Europe Report No.232, Sarajevo / Brisel, 10. juli 2014
10.07.2014.
Europe Report No. 232, Sarajevo / Brussels, 10 July 2014
10.07.2014.
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Bosna i Hercegovina (BiH ili Bosna) ne predstavlja rizik za veliki sukob, ali poslije milijardi dolara strane pomoći i nametljive međunarodne administracije i uprkos podršci evropskog okruženja, ona se polako kreće ka dezintegraciji. Sukobljeni ciljevi i interesi tri zajednice su stalan izvor krize, koju pogoršava ustav koji ne zadovoljava potrebe nijedne grupe. Politička elita uživa u nadmoći nad svim nivoima vlasti i velikim dijelom ekonomije, bez praktičnog načina za glasače da je pomaknu. Evropska Unija (UN) nameće zadatke koje BiH ne može ispuniti. U februaru 2014, pobuna naroda širom zemlje spalila je vladine zgrade i zahtijevala hitne reforme, ali moguća rješenja nisu politički izvodljiva; ono što je možda politički izvodljivo izgleda nemoguće izvesti. Bosanski lideri, uz međunarodnu podršku, moraju započeti hitnu potragu temelja novog ustava.
Međunarodni projekt obnove Bosne imao je uspjeha: fizički ožiljci rata uglavnom su nestali i u zemlji je mir. Međutim, političke agonije pokazuju granice intervencije. Godine dobronamjernih reformi, nametnutih ili podstaknutih, navele su lidere vladajuće strukture da ih izbjegavaju, ignoriraju ili preziru. Majske poplave su ostavile desetine mrtvih i hiljade beskućnika, pokazujući cijenu nefunkcionalne vlasti. Sve češće Bosanci postavljaju pitanja koja su prethodila ratu 1992-1995: hoće li ovo biti jedna zemlja, dvije ili čak tri; ako je jedna hoće li imati jedan, dva ili tri konstitutivna entiteta i kako će se u njoj upravljati?
Suština problema je u Annexu 4 Daytonskog mirovnog sporazuma, poznatog kao ustav (sa nekoliko izmjena koje su nametnuli sudovi i međunarodni dužnosnici). On definiše BiH kao državu dva entiteta, važeću ali ne eksplicitno federalnu, ali takođe i kao državu tri konstitutivna naroda (Bošnjaci, Hrvati, Srbi) i istovremeno svih građana. Pridodan je zagušujući nivo etničkih kvota, obezbjeđujući sinecure dužnosnicima koji su sve udaljeniji od zajednica koje predstavljaju. Tenzije stvorene ustavnom šizofrenijom guraju BiH prema tački raspada. Potreban je redizajn: normalna federacija, teritorijalno definisana, bez posebne uloge za konstitutivne narode, ali koja odgovara interesima njene tri zajednice i daje prava svim građanima.
Potrebu da se reformiše državna administracija potaknula je 2009. odluka Evropskog suda za ljudska prava (ECtHR) kojom se traži od BiH da promijeni etnički bazirani princip po kome se bira izvršna vlast i dio zakonodavstva. Postojeći prijedlozi nastoje da stisnu konstitutivne narode u prividno etnički slijepu strukturu na čijem će vrhu komplikovana mreža indirektnih izbora dopustiti partijskim liderima da izaberu izvršna tijela sa što manje demokratskog ulaganja. EU i međunarodna zajednica podržavaju ovo petljanje sa Daytonom da bi zadovoljili donesenu odluku, iako su takvi prijedlozi nesumnjivo propali. Bosanci treba da obnove svoje političko uređenje idući odozdo prema gore.
Ne postoji konsenzus o tome odakle započeti, ali Bosna mora da se otrgne od svog političkog sistema koji se bazira na konstitutivnim narodima i njihovim pravima. Krizna grupa nije lako došla do ovog zaključka. Ona odražava dugo iskustvo i zapažanja koje niko nije u stanju da uokviri u široko prhvaćenu viziju na postojećoj manjkavoj osnovi. Uz stresove i frustracije koji se gomilaju u svim zajednicama Bosna mora osmisliti nove temelje da bi opstala. Možda će trebati godine da se dođe do sporazuma i mnogo eksperimentisanja i rasprava, ali potraga mora da započne.
BiH je dom tri političke zajednice: oni koji su primarno lojalni bosanskoj državi, obično ali ne i uvijek Bošnjaci; oni lojalni Republici Srpskoj (RS), uglavnom Srbi; i oni koji priželjkuju hrvatsku samoupravu, uglavnom Hrvati. Dati Hrvatima ono što žele, njihov vlastiti entitet da bi napravili troentitetsku Bosnu, Bošnjaci apsolutno odbijaju. Gradeći virtualne predstavničke jedinice za tri zajednice, moguće s novim naglaskom na općine kao bazični blok, intelektualno je vjerojatno ali zahtijeva čin povjerenja koji su samo neki spremni da preduzmu. Čisto građanska država je nezamisliva i Srbima i Hrvatima.
