Dvije decenije poslije potpisivanja Dejtonskog sporazuma koji je okončao rat 1992-95. Bosna i Hercegovina je i dalje etnički podijeljena i ekonomsko i politički nefunkcionalna.

Iako je EU izjavila da se Bosna vraća na reformski put, tempo i djelokrug sadašnje reformske agende je nadekvatan da bi se pokrenula skora i temeljna potreba za strukturalnom reformom kako bi se zaustavili problemi u ovoj zemlji.

Ukratko, dug put ka pristupanju EU ne može biti primarna pokretačka snaga za reforme; na prvo mjesto moraju doći reformski prioriteti Bosne. Da bi se to postiglo, EU i SAD treba da pomognu bosanskim istomišljenicima da pokrenu novi, opsežan, racionalan i interesno strukturalan reformski proces – zajedno sa reformskom agendom – kako bi se okončala međunarodna dejtonska misija nakon izbora 2018.

Istorija angažmana međunarodne zajednice u Bosni od 1995. nudi lekcije koje bi ovog puta mogle povećati šanse za novu snažniju reformsku inicijativu. Nema prostora za diskusiju o svima njima. Umjesto toga ću se fokusirati na neposredne razgovore u Dejtonu i pregovore o Aprilskom paketu 2005-6. koji su bili najbliži uspjehu u traženju strukturalne reforme za Dejton.

Neposredni razgovori u Dejtonu

Četiri su važna faktora uspjeha u Dejtonu koja treba imati na umu prilikom pripreme novog reformskog procesa.

Prvo, razgovori jednostavno nisu bili fokusirani na završetak rata u Bosni i Istočnoj Slavoniji, nego na korake potrebne da bi se Bosna stabilizirala i rekonstruirala kao unitarna država. Ovo je bilo artikulirano u aneksima Dejtonskog sporazuma. Kad se na to osvrnemo mogli bi se kritizirati aspekti Aneksa, iako su stvorili solidan okvir na kome se može graditi zemlja.

Drugo, pitanja o kojima se razgovaralo u Dejtonu nisu linearno korak po korak pratila proces, nego su ih različite radne grupe istovremeno pregovarale. Ovo je stvorilo momentum za opsežno rješenje u relativno kratkom vremenskom periodu.

Treće, razgovore su uglavnom vodile one strane – bosanski muslimani, Hrvatska i Srbija, kao i EU i SAD – čiji su interesi u pregovaranju, a ne opstruiranju, opsežnog rešenja. Ishod možda nije bio zadovoljavajući kako su se strane nadale, ali je alternativa – nastavak rata – bila mnogo gora.

Četvrto, dejtonske pregovore nadgledao je snažan, sposoban pregovarač kao što je Richard Holbrooke koji je pokazao jasno vođstvo i pravac ka kompleksnom procesu.

Pregovori o Aprilskom paketu

Pregovori o ustavnoj reformi u Aprilskom paketu vođeni su od marta 2005. do aprila 2006. Iako su u drugoj rundi procesa od decembra 2005, bila, isto tako, tri uspješna elementa o kojima je važno razmisliti zbog inkluzije u novi reformski proces.

Prvo, bosanske političke partije pozvane su da odluče koje bi ustavne reforme željeli da ostvare, što i jesu (grupe civilnog društva potaknute su da učestvuju ali su odbile). Ovo je stvorilo osjećaj interesnog bosanskog vlasništva na inicijativu.

Drugo, diskusije su bile podržane i intenzivne što je potaklo povjerenje Bosne u proces.

Treće, Aprilski paket je propao jer nije postojala dvotrećinska većinska potvrda u bosanskom parlametu kad su kratkoročni interesi jedne od bosanskih partija izigrale dugoročne interese svih strana u obimnom paketu ustavnih reformi.

Definiranje novog procesa strukturalnih reformi

Imajući sve ove faktore u vidu, prvi korak za pokretanje novog opsežnog reformskog napora mora da potvrdi, razveže i odgovori u dobroj vjeri na interese svih strana u Bosni od kojih neki koče strukturalnu reformu.

