Kao većina terorista i on je bio mlad. Rođen je u vrijeme nešto prije nego što je gorka mržnja preplavila njegovu zemlju; nedugo poslije njegovog rođenja oca su mu zarobile vlasti i ubile, zajedno s desetinama drugih muslimana. Prije dvije sedmice, 24-godišnji sin umarširao je u policijsku stanicu navodno uzvikujući ratni poklič džihadista “Allahu Akbar!” i zatim otvorio vatru, ubivši jednog policajca i ranivši drugu dvojicu, prije nego što je i sam ubijen u razmjeni vatre s policijom.

Tokom vikenda, 350 kilometara južno, još osam policajaca ubijeno je zajedno sa 14 osumnjičenih terorista u žestokoj pucnjavi u blizini međunarodne granice stvorene nakon Prvog svjetskog rata a koju radikali više ne priznaju.

Još jedan dan u Siriji ili Iraku? Ne, ovo se desilo u Evropi, dan vožnje od Beča. Prvi napad, u Zvorniku, gradu u entitetu bosanskih Srba, bio je šokantno podsjećanje na mogući uticaj radikalnog Islama u regionu, posebno u svjetlu rasta islamske države (ISIS). Samo je mali broj Bosanaca radikalizovan, a još je manji broj onih koji su otišli da se bore u Siriji i Iraku. Ali na iscjepkanom Balkanu ne treba mnogo radikala da bi se zemlja radikalizovala.

Niti je radikalni Islam jedina prijetnja godinama rada i milijardama investiranja Vašingtona i njegovih evropskih partnera u region. U svjetlu zastoja sa Zapadom oko Ukrajine, Rusija je pojačala svoju ulogu tamo, sa zapaljivim pozivima na solidarnost ortodoksnih Srba.

Zaista, Moskva je iskazala čvrstu podršku borbenoj vladi u Makedoniji, gdje se desio drugi šokantni incident. Puščana paljba u toku vikenda, podržana granatama, snajperima i automatskim oružjem, desila se u gradu Kumanovo blizu granice Makedonije, Srbije i Kosova. Vlada je opisala sukob kao bitku između policije i “jedne od najopasnijih terorističkih grupa na Balkanu”, po svoj prilici misleći na albanske radikale. Stvarne okolnosti pucnjave su mračne a tajming sumnjiv, došavši u vrijeme sukoba vlade sa rastućim talasima protesta oko otkrića navodno masovne vladine zloupotrebe. Kako je makedonski predsjednik dojurio iz Moskve, njegovo domaćini tamo oštro su kritikovali demonstrante i upozorili na još jednu “obojenu revoluciju”.

Sa Makedonijom suočenom sa potencijalnim implozijom, sa Bosnom na najtananijoj tački od rata i sa Kosovom koji svjedoči masovnom egzodosu građana koji su pokleknuli pred koruptivnom, podijeljenom vladom, tri najranjivije zemlje u regionu stoje na ivici ponora. I te kako je moguće klizište prema radikalizmu i inter – ili čak međuetničkoj borbi, koju su potakli Rusija ili islamski oportunizam. I ako se to dogodi, američki i evropski diplomati biće prisiljeni da napokon odgovore na pitanje: Ko je izgubio Balkan?

Baš kao i na vrhuncu ratova u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, Vašington i Brisel će prstom ukazati jedni na druge. Ustvari, krivica će biti podijeljena. Ni kriza u Ukrajini ni one na Bliskom istoku nisu alibi za blijedu politiku Zapada i sporadičnu pažnju posljednjih godina. Iako destabilizacija na Balkanu predstavlja daleko manju prijetnju zapadnim interesima nego Putinova agresija ili barbarizam ISIS-a, nije toliko teško prevazići taj izazov. U regionu nema nuklearnog oružja. Samoubilački terorizam je rijetka pojava. A prije svega, za razliku od Ukrajine ili zemalja na Bliskom istoku, čak i najviše podijeljene zemlje u jugoistočnoj Evropi još uvijek dijele zajedničku stratešku orijentaciju, sa izuzetno visokim stepenom podrške za pridruživanje u NATO i EU.

