BiH2.0 PERCEPCIJE PERCEPTIONS

SESIJA #1

Razmišljanja o prošlom učešću međunarodne zajednice i sadašnjoj situaciji

Skoro 20 godina od potpisivanja Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma Bosna i Hercegovina se nalazi u stanju krize. Na rubu ekonomske propasti, ima potencijal da postane sigurnosna prijetnja. Momentum od prije 10 godina se usporio i ima znakova nazadovanja. Iako je bilo predviđeno da se Ured visokog predstavnika (OHR) zatvori 2006, još uvijek je operativan.Ustvari, 2006.godina se na mnoge načine pokazala kao početak zastoja. Država nije uspijevala da ponudi najosnovnije usluge kao što su izdavanje ličnih karata, zdravstvena zaštita i opšta socijalna sigurnost. Nivo stagnacije se najbolje očituje u najnovijem izvještaju o BiH Evropske inicijative za stabilnost (ESI) . Ponovo su objavili svoj izvještaj iz 2004, procjenjujući da se tako malo promijenilo od tada da nije bilo potrebe da se mijenja sveukupna procjena situacije.

Potvrdilo se da na međunarodnim organizacijama leži dio krivice za neuspjeh da se obezbijedi dosljedno rukovođenje i liderstvo. Nedostatak prave perspektive za članstvo u EU i NATO, zajedno sa krivo primijenjenom i neopravdano strogom uslovljenošću, smanjio je kredibilitet međunarodnih napora da BiH približe i eventualno uključe u obje organizacije, i tako razvodnio i potkopao bitnu političku debatu u zemlji.

Regionalna dinamika takođe je odigrala važnu ulogu. S obzirom na etno-nacionalnu strukturu i istoriju BiH, njen napredak je vezan za događanja u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj i širem regionu zapadnog Balkana. Iako je Hrvatska ušla u EU 2013.a Srbija dobila status kandidata 2014, sadašnji politički razvoj u obje zemlje razlog je za zabrinutost.

Na unutrašnjem planu postojala je samo ograničena politička volja među najvišim ešalonima da se postigne napredak u reformama, koje bi ojačale centralne državne institucije i ograničile broj etničkih blokada.Rastuće su tenzije oko viđenja buduće države.Lider bosanskih Srba Milorad Dodik neprestano djeluje kao da je Republika Srpska posebna država i povremeno prijeti secesijom. I daleko je povezaniji sa Rusijom nego sa EU. U međuvremenu, najjača stranka bosanskih Hrvata (HDZ) i njen lider Dragan Čović zagovaraju treći entitet, što uznemirujuće povećava broj prepreka za političku reformu. Odgovarajući na te centrifugalne tendencije, neke bošnjačke političke partije (SBiH i SDP) insistirale su na ukidanju entiteta, dozvoljavajući samo malo prostora za dijalog o teritorijalnoj strukturi države. Štaviše, najjača bošnjačka partija koju vodi Bakir Izetbegović uspostavlja bliske veze sa muslimanskim svijetom, radije nego sa ostatkom Evrope, udaljujući druge dvije (hrišćanske) etno-nacionalne grupe. Politika u Bosni je reducirana na prepirke oko kompetentnosti i “svoje livade”, u formi suparništva oko javnih resursa: ovo je ograničilo prostor za političku debatu oko pitanja ko će držati vlast nad ključnim institucijama i sektorima kao što su zračni transport, željeznica i komunalne usluge.

Osnovni uzroci otpora političkih lidera prema reformama i efikasnom približavanju Evropskoj uniji nisu bazirani samo na nacionalizmu. Tokom proteklih 20 godina partijski lideri su stvorili usko povezane klanove i nagomilali značajnu moć i resurse. Reforme u sudstvu, veća transparentnost, odgovornost i jačanje vladavine prava bi efikasno posjekli granu na kojoj sjede (kao što pokazuje primjer bivšeg premijera Ive Sanadera u susjednoj Hrvatskoj). Lideri strahuju da bi iskreno opredjeljenje za put u EU otkrilo njihovo koruptivno ponašanje i dovelo do krivičnog gonjenja zbog kriminala. Stoga je tako malo podsticaja da se podrže reforme.

Ipak, uočeno je da za sadašnju procjenu BiH treba uzeti u obzir kao očiglednu činjenicu da rekonstrukcija nikad neće biti laka. Čak i prije rata, BiH je bila ekonomski spora sa veoma nekonkurentnom i neuspješnom industrijom, duboko ukorijenjenim otporom i prema privatizaciji i bankrotu, i sa ekonomijom koju je vodio nekompetentan vojni sektor. Krajem rata, njen ekonomski kapacitet nije bio čak ni 10% od predratnog nivoa. Čak i uz ogromnu međunarodnu finansijsku pomoć BiH ostaje jedna od najsiromašnijih zemalja u Evropi.

