavio svoju odluku da će podržati još jednu vojnu smjenu, bez ikakvih rokova. NATO trupe će ostati i naša pomoć će se nastaviti, sve dok Bosna ne bude u stanju da stoji na svojim nogama.

Ovo opredjeljenje bilo je i te kako psihološki važno, jer je omogućilo tolerantnijim i demokratskijim elementima u zemlji da djeluju bez straha da će ih progutati ekstremisti. Znali su da će, i ako izgube jedan krug izbora, imati drugu šansu, pa i treću. Tako je bilo moguće organizovati i graditi dugoročno.

Naposljetku smo učinili sve što smo mogli da se uhapse i privedu pravdi odgovorni za zvjerstva počinjena za vrijeme rata – jer u slučajevima etničkog sukoba bitno je da se uspostavi individualna odgovornost. Inače, krivica nepravedno pada – ali često trajno – na cijele grupe. A mi žrtvama dugujemo dostojanstvo da otkrivamo i ispričamo njihove priče, uključujući i one ko su, kako su patili i ko je počinio zločin.

Iz ovog razloga ponosna sam što su SAD bile na čelu uspostave i podrške Međunarodne komisije za nestala lica, organizacije koja je identifikovala mnoge žrtve Srebrenice i sada radi globalno, u područjima pogođenim prirodnim katastrofama i zonama sukoba. Sada je u toku premještaj iz Sarajeva u Hag, gdje će djelovati kao mali legat o balkanskim ratovima.

Kad pogledamo unazad, znamo da je napredak u Bosni i Hercegovini u dvadeset godina od Dejtonskog sporazuma bio bolan i spor. Zemlja je i dalje najsiromašnija u Evropi. Zaostaje daleko iza ostatka Balkana u reformama potrebnim za članstvo u EU i NATO. Korupcija je i dalje ozbiljan problem – uglavnom zato što ratni lideri drže druge poluge moći, uključujući rent-a-mafiju na ulicama, mrežu nepotizma i kontrolu ekonomije i provedbu zakona.

Dok sam bila državni sekretar trebalo je strpljivog, teškog rada da bi se iskorijenili ti uticaji – ali krajem 2000. formirana je vlada koja nije nacionalistička. Ovaj princip se izgubio negdje kad se Amerika okrenula drugim konfliktima. Veliki dio nefunkcionisanja u Bosni danas mogao bi se pripisati političkim liderima, uključujući i one koji su došli na vlast kao reformatori, želeći da drže sva ta sredstva korupcije moći iako to čak znači da koče svoje društvo dok njihovi susjedi idu prema članstvu u EU.

U isto vrijeme jasno je da mnogi još moraju da prihvate ideju o nacionalnom jedinstvu – i ima zabrinjavajućih znakova da nasilni esktremizam i štetni ruski uticaj povećavaju etničke tenzije. Zaista, kad Rusija traži mjesto gdje može destabilizovati zapadni projekt, prva joj je meta Balkan. Potrebna nam je politika kojom ćemo razuvjeriti te zemlje kao i one koje su bile u Varšavskom paktu i Sovjetskom Savezu.

S obzirom na izazove u Bosni, možda ima i onih koji će iz ovog zaključiti da su cinici, ustvari, bili u pravu i da je pitanje međukulturnog razumijevanja i saradnje beznadežno. Ali ja se i dalje ne slažem.

Jedan bosanski lider koji je najveći dio života živio u Sarajevu rekao mi je za vrijeme rata kako je ponosan što je kao dijete mogao gledati kroz prozor i vidjeti zvonik katoličke katedrale, krst na pravoslavnoj crkvi i munaru džamije. Jedinstvo različitosti je koncept koji svaki Amerikanac, a i Svaki Evropljanin treba da razumije. To je vrijedan koncept na kome se gradi budućnost, i još uvijek vrijedan da se za njega bori.

U godinama kad sam napustila vladu, nastavila sam da radim na pitanjima koja se odnose na Balkan – uključujući i moj položaj predsjedavajuće u Nacionalnom demokratskom institutu. To iskustvo dalo mi je jasan uvid u izazove s kojima je suočena Bosna i region, ali sam uvijek osjećala da sve treba držati u perspektivi.

Da se od nas, prije dvadeset godina, tražilo da predvidimo gdje će biti Bosna za dvije decenije, mislim da bi mnogi pretpostavili da će se raspasti ili vratiti nasilju – a to se nije desilo. Bosna je funkcionalna demokratija i uz našu stalnu podršku može postati održiva. Za mene ovaj ishod dokazuje nekoliko principa za koje mislim da su vrijedni dok razmišljamo o međunarodnom odgovoru na druge dijelove svijeta u kojima bjesni rat.

Prvo, međunarodna zajednica ima obavezu da odgovori u situacijama gdje lokalne vlasti ili ne mogu ili ne djeluju da spriječe etničko čišćenje ili genocid. Važno je poštovati nacionalni suverenitet, ali to ne opravdava nedjelovanje pred moralnom katastrofom.