Ali umjesto da se uhvati ovog snažnog temelja da se prevaziđu preostale prepreke prema euro-atlantskoj integraciji, Zapad je dopustio nedoraslim zemljama regiona da ponovo pokliznu. Vašington je prerano prebacio vodeću odgovornost za Balkan EU, koja je prerano predala vodeću odgovornost liderima regiona. Bez značajne mrkve ili štapa EU da obuzda njihovo ponašanje, političari su uveliko konsolidovali svoju koruptivnu mrežu, kooptirali ili zaplašili medije i oduprli značajnoj reformi.

Like most terrorists, he was young. He had been born in the days just before bitter hatred engulfed his country; not long after his birth, his father had been seized by authorities and killed, along with scores of other Sunni Muslims. Two weeks ago, the 24-year-old son marched into a police station reportedly shouting the jihadist war cry “Allahu Akbar!” and then opened fire, killing one officer and wounding two others, before he was killed in a firefight with police.

Over the weekend, 350 miles to the south, eight more policemen were killed along with 14 suspected terrorists in a raging gunbattle near an international border created in the aftermath of World War I that radicals no longer recognize.

Another day in Syria or Iraq? No, this happened in Europe, an easy day’s drive from Vienna. The first attack, in Zvornik, a town in Bosnia’s Serb entity, was a shocking reminder of the potential influence of radical Islam in the region, especially in the wake of the rise of the Islamic State (also called ISIS). Only a small number of Bosnians have been radicalized, and even fewer have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq. But in the still-fractured Balkans, it doesn’t take many radicals to destabilize a country.

Nor is radical Islam the only threat to years of work and billions in investment in the region by Washington and its European partners. In the wake of the standoff with the West over Ukraine, Russia has stepped up its own role there, with incendiary appeals to Orthodox Slav solidarity.

Indeed, Moscow has voiced staunch support for the embattled government in Macedonia, where the second shocking incident occurred. The weekend’s firefight, replete with grenades, snipers, and automatic weapons, took place in the town of Kumanovo near the border of Macedonia, Serbia, and Kosovo. The government described the fight as a battle between the police and “one of the most dangerous terrorist groups in the Balkans,” presumably meaning Albanian radicals. The real circumstances of the shoot-out are murky and the timing suspicious, coming as the government contends with growing waves of protests over revelations of alleged massive government abuse. As the Macedonian president rushed back from Moscow, his hosts there sharply criticized demonstrators and warned against another “color revolution.”

With Macedonia facing potential implosion, with Bosnian unity at its most tenuous since the war, and with Kosovo witnessing a mass exodus of citizens who have given up on its corrupt, divisive government, the three most vulnerable countries of the region stand on a precipice. A slide toward radicalism and inter- or even intraethnic strife, abetted by Russian or Islamist opportunism, is fully plausible. And if it happens, U.S. and European diplomats will be forced to finally answer a question: Who lost the Balkans?

Just as at the height of the wars in former Yugoslavia, Washington and Brussels will likely point fingers at each other. In fact, the blame will be shared. Neither the crises in Ukraine nor those in the Middle East are alibis for the West’s timid policies and sporadic attention in recent years. The truth is that although destabilization in the Balkans poses far less of a threat to Western interests than Putin’s aggression or ISIS’ barbarism, it is a far less difficult challenge to overcome. There are no nuclear weapons in the region. Suicide terrorism, so far, is extremely rare. And most of all, unlike either Ukraine or the countries of the Middle East, even the most divided countries of southeast Europe still share a common strategic orientation, with generally high rates of support for joining NATO and the EU.

But instead of seizing on this strong foundation to overcome remaining obstacles to Euro-Atlantic integration, the West has allowed the fledgling countries of the region to backslide. Washington prematurely handed over lead responsibility for the Balkans to the EU, which prematurely handed over lead responsibility to the region’s leaders. With no meaningful EU carrots or sticks to restrain their behavior, politicians have largely consolidated their corrupt patronage networks, co-opted or intimidated the media, and resisted meaningful reform.