Što se tiče društva, predratne podjele su pojačane naglaskom na etničku pripadnost i religiju tokom sukoba; a genocid koji se desio u zemlji imao je ogroman psiho-socijalni efekat. Slično tome, ruralno-urbana podjela, koja je prije rata stvorila iskomadanu socijalnu strukturu, proširila se sa masovnim preseljenjem ruralne populacije iz istočne i centralne Bosne u urbane centre kao što su Mostar, Zenica, Tuzla i Sarajevo. Godine 1995. BiH je bila ekonomski propala i teritorijalno i etnički podijeljena zemlja, koja je uz to uključila mnoge političke i psihološke elemente bivšeg jugoslovenskog sistema u svoj novi ustavni okvir (n.pr. kolektivno liderstvo). I tako su polazne tačke bile veoma nisko postavljene.

Uprkos izuzetno zabrinjavajućoj situaciji u Bosni, potrebno je očuvati osjećaj optimizma i svrhe.Mnogo je postignuto u proteklih 20 godina. U poređenju sa drugim poslijeratnim zemljama, koje su uzdrmane u složenim sukobima, BiH nije bila toliko neuspješna kako se često predstavlja. Posebno sepristup Paddyja Ashdowna, iako su ga neki kritikovali, pokazao kao veoma efikasan u njegovo vrijeme poguravši neke važne reforme. On je uveo jedinstven porezni sistem, što je fiskalno održalo Bosnu na vodi zbog efikasnog indirektnog oporezivanja. Drugi uspjeh je stvaranje državnog Vijeća ministara kao vlade na državnom nivou.

Izbori su protekli dosta mirno i radikalni vjerski kandidati kao što je Mustafa Cerić nisu dobro prošli. Jačanje kapaciteta odbrane je dobro napredovalo (za razliku u drugim sličnim postokonfliktnim situacijama kao što su Irak ili Avganistan). Sektor sigurnosti ostvario je strukturalne promjene kroz koherentan pristup međunarodnog tutorstva, postajući jedinstvena granična policija, jedinstvena državna obavještajna agencija (SIPA) i jedinstvena državna vojska.Veliki je uspjeh što sada BiH ima svoj centar za obuku u Partnerstvu za mir. Drugi učesnici naglasili su da je napokon, poslije mučnog procesa koji traje 24 godine, obavljen i popis stanovništva: rezultati bi mogli imati važne posljedice na mnoštvo propisa i institucija. Štaviše, gledajući unaprijed, još uvijek postoji jaka želja unutar BiH da se pridruži EU (oko 90% Bošnjaka i 75% bosanskih Srba prema IPSOS Public Affairs Data iz 2013).Ovo je primaran podsticaj koji se može iskoristiti da se povedu reforme koje traži EU.

Ukupna ocjena je da je bilo i uspjeha i neuspjeha, i da se ovo drugo ne treba preuveličavati na uštrb prvog. Važno je vidjeti kako su uspjesi postignuti i naučiti iz tog procesa. Dvije su sveobuhvatne teme u diskusiji: uprkos ogromnim problemima Bosna se proteklih 20 godina izvukla sa ruba; ali sada je dospjela do važnog raskršća i potreban je novi pristup da se deblokira.

SESSION #1

Reflections on past international involvement and the current situation

Close to 20 years since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina finds itself in a state of crisis. On the brink of economic decline, it has the potential to become a security threat. The momentum from 10 years ago has been slowing and there have been signs of backsliding. Although the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was scheduled to close down as early as 2006, it is still in operation. Indeed, in many ways 2006 proved to be the start of the standstill. The central state has been failing to deliver the most basic services such as issuing identity cards, health care, and general social security. The level of stagnation is best exemplified by the latest report on BiH by the European Stability Initiative (ESI) . It merely republished its 2004 report, arguing that so little had changed since then that there was no need to alter its overall evaluation of the situation.

It has been acknowledged that part of the blame lies with the international organizations for failing to provide consistent guidance and leadership. The lack of a genuine perspective for membership of the EU and NATO, combined with misplaced and unduly strict conditionality, has reduced the credibility of the international efforts to bring BiH closer to and eventually into both organizations, and thus diluted and undermined a substantial policy debate in the country.

