Biti član EU i dalje znači – biti priznat kao “normalna” zemlja, ne biti više “u tranziciji”, niti manje uspješna od drugih. Tranzicija je u ovim zemljama bolna i kompleksna i široka javnost se do sada umorila od svega. Bez članstva u EU, mnogi bi osjećali da dosadašnji napori nisu priznati i nagrađeni.

Pored toga, članstvo u Evropskoj uniji bi povećalo, ne umanjilo, autonomiju i “stvarnu moć” svake nove zemlje članice. Tokom dugog perioda od gotovo 25 godina od raspada bivše Jugoslavije, države nasljednice tretirane su više kao objekti, a ne subjekti vanjske politike. Često su morale činiti ono što ne žele, i bile su spriječene da rade ono što žele. Kao članice EU, osjećaju da bi imale mnogo više nezavisnosti u svojoj vanjskoj politici. Stoga, čak i nacionalisti i autonomaši sada podržavaju članstvo u EU, nadajući se da će za “nacionalne interese” biti najbolje ako se njihova zemlja pridruži Uniji.

Međutim, čini se da je malo vjerovatno da će ijedna od preostalih zemalja na Zapadnom Balkanu (“Restern Balkans”) dobiti članstvo u EU u bliskoj budućnosti. Sama EU je čak i više skeptična prema ideji daljeg proširenja. Iako Zapadni Balkan nije zapravo područje proširenja – već “konsolidacije” EU – pošto je ova oblast već okružena zemljama članicama EU, pa novo članstvo ne podrazumijeva širenje na istok, neke države-članice su najavile referendume o pridruženju bilo koje nove države Evropskoj uniji. Nijedna od država-kandidata nema jake “države-sponzore” unutar EU – što je znatno drugačije u poređenju sa njemačkim sponzorisanjem Hrvatske ili grčkim sponzorisanjem Kipra.

Nadalje, EU se, čini se, zabavila svojim unutrašnjim krizama, kao što su: kriza finansijskog sektora, grčka kriza, problem migracija i odnosa sa Rusijom u vezi sa Ukrajinom. Vizija budućeg razvoja sada je manje jasna nego ikada. Iako nijedna od ovih kriza ne potiče sa Zapadnog Balkana, gotovo sve su uticale i na odnose EU prema ovoj regiji. Relativan neuspjeh Bugarske, Rumunije, a sada i Hrvatske u konsolidovanju vlastitih finansija od trenutka pridruživanja EU, doveo je do toga da su neke države-članice dodatno oprezne u vezi sa novim članicama. Prije ekonomske krize, 2003. godine, EU je dala jasno obećanje svim zemljama na Zapadnom Balkanu da su vrata otvorena svima njima. Da li bi EU danas bila spremna da ponovi ovakvo obećanje?

Što EU više oklijeva da naznači čak i okvirni datum članstva preostalim kandidatima, to je sve teže odgovoriti na pitanja kao što su: “Zašto bismo uopšte pokušali da preduzmemo ozbiljne reforme, kada za našeg života možda neće biti jasne nagrade?” Promjene koje EU zahtijeva od zemalja kandidata su duboke i ponekad bolne. Riječima je reforme jednostavno promovisati, ali djelima je još jednostavnije nastaviti po starom, ploviti na talasima inercije. EU je takođe nekad prilično nerealna, dok nastavlja povećavati svoje zahtjeve i očekivanja, u ažuriranoj verziji kriterija “Kopenhagen Plus”. Mnoge od ovih novih zahtjeva gotovo je nemogući zadovoljiti od strane država koje su u goroj ekonomskoj, društvenoj i čak političkoj situaciji nego one koje su se pridružile pod manje zahtjevnim kriterijima. Čak i one koje su se pridružile 2007. godine i Hrvatska (2013. god.) često su samo simulirale reforme kako bi udovoljile EU. Ali, jesu li reforme bile neopozive? EU bi trebalo da bude realnija kada postavlja nove zahtjeve i očekivanja. Trebalo bi da se koncentriše na relativno mali broj apsolutno neophodnih poboljšanja, a ne da gradi Lego-land od novih zahtjeva, jer to može samo obeshrabriti pro-EU snage u zemljama kandidatima.