GUŽVA U MAKEDONIJI

Makedonija je prvi primjer posljedica sporadične pažnje. Uz intenzivnu međunarodnu pomoć koja je uslijedila nakon izbijanja neprijateljstava između etničkih Makedonaca i Albanaca 2001, zemlja je postigla snažan napredak u gradnji zajedničkih demokratskih institucija. Godine 2006. sadašnji premijer Nikola Gruevski preuzeo je dužnost. Poslije četiri sve sumnjivija izbora uspio je da učvrsti vlast slabljenjem sudstva, marginalizacijom opozicije i gušenjem nezavisnih medija. U 2007. Makedonija je zauzela 36. mjesto, ispred Sjedinjenih Država, u Indeksu slobode štampe u Freedom House. Prošle godine, Makedonija je pala na 123. mjesto, čameći uz zemlje poput Venecuele. U međuvremenu, ekonomija zemlje održava se uz ogroman i neodrživ rast posudbi.

Iako je među najmlađim liderima u regionu Gruevski bi mirno, još godinama, mogao ostati na vlasti da nije bilo skandala o prisluškivanju koji je otkrio uzbudljiv omjer zloupotrebe vlasti. Snimljeni telefonski razgovori, koje opozicija povremeno objavljuje, navodno opisuju direktnu umiješanost vlade u finansijsku i izbornu prevaru, masovnu elektronsku prismotru, lažne optužbe političkih protivnika za zločine, čak i ubistva. U najšokantnijem otkriću, objavljenom prošle sedmice, čulo se kako visoki vladini zvaničnici navodno planiraju kako da prikriju sumnjivu automobilsku nesreću u kojoj je život izgubio poznati kritičar vlade. U jednom drugom snimku vladi se stavlja u grijeh da pod tepih gura slučaj kad je policija pretukla mladića na smrt. Gruevski i drugi vladini zvaničnici su porekli navode, tvrdeći da su snimljene trake djelo neodređenih “stranih agenata” koji imaju za cilj da destabilizuju zemlju. Kao odgovor na ovo, ovog mjeseca, hiljade mladih Makedonaca suočile su se sa policijskim palicama. Oni i opozicija zahtijevaju da premijer i njegovi saradnici prepuste vlast privremenoj vladi koja će organizovati nove izbore sa nezavisnom istragom u procesu otkrića. Uz rastuću napetost, opozicija je pozvala na masovne demonstracije iduće sedmice. Suočen sa strogim zakonskim i ličnim posljedicama ako on i njegova kohorta daju ostavku, izgleda da je Gruevski spreman da se bori do kraja, podrivajući stabilnost Makedonije.

Ishod šokantnog nasilja u toku vikenda u Kumanovu je još nepredvidiv, kao što su tajanstvene i okolnosti sukoba. I ranije je u Makedoniji bilo sumnjive pucnjave sa navodnim teroristima, uključujući 2002. kad je sedam migranata iz Pakistana i Indije policija ubila u izuzetno sumnjivom incidentu. Makedonski sud je oslobodio bivšeg ministra unutrašnjih poslova optužbe za odgovornost za ubistva. Prošlog mjeseca, glasnogovornik makedonske policije tvrdio je da je 40 albanskih radikala napalo policijsku predstražu na granici sa Kosovom, ali ni NATO ni kosovska policija nisu mogli da potvrde sličnu aktivnost.

Ironija je da do pucnjave između makedonske policije i navodnih albanskih radikala dolazi u vrijeme kad međuetnički odnosi u zemlji prave impresivne korake. Izgleda da su po prvi put u 24-godišnjoj istoriji moderne nezavisne zemlje etnički Albanci i Makedonci uveliko ujedinjeni u borbi protiv vidljive diktature. Kako su skoro sve televizijske stanice pod čvrstom rukom vlade, albanska stanica Alsat objavljuje video zapise i nudi dovoljno prostora glasovima opozicije, što je značajan gest solidarnosti. Na albanskim veb-stranicama objavljuju se oštri komentari etničkih Makedonaca protiv vlade, nešto što se dosad nije čulo u tradicionalno etnički podijeljenom medijskom sektoru. Emitovanje postaje sve neprijatnije i za vladajauće i opozicione albanske partije koje su bile neobično tihe pred masovnim skandalom.

