Kurt Bassuener :

Oružane snage u BiH: Neispunjena obećanja

Ova politička bilješka DPC-AI je dio niza povremenih političkih dokumenata koji zajednički čine drugo izdanje Studije DPC i Atlantske inicijative o analizi rizika. Ovo drugo izdanje procjenjuje iste faktore iz sveukupne perspektive do današnjeg dana, uključujući novu informaciju koja ranije nije bila dostupna autorima. Ti dokumenti nisu samo najnovije informacije prvog izdanja; svaka politička zabilješka je samostalna procjena teme o kojoj je riječ. Ipak, ostaju i informacije iz izdanja iz 2011. koje su relevantne.

17.12.2015.

Kurt Bassuener :

The Armed Forces of BiH: Unfulfilled Promises

This DPC-Atlantic Initiative Policy Note is part of a series of occasional thematic papers which collectively compose the second edition of DPC and the AI’s Security Risk Analysis Study. This second edition assesses these same factors from the vantage point of the present day, including new information previously unavailable to the authors. These papers are not mere updates of the first edition; each Policy Note is a stand-alone assessment of the theme in question. However, where information from the 2011 edition remains relevant, it is included.

17.12.2015.

REZIME I PREPORUKE

Oružane snage Bosne i Hercegovine (OSBiH ili “vojska”) obilježiće desetu godišnjicu 2016. i stoje kao koristan podsjetnik znatnog napretka postignutog u prvoj deceniji nakon potpisivanja Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma 1995. Mađutim, vojska je bila okupljena tek kad su konsolidacija na nivou države i reforme počele da zastaju, da se povlače ili obratno. OSBiH nisu imune na posljedice polariziranog političkog okruženja i njegove prateće boljke – nepotizam i klijentelizam, kratkoročnost i nedostatak odgovornosti. Šta više, vlada Republike Srpske (RS) vječno cilja na rezanje budžeta OSBiH kao dio njene politike da se demilitarizira BiH, i na taj način dalje oslabi država.

Uz to, na uveliko isti način na koji je Dejton uključio kompromise za koje se pokazalo da opstruiraju stvaranje funkcionalnog i odgovornog sistema vlasti u BiH, kompromisi traženi da se stvori OSBiH ometaju njenu integraciju. Posebno, održavanje pješadijskih bataljona sa etničkom većinom predstavlja rizik u slučaju izbijanja dalje međuetničke polarizacije, kao i (ceremonijalni) pukovski sistem – prvobitno zamišljen kao zatvoreni mehanizam za veterane Armije BiH, Vojske RS i HVO, ali sada ovjekovječen poticanjem novih regruta da im se pridruže. Puna integracija do operativnog nivoa ostaje nerealizirana. Šta više, izvori ukazuju da laskanje političkim i vjerskim vlastima kako bi napredovali postaje sve vidljivije u činovima.

Napredovanje prema cilju članstva u NATO, koje je upitno i za vladu RS i za novog srpskog člana Predsjedništva BiH Mladena Ivanića, hrama zbog činjenice da vlasništvo vojne imovine ostaje predmet spora. Rješenje za ovo pitanje koje bi oslobodilo vojsku od odbrane tih položaja za druge dužnosti, je eksplicitan zahtjev da bi se aktivirao Akcioni plan za članstvo u NATO (MAP). Upis ove imovine, koju je Ustavni sud BiH a nedavno i Sud BiH proglasio državnom imovinom, bio je dio koalicionog sporazuma za vladu BiH, ali mu se žestoko protivi RS.

Uprkos tim znatnim zaprekama OSBiH se ponaša pohvalno i u inozemstvu u operacijama za podršku mira (sa regularnim kontigentima koji podržavaju ISAF u Afganistanu) i kod kuće. U ovom drugom slučaju, za vrijeme i poslije spašavanja za vrijeme majskih poplava 2014, OSBiH su spašavale živote i imovinu građana BiH u svim poplavom pogođenim oblastima. Ovo je znatno ojačalo moral i povezalo vojsku s građanima više nego ikad prije. OSBiH su bile jedino državno, entitetsko ili kantonalno zvanično tijelo čija je reputacija naglašena tokom odgovora na poplavu, svi drugi su se mizerno ponijeli. Ovo iskustvo u vrijeme katastrofe takođe je pokazalo nedostatke u opremi, obuci i pripremama što se može popraviti da bi se osiguralo bolje djelovanje u budućnosti.