Drugo, čak i ograničena upotreba sile može učiniti razliku, ako se primijeni u pravo vrijeme i na pravi način. Iako je Pentagon upozorio da će troškovi i rizici intervenisanja u Bosni biti astronomski, predviđanje se nije ispunilo. Bosna će se pokazati kao dug, težak rad, ali to nije bilo živo blato. I potvrdila je stalnu važnost NATO-a.

Treći princip koji je potvrdilo dvije decenije iskustva je da su rokovi kao cijev upereni u glavu. Međunarodna zajednica ne može očekivati da se tek tako izvuče iz konfliktne zone kad ona to izabere. To je lekcija koju smo naučili na Kosovu i ovdje treba da spomenem da je Dan Hamilton bio apsolutno važna karika u izradi našeg dugoročnog plana rekonstrukcije za cijeli region Balkana.

Nažalost, izgleda da ta lekcija nije naučena u godinama koje su uslijedile. Vidjeli smo posljedice ovog u Iraku 2003, gdje nije postojao plan šta uraditi poslije svrgavanja Sadama. Vidjeli smo to i u Libiji, gdje je međunarodna zajednica nedovoljno angažovana dok Libija sve više i više tone u haos.

Četvrti princip dokazan u Bosni i danas ga vrijedi sjetiti se, jeste da Sjedinjene Države ne mogu izbjegavati svoje odgovornosti da vode međunarodnu zajednicu – čak i u pitanjima evropske sigurnosti. Bilo da se radi o budućnosti Balkana ili budućnosti nezavisne Ukrajine, Sjedinjene Države se ne mogu jednostavno pretvarati da naš interes nije na kocki i ostaviti to Evropi da razriješi. Zato mi je drago što je sekretar Kerry ove sedmice posjetio Soči da razgovara s predsjednikom Putinom.

Najzad, cijelo ovo iskustvo opravdava princip da su vrijedna individualna prava. Bosna je u biti bila bitka između dvije vizije svijeta. U prvoj, globalno stanovništvo se dijeli između ‘nas’ i ‘njih’. Ljude sude ne prema njihovim djelima i karakteru, nego prema etničkom porijeklu i vjeri. U ovom pogledu, budućnost je borba za osvetu prošlih poraza. Grijehe jedne generacije nasljeđuje svaka druga. I možda djeluje pravo.

U drugoj viziji svijeta, svaka individua je obdarena izvjesnim neotuđivim pravima. Ljude sude prema zakonima koje su oni, ili njihovi predstavnici, pomogli da se donesu. Budućnost je velika borba – ne samo na Balkanu nego i svugdje u Evropi, na Bliskom istoku i dalje. Ali to je borba koju snage integracije i demokratije moraju da dobiju.

Zato moramo ostati u potpunosti uključeni u budućnost Bosne – i osigurati da postane održiva demokratija sa vladom koja radi za svoj narod.

Dozvolite da zaključim s preporukom Centru za transatlantske studije u SAIS-u i svim organizatorima ove konferencije da pomognu da međunardna zajednica ostane fokusirana na rad koji još treba uraditi u Bosni i na Balkanu.

Hvala vam za sve vaše napore u prošlosti i budućnosti i hvala vam za vašu ljubaznu pažnju danas. Očekujem vašu diskusiju.

I announced our new approach in May of 1997, and flew immediately to the region – first stopping in Croatia, and then flying to Belgrade to meet with Milosevic in what would be our only face-to-face encounter. From Serbia I went on to Bosnia, where I visited Sarajevo and, in the spirit of reconciliation, became the first U.S. cabinet member to travel to the Republika Srpska.

Building off of that trip, our policy concentrated on three goals. The first was to see Dayton implemented – especially its far-reaching goals of letting people return home and rooting out the wartime leaders who were trying to wait out the international community. Our second goal was to make crystal clear that we were not going to abandon Bosnia. We accomplished this in December 1997, when President Clinton announced his decision to support another follow-on military deployment, without any deadline. NATO troops would remain, and our help would continue, until Bosnia was able to stand on its own.

This commitment was critical psychologically, because it enabled the more tolerant and democratic elements in the country to operate without the fear of being swallowed up by extremists. They knew that, even if they lost one round of elections, they would have a second chance and a third. Thus, it was possible to organize and build for the long term.

Finally, we did all we could to apprehend and bring to justice those responsible for atrocities committed during the war – because in cases of ethnic conflict, it is essential that individual responsibility be established. Otherwise, blame falls unfairly – but often permanently – upon entire groups. And we owe the victims the dignity of discovering and telling their stories, including who they are, how they suffered, and who committed the crime.