Međunardnona zajednica mogla bi odigrati ključnu ulogu u donošenju mirnog rješenja, ali je do sada njena reakcija još suzdržana. Samo je njemački ambasador otvoreno pozvao vladu da podnese ostavku. U svjetlu nedavnog nasilja, američka ambasada pridružila se EU, NATO-u i Organizaciji za sigurnost i saradnju u Evropi da pozove, “lidere zemlje da sarađuju i započnu dijalog o svim pitanjima koja se tiču zemlje”.

To je tipično za Zapad da nastoji izbjeći konfrontaciju sa Gruevskim, dozvoljavajući njemu i drugim figurama da otvorena pitanja u regionu drže na tački ključanja. Ali jedna sveobuhvatna lekcija od nasilnog pada Jugoslavije prije 25 godina jeste da im je neuspjeh da se suoče sa ključnim problemima samo otežao donošenje odluke. Ovo je posebno važno u slučaju Makedonije, gdje su dugogodišnji prigovori Grčke o imenu zemlje, koje Atina vidi kao krađu grčkog naslijeđa, ostavili Makedoniju i izvan NATO-a (gdje je njeno članstvo ponuda) i EU (s kojom vodi otvorene pregovore). Sadašnja nestabilnost zemlje mogla bi se izbjeći ako se Skoplju dozvoli da krene prema članstvu u NATO i EU. Umjesto da ide prema autokratiji, Gruevski bi bio ograničen strogim zahtjevima za koje se na drugim mjestima pokazalo da mogu osnažiti demokratske institucije.

Umjesto da postigne trans-atlantski konsenzus o hitnosti kompromisa o imenu – za što postoje mnoge mogućnosti – Vašington se fokusirao na to pitanje tek kad se od njega to zatražilo. Godine 1995, uoči razgovora u Dejtonu s ciljem završetka rata u Bosni, Richard Holbrooke je postigao modus vivendi između Atine i Skoplja. Godine 2004. kriza u Makedoniji je potaknula Bushovu administraciju da napokon prizna Makedoniju po njenom ustavnom imenu.

Strah da će Grčka uzvratiti na ovaj potez nikad se nije materijalizovao. Uprkos toj činjenici, Vašington je ispustio ovo pitanje sve do samita NATO-a 2008. kad je bilo suviše kasno da strane natjera na kompromis. Naglašavajući nemoć Zapada po ovom pitanju, Međunarodni sud pravde je 2011. presudio da Atina nema pravo da uskrati ulazak Makedonije u NATO.

I pored toga, Savez ostavlja Skoplje u čekaonici iako je ispunio sve zahtjeve za članstvo.

Grueski je iskoristio međunarodnu paralizu oko pitanja imena da provocira Grčku sa napadnim pozivima na makedonski nacionalizam. Nedavno je tvrdio da su snimljeni zapisi dio međunarodne urote s ciljem da ga prisili da odbaci ime zemlje. Sa svoje strane, Atina je nedavno izbila kao ključni igrač u trans-atlanstkim nastojanjima da se osujeti planirani rusko-turski gasovod, što pojačava mogućnost skoro bankrotirane zemlje da podlegne zapadnom pritisku po pitanju imena. Ukratko, kao i u drugim slučajevima u regionu, nepažnja Zapada je pitanje imena Makedonije samo učinila akutnijim i bremenitijim.

MELEE IN MACEDONIA

Macedonia is a prime example of the consequences of sporadic attention. With intensive international help following the outbreak of hostilities between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians in 2001, the country made steady progress in building joint democratic institutions. In 2006, current Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski took office. After four increasingly dubious elections, he has managed to consolidate power by debilitating the judiciary, marginalizing the opposition, and eviscerating independent media. In 2007, Macedonia ranked number 36, ahead of the United States, in Freedom House’s Press Freedom Index. Last year, Macedonia sunk to 123, languishing with the likes of Venezuela. The country’s economy, meanwhile, remains afloat through a sharp and unsustainable rise in borrowing.