Nijedan od lidera niti civilno društvo nisu dublje istražili alternative za tri konstitutivna naroda u dva entiteta; za svaki konsenzus treba vremena. Ipak, cilj treba da bude jasan. Šef države treba da odražava različitost Bosne, nešto što kolektiv radi bolje nego pojedinac. Isto tijelo moglo bi biti izvršna vlast. Neke odluke zahtijevaju konsenzus, druge većinu. Sve tri zajednice treba da budu zastupljene, ne obavezno u jednakom broju. Ne smije biti etničkih kvota; izabrano tijelo treba da predstavlja samoupravne regije i sve njihove glasače. One koji slabo rade, nepotrebne državne agencije i ministarstva treba smanjiti ili ukinuti i vlast prenijeti na entitete; ali država treba nova ministarstva i agencije koje se traže za članstvo u EU. Deset kantona u većem od dva BiH entiteta, Federaciji (FBiH), su neproduktivan, suvišan nivo vlasti. Mogli bi biti ukinuti, njihova vlast podijeljena između općina i entitetske vlade.
Politička kultura je dio problema; neformalna ‘Šestorka’ stranačkih lidera ustvari kontroliše vladu i veliki dio ekonomije. Multietnička koalicija ustrajava, od izbora do izbora, sa manjim usaglašavanjem. Članstvo se dobija netransparentnom pobjedom međustranačkih nadmetanja u kome glasači nemaju mnogo šta da kažu. Promjena u ovom sistemu može doći samo iznutra: Bosanci treba da se uključe u partije i učestvuju u pravim liderskim takmičenjima. Moć ‘Šestorke’ dalje jača kontrola zapošljavanja, ulaganja i poslovne odluke državnih kompanija, situacija koja guši privatno ulaganje i rast.
Bosna je nezamisliva bez djelovanja međunarodnih dužnosnika koji su mnogo učinili u oblikovanju političkih institucija i impementaciji mira, ali međunarodna zajednica je postala više prepreka nego pomoć. BiH je zapala u ciklus slabo promišljenih, međunarodno nametnutih zadataka da bi se pokazala spremnost lidera da preuzmu odgovornost, ali to je zauvijek izmaklo. Jedini način da se lideri potaknu da preuzmu odgovornost jeste da se država tretira normalno, bez stranih testova ili visokog predstavnika. EU bi mogla dati znak za novi početak izjavom da će primiti aplikaciju za članstvo – prvi od mnogo koraka na dugom ulaznom putu. Tada treba jedan angažovan, ne predidaktičan partner u bosanskom traženju puta da se razmrsi ustavni čvor.
Da se zemlja postavi na čvrst temelj novog ustava
Vladi Bosne i Hercegovine (BiH), Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine (FBiH) i Republici Srpskoj (RS):
Građanima Bosne i Hercegovine:
Međunarodnoj zajednici, prije svega EU, US i donatorima:
Predsjedništvu Bosne i Hercegovine:
EU:
Članovima Vijeća za implementaciju mira (PIC), posebno EU i US:
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH, or Bosnia) poses little risk of deadly conflict, but after billions of dollars in foreign aid and intrusive international administration and despite a supportive European neighbourhood, it is slowly spiralling toward disintegration. Its three communities’ conflicting goals and interests are a permanent source of crisis, exacerbated by a constitution that meets no group’s needs. The political elite enjoys mastery over all government levels and much of the economy, with no practical way for voters to dislodge it. The European Union (EU) imposes tasks BiH cannot fulfil. A countrywide popular uprising torched government buildings and demanded urgent reforms in February 2014, but possible solutions are not politically feasible; those that might be politically feasible seem unlikely to work. Bosnia’s leaders, with international support, must begin an urgent search for a new constitutional foundation.
The international project to rebuild Bosnia has had success: war’s physical scars are largely gone, and the country is peaceful. The political agonies, however, show the intervention’s limits. Years of well-intentioned reforms, imposed or urged, have left a governing structure leaders circumvent, ignore or despise. May’s floods left scores dead and thousands homeless, exposing the price of poor governance. With growing frequency, Bosnians ask the questions that preceded the 1992-1995 war: shall it be one country, two, or even three; if one country, shall it have one, two or three constituent entities, and how shall it be governed?