For this reason, I am proud that the U.S. led the way in establishing and supporting the International Commission on Missing Persons, an organization that has identified many victims of Srebrenica and now works globally, in areas hit by natural disasters and conflict zones. It is now in the process of moving from Sarajevo to the Hague, where it will endure as one small legacy of the Balkan Wars.

Looking back, we know that progress in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the twenty years since the Dayton accords were signed has been painful and slow. The country remains one of the poorest in Europe. It lags far behind the rest of the Balkans in the reforms needed for membership in the EU and NATO. Corruption remains a serious problem – largely because wartime leaders held on to other levers of power, including rent-a-mobs in the streets, patronage networks, and control of the economy and of law enforcement.

It took patient, difficult work over my time as Secretary to root out these influences – but by the end of 2000, a non-nationalist government was formed. This principle was lost somewhere as America moved on to other conflicts. Much of the dysfunction in Bosnia today can be traced to political leaders, including those who came to power as reformers, wanting to hold onto these corrupt tools of power even if it means holding their society back while its neighbors move toward EU membership.

At the same time, it is clear that many have yet to accept the idea of national unity – and there are worrying signs that violent extremism and malign Russian influence are heightening ethnic tensions. Indeed, when Russia looks for a place it can destabilize a Western project, a prime target is in the Balkans. We need a policy to reassure those countries as well as the states that were in the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union.

Given Bosnia’s challenges, there may be some who conclude from this that the cynics were, in fact, right and that the cause of inter-cultural understanding and cooperation is hopeless. But I still do not agree.

A Bosnian leader who lived most of his life in Sarajevo told me during the war how proud he had been as a child to be able to look out his window and see the steeple of a catholic church, the cross of an orthodox one, and the minaret of a mosque. Unity out of diversity is a concept any American, or for that matter, any European, should understand. It is a concept worth building toward and, it is still worth fighting for.

In the years since leaving government, I have continued to work on issues relating to the Balkans – including in my capacity as Chairman of the National Democratic Institute. That experience has made me clear-eyed about the challenges facing Bosnia and the region, but I have always felt that everything should be kept in perspective.

If, twenty years ago, we were asked to predict where Bosnia would be in two decades, I think many would have assumed it would have disintegrated or returned to violence – and that has not happened. Bosnia is a functioning democracy, and with our continued support, it can become a sustainable one. To me, this outcome vindicates several principles that I think are relevant as we consider the international response to other conflict-ravaged parts of the world.

First, the international community has an obligation to respond in situations where local governments either cannot or will not act to prevent ethnic cleansing or genocide. Respect for national sovereignty is important, but it does not excuse inaction in the face of moral catastrophe.

Second, even the limited use of force can make a difference, if applied at the right time and in the right way. Although the Pentagon had warned that the costs and risks of intervening in Bosnia would be astronomical; that did not turn out to be the case.

Bosnia would prove to be a long, tough slog, but it was not a quagmire. And it reaffirmed the enduring importance of NATO.

A third principle reaffirmed by two decades of experience is that deadlines are a gun to your own head. The international community cannot expect to just disengage from a conflict zone at a time of their choosing. It is a lesson we took to heart with Kosovo – and I should mention here that Dan Hamilton was absolutely instrumental in crafting our long-term reconstruction plan for the entire Balkans region.

Unfortunately, that lesson seemed to have been unlearned in the years that followed. We saw the consequences of this in Iraq in 2003, where there was essentially no plan for what to do after toppling Saddam. And we have seen it as well in Libya, where the international community has been insufficiently engaged as Libya slips further and further into chaos.

A fourth principle vindicated in Bosnia, and worth remembering today, is that the United States cannot shirk its responsibilities to lead the international community – even in matters of European security. Whether it is the future of the Balkans or the future of an independent Ukraine, the United States cannot simply pretend that our own interest are not at stake, and leave it to Europe to sort out. That’s why I was pleased to see Secretary Kerry visit Sochi this week for talks with President Putin.

Finally, this entire experience validated the principle that individual rights matter. Bosnia was essentially a fight between two visions of the world. In the first, the global population is divided between “us” and “them.” People are judged not according to their actions and character, but according to their ethnicity and creed. In this view, the future is a struggle to take revenge for past defeats. The sins of one generation are inherited by every other. And might makes right.

In the second vision of the world, every individual is endowed with certain inalienable rights. People are judged according to laws which they, or their representatives, have helped to enact. The future is still very much a struggle – not just in the Balkans but elsewhere in Europe, in the Middle East, and beyond. But it is a struggle that the forces of integration and democracy must win.

That is why we must remain fully invested in the future of Bosnia – and in ensuring that it becomes a sustainable democracy with a government that delivers for its people.

So let me close by commending the Center for Transatlantic Studies at SAIS, and all the organizers of this conference, for helping to keep the international community focused on the work that remains to be done in Bosnia and the Balkans.

Thank you for all of your efforts in the past and in the future, and thank you for your kind attention here today. I look forward to our discussion.