Still among the region’s youngest leaders, Gruevski would be sitting pretty with years left in power were it not for a wiretapping scandal that has revealed the breathtaking extent of government abuse. Released periodically by the opposition, recorded phone calls allegedly describe the government’s direct orchestration of financial and electoral fraud, mass electronic surveillance, framing of political opponents for crimes, and even murder. In the most shocking revelation, released last week, senior government officials are allegedly heard scheming to cover up a dubious car accident that took the life of a noted government critic. Another recording seems to implicate the government in sweeping under the rug a case in which police had beaten a young reveler to death. Gruevski and other government officials have denied the allegations, claiming that the wiretaps are the work of unspecified “foreign agents” who aim to destabilize the country.

In response, this month, thousands of young Macedonians have braved truncheon-bearing riot police to protest. They and the opposition demand that the prime minister and his associates hand power over to a caretaker government that will organize fresh elections while independent investigations into the revelations proceed. With tensions mounting, the opposition has called for a massive demonstration next week. Facing severe legal and personal consequences if he and his cohorts resign, Gruevski appears poised to fight it out to the end, leaving Macedonia’s stability in the breach.

The ramifications of the weekend’s shocking violence in Kumanovo are as unpredictable as the circumstances of the clash are mysterious. There is precedent in Macedonia for dubious shoot-outs with purported terrorists, including in 2002 when seven migrants from Pakistan and India were shot dead by police in a highly suspicious incident. A Macedonian court eventually cleared the former interior minister of charges of responsibility for the killings. Last month, a Macedonian police spokesman claimed that 40 Albanian radicals attacked a police outpost on the border with Kosovo, yet neither NATO nor the Kosovo police could confirm any such activity.

Ironically, the shoot out between Macedonian police and purported Albanian radicals comes as inter-ethnic relations in the country have made impressive strides. For the first time in its 24-year history as a modern independent state, ethnic Albanians and Macedonians seem largely united in the struggle against perceived dictatorship. With nearly all television stations under the government’s grip, it is Alsat, an Albanian-owned station, that is airing the wiretaps and offering extensive airtime to opposition voices, a remarkable gesture of solidarity. Albanian web-sites have published sharp anti-government commentary by ethnic Macedonians, something that was largely unheard of in the traditionally ethnically segregated media sector. The broadcasts have become increasingly awkward for both the ruling and opposition Albanian political parties, which have been curiously silent in the face of the massive scandal.

The international community could play a decisive role in bringing things to a peaceful resolution, but so far its reaction has been tentative. Only the German ambassador has openly called for the government to resign. In the wake of the recent violence, the U.S. embassy joined the EU, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to call, improbably, for “the country’s leaders to pull together and engage in dialogue on all issues facing the country.”

It is typical of the West to seek to avoid a confrontation with Gruevski, allowing him and other figures to keep the region’s open questions simmering. But the one over-arching lesson since the violent collapse of Yugoslavia 25 years ago is that the failure to deal with core problems head-on has only made them harder to resolve in the end. This is especially true in Macdonia’s case, where Greece’s longstanding objections to the country’s name, which Athens sees as theft of Greek heritage, have kept Macedonia out of both NATO (where its membership is on offer) and the EU (with which it is poised to open negotiations). The country’s current instability could have been avoided had Skopje been allowed to proceed towards NATO and EU membership. Rather than move toward autocracy, Gruevski would have been constrained by strict requirements that have proved to empower democratic institutions elsewhere.

Rather than forge a trans-Atlantic consensus on the urgency for a compromise on the name—for which many possibilities exist—Washington has focused on the matter only when pressed to do so. In 1995, on the eve of the talks in Dayton, Ohio aimed at ending the war in Bosnia, Richard Holbrooke achieved a modus vivendi between Athens and Skopje. In 2004, crisis in Macedonia prompted the Bush administration to finally recognize Macedonia by its constitutional name.