Na kraju, OSBiH uvodi “svježu krv” u oficirski kadar putem programa koji sponzorira Velika Britanija da bi regrutovali univerzitetski obrazovan kadar. Ovaj napor je uveliko hvaljen u intervjuima autora kao put za dalju profesionalizaciju vojske.

Ukratko, problemi koji se vežu za OSBiH su isti kao oni prije četiri godine, kad je objavljeno prvo izdanje Analize DPC/Atlantska inicijativa o sigurnosnom riziku. Ne očekuje se da će OSBiH generirati destabilizaciju ili inicirati međuetničko nasilje. Ali tu je i generalno uvjerenje da u slučaju takvog nasilja može pasti duž etničkih linija. OSBiH ne može drugo osim odražavati politički motiviranu polarizaciju koja dominira političkom arenom u BiH.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH or “the force”) will mark its tenth anniversary in 2016 and stands as a useful reminder of the considerable progress achieved in the first decade following the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. However, the force was assembled just when all other state-building consolidation and reforms began to stop, stall or reverse.. The AFBiH is not immune to the effects of the polarized political environment and its attendant afflictions – patronage and clientelism, short-termism, and a lack of accountability. Furthermore, the Republika Srpska (RS) Government has perennially targeted the AFBiH’s budget for cuts as part of its policy to demilitarize BiH, and thereby further weaken the state.

In addition, in much the same way that Dayton included compromises which have been proven to obstruct the creation of a functional and accountable governance system for BiH, the tradeoffs required to create the AFBiH impedes its integration. In particular, the maintenance of ethnic majority infantry battalions poses a risk in the event of the emergence of further interethnic polarization, as does the (ceremonial) regimental system – originally intended as a containment mechanism for Armija BiH, Vojske RS, and HVO traditions for veterans of these forces, but now being perpetuated by the encouragement of new recruits to join them. Full integration of the force down to the operational level remains unrealized. Furthermore, sources indicate that currying favor with political and religious authorities in pursuit of advancement has become ever more visible in the ranks.

Progress toward the goal of NATO membership, questioned by both the RS Government and more recently by Serb member of the BiH Presidency Mladen Ivanić, has been hobbled by the fact that the ownership of defense property remains in dispute. Resolution of this issue, which would free troops from defending these sites for other duties, is an explicit requirement for the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) to be activated. Registration of this property, ruled State property by the BiH Constitutional Court and more recently the Court of BiH, was part of the coalition agreement for the BiH Government, but remains vehemently opposed by the RS.

Despite these considerable impediments, the AFBiH has performed admirably, both abroad in peace support operations (with regular contingents supporting ISAF in Afghanistan) and at home. In the latter case, during and following the May 2014 flood emergency, the AFBiH saved lives and property of BiH citizens throughout the flood affected areas. This boosted morale considerably and connected the force to the citizenry as never before. The AFBiH was the only state, entity, or cantonal official body to emerge with its reputation enhanced through its flood response; all others performed miserably. This disaster response experience also identified deficiencies in equipment, training and preparation which can be remediated to ensure better performance in the future.

Finally, the AFBiH is inducting “new blood” into the officer corps through a British-sponsored program to recruit university graduates. The effort was universally lauded in the author’s interviews as an avenue to further professionalize the force.

In short, the problems identified with the AFBiH are essentially the same as they were four years ago, when the first edition of the DPC/Atlantic Initiative (AI) Security Risk Analysis was published. There is no expectation that the AFBiH will generate destabilization or initiate inter-ethnic violence. But there is almost universal belief that in the event of such violence, it would collapse along its ethnic fault lines. The AFBiH cannot but reflect the politically-driven polarization which dominates the political arena in BiH.

Imajući ova saznanja na umu DPC i AI preporučuju sljedeće zapadnim vladama:

1. Završiti sa nejasnim garancijama sigurnosti BiH: Smanjenje EUFOR-a na tričavih približno 600 vojnika poslalo je signal političarima i građanima da više nema kredibilnog faktora za destabilizirajuće aktere, niti sposbnosti da se reagira u nepredviđenim krizama i širenju prijetnji. EU i NATO treba da konačno izgovore bez dvosmislenosti da će svaki pokušaj da se podijeli BiH ili započne međuetničko nasilje biti dočekan silom.