Nakon krize u Ukrajini, EU se suočava sa političkom konkurencijom za uticaj u zemljama izvan Unije, na jugu i jugoistoku Evrope. To takođe treba uzeti u obzir, naročito na Zapadnom Balkanu. Teško da Rusija i Turska mogu ponuditi više od Evropske unije zemljama ove regije. Međutim, ukoliko im EU ne ponudi članstvo u neko dogledno vrijeme, uticaj ovih regionalnih sila će biti još veći. U interesu Evropske Unije je da prihvati nove članice sa Zapadnog Balkana što prije može. Predugo boravljenje u čekaonici EU nije produktivno jer ne čini zemlje kandidatkinje mnogo boljim. Ali se istovremeno rizikuje da se one okrenu drugim alternativama. U rastućoj multipolarizaciji na unutrašnjoj i vanjskoj periferiji Evrope, to bi bio pogrešan pravac djelovanja.

To be a member of EU still means – to be recognised as a “normal” country, no longer “in transition” and thus less successful than others. Transition in these countries has been painful and complex, and general public is by now tired of it. Without membership in the EU, many would feel that efforts so far have not been recognised and rewarded.

In addition, membership in the European Union would increase, not decrease, sovereignty and “real power” of each of new member-state. For long period of now almost 25 years since the old Yugoslavia collapsed, its successor-states have been treated more as objects, not subjects, of foreign policy. They often had to do what they did not want to do, and were prevented from doing what they wanted. Once members of the EU, they feel they would be much more independent in their foreign policy. Hence, even nationalists and sovereignists now support membership in the EU, hoping that the mail “national interests” would be best served if their country joins the Union.

However, it seems unlikely that the membership in the EU is to be achieved in near future by any of the countries of remaining Western Balkans (“Restern Balkans”). The EU itself is ever more sceptical towards the idea of further enlargement. Although the Western Balkans is actually not the area of enlargement – but of “consolidation” of EU – since the area is already encircled by EU member-states and thus new membership does not involve expansion eastwards, some countries announced referenda on any new state joining the EU. None of the candidate-countries has any strong “sponsor-state” within the EU – which is rather different compared to Germany’s sponsorship of Croatia, or Greek sponsorship of Cyprus. Furthermore, EU seems to be engaged with its own internal crises, such as: the crisis of financial sector, the Greek crisis, the issue of migration and the relationship with Russia over Ukraine. The vision of further development is now more blurred than ever. Although none of these crises originated in the Western Balkans, almost all have affected EU relations with this region too. Relative failure of Bulgaria, Romania and now also Croatia in consolidating of its own finances since they joined the EU, makes some member-states additionally cautious about new members. In 2003, before the economic crisis, EU issued a clear promise to all countries of Western Balkans that the doors are opened to all countries of Western Balkans. Would EU be willing to repeat such promise today?

The more EU hesitates even to indicate tentative date of membership for the remaining candidates, the more difficult it would become to respond to questions such as: “Why would we even try to undertake serious reforms, when in our lifetime there might be no clear reward?” Changes that the EU demands from candidate-countries are deep and sometimes painful. In words, it is easy to promote “reforms”. But, in deeds, it is even easier to continue with “business as usual”, to float on the waves of inertia. The EU too is sometimes also rather unrealistic, as it keeps increasing its demands and expectations, in an upgraded version of “Copenhagen Plus” criteria. Many of these new requests are almost impossible to satisfy by countries that are in worse economic, social and even political situation than those that joined under less demanding criteria. Even those who joined in 2007 and Croatia (in 2013) have often only simulated reforms in order to please the EU. But, were the reforms irreversible? The EU should be more realistic when issuing new requests and expectations. It should concentrate on relatively small number of absolutely crucial improvements, rather than building a Lego-land of new and new requests, which can only discourage pro-EU forces in candidate countries.

After the crisis in Ukraine, the EU is facing political competition for influence in countries outside the Union, in European East and Southeast. This should also be taken into account, especially in Western Balkans. Russia and Turkey are unlikely to offer more than EU to countries of this region. However, unless EU offers membership in due course, the impact of these other regional powers will be ever bigger. It is in the interest of EU to include new members from Western Balkans as soon as it can. Long lodging in EU waiting room is unproductive as it does not make candidate-countries much better. But it risks their turning towards other alternatives. In an emerging multipolarism in European internal and external peripheries, this would be a wrong direction to move on.