Feared blowback from Greece over this move never materialized. Despite that fact, Washington dropped the issue until the run-up to NATO’s 2008 summit, when it was too late to push the parties into compromise. Underscoring the West’s impotence on the issue, the International Court of Justice ruled in 2011 that Athens had no right to deny Macedonia entry into NATO.

Nonetheless, the alliance continues to leave Skopje, which has fulfilled all requirements for membership, in the waiting room.

Grueski has seized on international paralysis over the name issue to provoke Greece with tacky appeals to Macedonian nationalism. Most recently, he claimed that the wiretaps are part of an international conspiracy designed to force him to jettison the country’s name. For its part, Athens has recently emerged as a key player in trans-Atlantic attempts to thwart a planned Russian-Turkish gas pipeline, which boosts the ability of the nearly bankrupt country to stand up to Western pressure on the name issue. In short, as in other cases from the region, Western inattention has only made the question of Macedonia’s name more acute and more fraught.

SLOMLJENA BOSNA

Ako je Makedonija u akutnoj boli, Bosna se suočava sa dubljom i skoro nepopravljivom povredom. Radikalni Islam i ruski uticaj pogoršavaju stalne etničke sumnje. U međuvremenu, neki političari u zemlji preduzimaju konkretne korake da podijele zemlju. Vladajuće srpske i hrvatske stranke su nedavno najavile svoje opredjeljenje u slabo prikrivenoj separatističkoj agendi. Parlament Republike Srpske je čak donio rezoluciju za referendum o odcjepljenju za koji je, po prvi put, uključen i konkretan datum, 2018, što je zapaljiv plebiscit. Ako se održi, srpski referendum će sigurno ponovo otvoriti neprijateljstva.

Bosna će se ovog ljeta suočiti s novim testovima o svojoj koheziji. U junu će biti objavljeni dugo odlagani rezultati glasanja, moguće podgrijavajući bijes među Bošnjacima, Hrvatima i Srbima, iz kojih bi svaki od njih mogao izvući cifre da tvrde o prednosti ili da se žale na sistematski nepovoljan položaj. Zatim će u julu Bosna obilježiti 20-godišnjicu masakra u Srebrenici gdje su srpske snage pobile više od 7.000 Bošnjaka, muškaraca i djece.

Američki i EU lideri su odustali od prioriteta da Bosna promijeni svoj zastarjeli ustav koji je odgovoran za većinu problema koji zemlju drže u blatu. Lideri EU su se sada ujedinili oko nove politike za naizgled lakše postizanje ekonomskih i socijalnih mjera. Sljedećeg mjeseca, EU i Međunarodni monetarni fond (MMF) će najaviti pretjerano reklamirani “akcioni plan reformi” s namjerom da se potaknu rezovi u prekomjernoj birokratiji i druge reforme potrebne za pridruženje u EU. Nažalost, javnost je odlučno protiv rezova radnih mjesta u javnom sektoru i mnogi političari s pravom strahuju da će ih reforme prisiliti da privatizuju javna preduzeća kojima sada manipulišu uz pokroviteljstvo i korupciju. Osjećajući ovaj otpor i uz to se plašeći suočavanja s lokalnim zvaničnicima, međunarodni igrači će vjerovatno umjeriti svoje zahtjeve za reformom. Brisel je već izmislio svoje zahtjeve za formalan sporazum o pridruživanju između Bosne i EU donesen ove godine i zvaničnici su jasno dali na znanje da je status kandidata Bosne srž njihove najnovije strategije za namučenu zemlju.