2. Pokazati postojanu solidarnost i čvrstinu Zapada u vezi usaglašavanja sa legalnim odlukama važnim za vojnu imovinu: Odluka Ustavnog suda BiH iz 2012. o državnoj imovini nikad nije bila poziv na pobunu kako se očekivalo s obzirom na rezoluciju vlade RS da je ne prihvata. Moraju biti konkretne posljedice za kreatore politike u vladi RS, u što se mogu uključiti “restriktivne mjere” EU.

3. Nastaviti dugoročnu podršku za “svježu krv” u OSBiH. Uveliko se hvali novi program za uvođenje oficira koji sponzorira Velika Britanija. Drugi donatori treba da razmisle o sličnim ili komplementarnim naporima da se u OSBiH uvedu novi talenti i vještine.

4. Obezbijediti podršku za integraciju vojske na novi nivo vojnih jedinica. Integracija operativne jedinice, posebno za jedinice raspoređene u inozemstvu i za nove oficire je važan cilj koji treba da bude eksplicitno definiran – i artikuliran – kao meta za zapadnu pomoć.

5. Odrediti stručnjake da pomognu u nabavci, kako bi vojni budžet bio pametno utrošen na blagovremen način. Pomoć u razvoju tendera i iskustvo zapadnih oružanih snaga će maksimizirati korist ograničenog vojnog budžeta i vanjsku pomoć.

6. Obezbijediti pomoć u planiranju u slučaju prirodnih katastrofa: Pristup sličan ranijim naporima koji su preduzeti da bi se sanirali ozbiljni nedostaci u političkoj koordinaciji treba poduzeti OSBiH i šira civlna odbrana u BiH, uključujući ministarstvo sigurnosti i entitete i kantonalna tijela.

7. Obezbijediti ili pomoći u nabavci specijalizirane opreme za hitne slučajeve, i putem regionalnog udruženih/kolaborativnih aranžmana, s posebnim fokusom na nedostatke identificirane prilikom pružanja pomoći u vrijeme poplava u maju 2014: helikopteri za vertikalno izvlačenje, vatrogasna oprema, čamci, i specijalizirana inženjerska oprema.

With these findings in mind, DPC and AI recommend the following to Western governments:

1. End the ambiguity on BiH security guarantees: The reduction of EUFOR to a paltry approximately 600 troops has conveyed the signal to politicians and citizens alike that there is no longer a credible deterrent to destabilizing actors, nor a capability to react to unforeseen crises or undeterrable threats. The EU and NATO need to finally state without ambiguity that any attempts to split BiH or initiate interethnic violence will be confronted forcefully.

2. Demonstrate steadfast Western solidarity and firmness regarding compliance with legal decisions relevant to defense property: The 2012 BiH Constitutional Court decision on State property has never been the rallying cry it should have been, given the resolution of the RS Government to defy it. There must be concrete consequences for RS Government decisionmakers, which can include EU “restrictive measures.”

3. Continue long-term support to “new blood” in the AFBiH. The British-sponsored new officer induction program is universally praised. Other donors should consider similar or complimentary efforts to introduce new talent and skills into the AFBiH.

4. Provide support for force integration at the company level. Operational unit integration, particularly for units deployed abroad and for newly-inducted officers, is an important goal that needs to be an explicitly defined – and articulated – target for Western assistance.

5. Assign experts to assist in procurement, so the defense budget can be wisely spent in a timely fashion. Assistance in developing tenders and due diligence by Western militaries/MoDs would maximize the utility of the limited defense budget and external assistance.

6. Provide assistance in planning for natural disasters: An approach similar to the preliminary efforts that were undertaken to remediate serious deficiencies in police coordination should be undertaken for the AFBiH and the wider civil defense architecture in BiH, including the Ministry of Security and entity and cantonal bodies.

7. Provide or assist in procuring specialized equipment for civil emergencies, including through regional pooling/collaborative arrangements, focusing particularly on the deficiencies identified in the May 2014 flood emergency: helicopters capable of vertical extraction, firefighting equipment, boats, and specialized engineering equipment.

Izvještaj Atlantske inicijative i Vijeća za demokratizaciju politike Autor: Kurt Bassuener Uredništvo: Toby Vogel &DPC editorial board

A report from Atlantic Initiative & Democratization Policy Council Author: Kurt Bassuener Editing: Toby Vogel & DPC executive editorial board

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