The heart of the problem is in Annex 4 to the Dayton Peace Agreement, known as the constitution (and in several changes imposed by courts and international officials). It defines BiH as a state of two entities, in effect but not explicitly federal, but also the state of three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs), and yet, simultaneously, of all citizens. A suffocating layer of ethnic quotas has been added, providing sinecures for officials increasingly remote from the communities they represent. The tensions created by constitutional schizophrenia are pushing BiH to the breaking point. A new design is needed: a normal federation, territorially defined, without a special role for constituent peoples, but responsive to the interests of its three communities and the rights of all citizens.
The state administration’s need to reform is made acute by a 2009 decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that in effect requires BiH to change the ethnicity-based way it chooses its chief executive and part of its legislature. Existing proposals try to squeeze the constituent peoples into an ostensibly ethnicity-blind structure on top of which a complicated network of indirect elections would allow party leaders to choose the executive with as little democratic input as possible. The EU and the outside world support this tinkering with Dayton to satisfy the decision, though such proposals have manifestly failed. Bosnians need to rebuild their political structure from the bottom up.
There is no consensus on where to start, but Bosnia may have to break from its political system based on constituent peoples and their rights. Crisis Group has not reached this conclusion lightly. It reflects long experience and observation that no one has been able to frame a broadly attractive vision on the existing flawed basis. With stresses and frustrations accumulating in all communities, Bosnia must conceive new foundations to survive. Agreement may take years and much experimentation and debate, but the search should begin.
BiH is home to three political communities: those primarily loyal to the Bosnian state, usually but not always Bosniaks; those loyal to Republika Srpska (RS), usually Serbs; and those desirous of Croat self-government, usually Croats. Giving the Croats what they want, their own entity to make a three-entity Bosnia, is absolutely rejected by Bosniaks. Building virtual representative units for the three communities, possibly with new emphasis on municipalities as basic building blocks, is intellectually plausible but requires a leap of faith few seem ready to take. A purely civic state is inconceivable to Serbs and Croats.
Neither leaders nor civil society have deeply explored alternatives to three constituent peoples in two entities; any consensus would take time. Nevertheless, the goal should be clear. The head of state should reflect Bosnia’s diversity, something a collective does better than an individual. The same body could be the executive government. Some decisions should require consensus, others a majority. All three communities should be represented, not necessarily in equal numbers. There should be no ethnic quotas; representation should reflect self-defined regions and all their voters. Poorly performing, unnecessary state agencies and ministries should be slimmed or abolished, with powers reverting to the entities; but the state would need new ministries and agencies required for EU membership. The ten cantons in the larger of BiH’s two entities, the Federation (FBiH), are an underperforming, superfluous layer. They could be abolished, their powers divided between the municipalities and the entity government.
Political culture is part of the problem; an informal “Sextet” of party leaders in effect controls government and much of the economy. A multi-ethnic coalition persists, election to election, with only minor adjustments. Membership is earned by winning opaque intra-party competitions in which voters have little say. Change in this system can only come from within: Bosnians should join parties and participate in genuine leadership contests. Sextet power is further buttressed by control of hiring, investment and commercial decisions at state-owned firms, a situation that chokes private investment and growth.
Bosnia is unimaginable without the work of international officials who did much to shape political institutions and implement peace, but the international community has become more obstacle than help. BiH is trapped in a cycle of poorly thought-out, internationally-imposed tasks designed to show leaders’ readiness to take responsibility but that put that moment forever out of reach. The only way to encourage leaders to take responsibility is to treat the country normally, without extraneous tests or High Representatives. The EU could signal a new start by stating it will receive a membership application – the first of many steps on the long accession road. It should then be an engaged, not over-didactic partner in Bosnia’s search for a way to disentangle the constitutional knot.
To set the country on a firm new constitutional foundation
To the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS):
To the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
To the international community, notably the EU, U.S. and donors:
To the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
To the EU:
To the members of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), in particular the EU and U.S.:
Međunarodna krizna grupa je nezavisna, neprofitna i nevladina organizacija posvećena sprječavanju i rješavanju sukoba.
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The International Crisis Group is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation committed to preventing and resolving deadly conflict.
Ovaj izvještaj,kratak izvod i preporuke su prvobitno objavljeni na web sajtu ICG-ija (10.07.2014). [prevod: Dijalog BiH2.0]
This report,executive summary and recommendations were originally published on the ICG website (10.07.2014).
Odgovornost za informacije i gledišta iznesena u ovom članku, isključivo leži na autorima i nužno ne odražavaju mišljenje urednika Dialogue - BiH2.0 – Dijalog, njegovog savjetodavnog odbora, Tufts univerziteta, partnera, pobornika i donatora.
Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Dialogue - BiH2.0 - Dijalog Editors, its Advisory Board, Tufts University, Partners, Supporters and Donors.}