Naglašavajući formu nad supstancom, nije vjerovatno da će EU postići očajno potreban napredak sada više nego u posljednjih devet godina. Kao i u Makedoniji, u 2006. počeo je da se raspliće proces demokratizacije, koji je vidio kako novonastale zajedničke institucije dobijaju oblik pod energičnim međunarodnim upraviteljstvom. Prerano primjenjujući rigidnu formu lokalnog vlasništva nad institucijama, neposlušni zvaničnici (posebno u srpskom entitetu) počeli su da usporavaju napredak i otvoreno prkose jedinstvu zemlje. Kako je Vašington periodično pokušavao da potakne EU na akciju a lokalne zvaničnike na kompromis, bosanski lideri odbacili su napore i zemlja je upala još dublje u stagnaciju. Sa 14 odvojenih vlada institucije u zemlji danas su nefunkcionalan relikt ratnih godina, kočeći investiranje i međuetničku saradnju.

Jedino što je pozitivno iz terorističkog napada u Zvorniku jeste da može konačno šokirati međunarodne zvaničnike i potaći na akciju. EU-MMF paket koji povezuje ambiciozne standarde sa velikodušnim finansijskim inicijativama i vjerovatnim kaznama – kao što su zabrane viza i razotkrivanje neposlušnih lidera zbog finansijskih prevara – konačno može upraviti pažnju na Bosnu.

BROKEN BOSNIA

If Macedonia is in acute pain, Bosnia is facing deeper and nearly irreparable injury. Radical Islam and Russian influence are exacerbating ever-present ethnic suspicions. Meanwhile, some of the country’s politicians are taking concrete steps to split the country. Ruling Serb and Croat parties recently announced their commitment to thinly veiled separatist agendas. The Republika Srpska parliament even passed a resolution for a separatist referendum that, for the first time, included a concrete date, 2018, for the incendiary plebiscite. If held, the Serb referendum is guaranteed to reopen hostilities.

Bosnia will face near-term tests of its cohesion this summer. In June, long-delayed census results are set to be released, potentially fueling anger among Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Croats, and Serbs alike, each of whom can spin figures to claim advantage or complain of systematic disadvantage. Then, in July, Bosnia will mark the emotional 20th anniversary of the massacre at Srebrenica, where more than 7,000 Bosniak men and boys were killed at the hands of Serb forces.

U.S. and EU leaders have given up on the priority of getting Bosnia to change its outmoded constitution that is responsible for most of the gridlock that keeps the country mired. EU leaders have now coalesced around a new policy of seemingly easier-to-achieve economic and social measures. Next month, the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are to announce a ballyhooed “reform action plan” meant to spur long overdue cuts to the bloated bureaucracy and other reforms needed for EU accession. Unfortunately, the public is adamantly against cutting public sector jobs, and many politicians rightly fear that reform will force them to privatize public companies they currently manipulate for patronage and graft. Sensing this resistance, and congenitally afraid of confronting local officials, international players are likely to temper their demands for reform. Brussels already fudged its own requirements for the formal association agreement between Bosnia and the EU enacted this year, and officials have made it clear that according Bosnia candidate status is the crux of their latest strategy for the troubled country.

Emphasizing form over substance, the EU is no more likely to achieve desperately needed progress now than it has been over the past nine years. As in Macedonia, it was in 2006 that the democratization process, which had seen fledgling joint institutions take shape under vigorous international stewardship, began to unravel. Prematurely applying a rigid form of local ownership over institutions, recalcitrant officials (particularly in the Serb entity) began to unwind progress and openly challenge the country’s unity. As Washington periodically attempted to goad the EU into action and local officials into compromise, Bosnian leaders shrugged off the efforts and the country slumped more deeply into stagnation. With 14 separate governments, the country’s institutions today are a dysfunctional relic of the war years, inhibiting investment and interethnic cooperation.

The only positive from the terrorist attack in Zvornik is that it may finally shock international officials into action. An EU-IMF package that links ambitious standards with generous financial incentives and credible penalties—such as visa bans and exposure of financial chicanery for recalcitrant leaders—can finally concentrate minds in Bosnia.