Regional dynamics have also played an important role. Given BiH’s ethno-national structure and history, its progress is tied in with developments in Serbia and Croatia and the broader West Balkan region. Although Croatia entered the EU in 2013, and Serbia was given candidate status in 2014, current political developments in both countries have given cause for concern.

Internally, there has been only limited political will among the top echelons to make progress on reforms, which would strengthen the central state institutions and limit the number of ethnic vetoes. There have been growing tensions over competing visions of the future of the state. The Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik continually acts as if Republika Srpska was a separate state and occasionally threatens with secession. He has also been far more closely aligned with Russia than with the EU. Meanwhile, the strongest Bosnian Croat party (HDZ) and its leader Dragan Čović have been pressing the case for a third entity, adding alarmingly to the number of obstacles to political reform. Countering these centrifugal tendencies, some Bosniak political parties (SBiH and SDP) have been insisting on abolishing the entities, allowing only little space for dialogue about the territorial structure of the state. Moreover, the strongest Bosniak party led by Bakir Izetbegović has been establishing close ties with the Muslim world, rather than with the rest of Europe, alienating the other two (Christian) ethno-national groups. Politics in Bosnia have been reduced to squabbles over competence and “turf”, in the form of competition for public resources: this has limited the scope for political debate over who should hold power over key institutions and sectors such as airways, railways, and utilities.

The underlying causes for the reluctance of political leaders to reform and effectively move closer to the European Union are not merely based on nationalism. Over the past 20 years, party leaders have created close-knit clans and accumulated significant power and resources. Reforms in the judiciary, increased transparency, accountability, and strengthening the rule of law would effectively cut off the branch on which they are sitting (as the example of the former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader in neighbouring Croatia suggests). Leaders fear that a frank commitment to the EU path would uncover their corrupt behaviour and lead to their criminal prosecution. There is thus little incentive for them to support reforms.

Nonetheless, it was noted that the current assessment of BiH should take into consideration the self-evident fact that reconstruction was never going to be easy. Even before the war, BiH was an economic laggard with highly uncompetitive and underperforming industries, deep-rooted resistance to both privatization and bankruptcy procedures, and with an economy driven by the uncompetitive military sector. By the end of the war, its economic capacity was not even at 10% of the pre-war level. Even with vast international funding, BiH remains one of the poorest countries in Europe.

Socially, pre-war cleavages were intensified by the emphasis on ethnicity and religion during the conflict; and the genocide that took place in the country has had an enormous psycho-social impact. Similarly, the rural-urban divide, which before the war created a fragmented social structure, widened with the mass resettlement of rural populations from Eastern and Central Bosnia to urban centres such as Mostar, Zenica, Tuzla, and Sarajevo. In 1995, BiH emerged as an economically broken and territorially and ethnically divided country, which further incorporated many of the political and psychological elements of the former Yugoslav system into its new institutional framework (e.g. collective leadership). The starting points were thus very low.

Despite an extremely alarming situation in Bosnia, it is necessary to maintain a sense of guarded optimism and purpose. Much has been achieved in the past 20 years. Compared with other post-war countries, which have been shattered in complex conflicts, BiH has not been as much of a failure as is often presented. In particular, although criticized by some, the approach of Paddy Ashdown proved to be very effective at the time in pushing forward some important reforms. He introduced a single tax system, which has kept Bosnia fiscally afloat because of its effective indirect taxing. Another success has been the creation of the State Council of Ministers as the state-level government.

Elections have been fairly peaceful, and radical religious candidates such as Mustafa Ceric have not been scoring well. Defence capacity-building has progressed well (unlike in other similar post-conflict situations such as Iraq or Afghanistan). The security sector achieved structural changes through a coherent approach of international tutelage, materializing in a single border police, a single state intelligence agency (SIPA), and a single state army. A great success is that BiH now has its own Partnership for Peace training centre. Other participants stressed that finally, after a tortuous process lasting 24 years, a census was being carried out: the results could have important consequences for a variety of regulations and institutions. Moreover, looking ahead, there is still a strong wish within BiH to join the EU (around 90% of Bosniaks and 75% of Bosnian Serbs according to IPSOS Public Affairs Data from 2013). This is the primary incentive which can be used to drive further reform required by the EU.

Overall, the assessment was that there had been both successes and failures, and that the latter should not be exaggerated at the expense of the former. The important thing was to see how successes had been achieved, and learn from this process. There were two over-arching themes to the discussion: despite enormous problems, Bosnia had over the past 20 years been pulled back from the brink; but it had now reached an important fork in the road, and a new approach was needed to break the deadlock.
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