PRIMJER KOSOVA

Zajednički napor može donijetiti i rezultate na Kosovu, mjestu gdje EU ima najznačajniji prodor. Pod vođstvom Brisela i uz snažnu podršku SAD, Srbija i Kosovo su se prije dvije godine složili da normalizuju odnose. Ali prepirke između Beograda i Prištine, pojačane odbijanjem pet zemalja EU da priznaju nezavisno Kosovo, uz endemsku korupciju, ostavile su Kosovo u bijedi. Desetine hiljada Kosovara napustile su zemlju i krenule u EU, izražavajući nedostatak povjerenja u budućnost na vlastitim nogama.

Radikalne opcije za ujedinjenje Kosova sa Albanijom, što bi ponovo otvorilo sukob sa Srbijom, i dalje nailaze na naklonost. Nekad primjerni umjerenjaci učvrstili su svoje držanje protiv kompromisa koji je podržao Brisel. U isto vrijeme, u Kosovu se vide uznemirujući znaci islamskih radikala koji unose strah u srca Srba i umjerenih albanskih muslimana. Velika je zabrinutost da će islamisti naći zajednički stav sa radikalnim albanskim nacionalistima, ubacujući sve veću nestabilnost u zemlju čiju sigurnost i dalje nadgleda NATO, uz znatno prisustvo EU. Brisel i Vašington treba da pritisnu albanske lidere da sada pokrenu ključnu reformu vladavine prava, dok vuku Beograd i Prištinu do sporazuma o pitanjima koja su nedvojbeno manje teška od onih koje su prevazišli 2013. Ti razgovori pokazali su da, kad Brisel uslovljava napredak prema članstvu u EU napretkom u njihovim odnosima, onda Srbi i Albanci počinju da idu ka kompromisu.

Brojne su opasnosti, ali Balkan ni u kom slučaju nije beznadežan. Ironija današnje krize u Makedoniji, Bosni i Kosovu jeste da je, iako neki lideri igraju na kartu nacionalizma, sve više običnih građana koji su više nego ikad voljni da prevaziđu etničke razlike. Dovoljno je vremena potrošeno odugovlačenjem gorućih pitanja u regionu sa bezuspješnim, neadekvatnim inicijativama. Nema potrebe da se protraći, kroz nebrigu i bojažljivost, principijelan (i uglavnom uspješan) napor započet hrabro i s vizijom. Više od bilo čega, rješenje problema u regionu danas jednostavno zahtijeva da ih zvaničnici još jednom shvate ozbiljno.

THE KOSOVO EXAMPLE

Concerted effort can also achieve results in Kosovo, the site of the EU’s most significant breakthrough. Under Brussels’ leadership, and with strong U.S. support, Serbia and Kosovo agreed to normalize their relations two years ago. But bickering between Belgrade and Pristina, abetted by the refusal of five EU countries to recognize independent Kosovo, along with endemic corruption, has left Kosovo in miserable shape. Tens of thousands of Kosovars have left the country for the EU, expressing their abject lack of confidence in the future with their feet.

Radical options for unifying Kosovo with Albania, which would reopen conflict with Serbs, continue to find favor. Once exemplary moderates have been hardening their stance against the Brussels-backed compromise. At the same time, Kosovo has seen disturbing signs of Islamist radicals who strike fear in the hearts of Serbs and moderate Albanian Muslims alike. The great worry is that Islamists will find common cause with radical Albanian nationalists, injecting greater instability into a country whose security is still overseen by NATO, along with a substantial EU presence.

Brussels and Washington need to press Albanian leaders to move forward now on key rule of law reforms, while dragging Belgrade and Pristina to agreement on issues arguably far less onerous than those they overcame in 2013. Those talks proved that when Brussels conditions progress toward EU membership on progress in their relations, then Serbs and Albanians begin to move toward compromise.

Dangers abound, but the Balkans are by no means hopeless. The irony of today’s crises in Macedonia, Bosnia, and Kosovo is that while some leaders play the nationalism card, more ordinary citizens than ever before are willing to move past ethnic differences. Enough time has been frittered away protracting the region’s outstanding issues with abortive, inadequate initiatives. There is no need to squander, through neglect and timidity, a principled (and largely successful) effort begun with courage and vision. More than anything, resolving the region’s problems today simply requires that officials once more take them seriously.