Ovo, između ostalog, znači strepnju zbog budućnosti entiteta, strah političkih partija od gubitka moći u procesu reformi, zabrinutost zbog kapaciteta države da zaštiti i upravlja interesima njenih građana (ne samo etniciteta) i zemlje, cijenu od oštrih rješenja ekonomske slabosti Bosne i budućnosti međunarodne misije koju predvodi Ured visokog predstavnika (OHR).

Svaki od ovih interesa mogao bi se uraditi kroz radne grupe podržane od EU i SAD s ciljem postizanja dogovorene srednje osnove zajedničkih interesa, tako reducirajući zabrinutost oko djelokruga i dubine strukturalnih reformi Ovo će nesumnjivo biti teški pregovori, ali su bitni i mogu biti uspješni ako su podržani i ozbiljni.

I kad pregovori budu kompletirani Bosanci moraju kolektivno odgovoriti interesima EU i SAD.

I Brisel i Vašington žele da rade sa Bosnom koja poštuje vladavinu prava, koja je istinski demokratska i iskazuje sposobnost da snosi odgovornost za svoje međunarodne ekonomske i sigurnosne obaveze.

Ovo posebno za EU znači veći zajednički bosanski angažman za ispunjenje zahtjeva za Sporazum o stabilnosti i udruživanju (SAA). Što se tiče SAD, riječ je o pregovorima o reformama odbrane i sigurnosti što će Bosnu učiniti pouzdanim evro-atlantskim partnerom i potencijalnom članicom NATO-a u stanju da sarađuje u borbi protiv organiziranog kriminala, terorizma i angažovanju u mirovnim operacijama.

Kolektivna nesposobnost bosanskih vlasti da blagovremeno jednoglasno odgovore na te interese zabrinjava EU i SAD da uveliko investiraju u razrješenje problema u zemlji jer je visoki rizik od neuspjeha u saobraćanju sa nepouzdanim partnerom prevagnuo nad prednošću intenzivnijeg angažmana.

Mantra EU-SAD je jasna: bolje je manje uraditi sa nefunkcionalnom Bosnom u miru nego preduzeti vidljiviji reformski napor koji moguće neće uspjeti i koji će dalje zaprijetiti krhkoj stabilnosti zemlje.

U isto vrijeme, EU – uključujući pojedine evropske zemlje – i SAD moraju takođe učiniti veći napor da jednoglasno progovore u ime njihovih interesa.

U proteklih 20 godina EU i SAD su suviše često bile u suptilnoj kompeticiji i čak suprotstavljene jedna drugoj, iako iza scene, o tome kako se odnositi prema Bosni uprkos uveliko zajedničkim principima i ciljevima.

Da su i jedni i drugi radili zajedno efikasnije i robusnije (isto bi se moglo reći i za Rusiju u skorije vrijeme), vjerujem da bi međunarodna misija završila u Bosni najkasnije do 2006.

Konačni i najkritičniji korak u reformskom procesu mora biti pregovaranje i sporazum o paketu strukturalnih reformi važnih za Bosnu kako bi postala funkcionalno suverena zemlja odgovorna za svoje građane, iznad i odvojeno od njenih međunarodnih obaveza.

Da ponovimo, te pregovore treba da podstiču EU i SAD i uključe izabrane lidere Bosne i članove civilnog društva. Kompletiranje pregovora baziranih na interesima, posebno onih koji uključuju različite bosanske interesne grupe i institucije, potreban je preduvjet za ovu fazu procesa.

Strukturalne reforme uključuju i prevazilaze odredbe za javnu administraciju, sudstvo i ekonomske institucije. Takođe prevazilaze, u prvoj instanci, saglasnost sa pravnim i regulatornim zahtjevima za članstvo u EU, i druge međunarodne obaveze.

Iako je prerano definirati šta bi tačno te strukturalne reforme zahtijevale, pregovori moraju početi od premise da Bosna hrama u svim redovima vlasti, ali najhitnije i najvažnije na državnom nivou, zbog prekomjerne i slabe etničke zaštite ugrađene u dejtonski ustav i svuda u odgovor na neposredne poslijeratne uvjete u kojima je 1995. ispregovaran Dejtonski sporazum.

Ako se racionalni interesi svih strana riješe prije nego što počnu razgovori o strukturalnim reformama, treba da bude moguće postići sporazum kojim se reduciraju pretjerani etnički interesi barem na nivou države u vrijeme izbora 2018. Ova faza pregovora takođe bi neizbježno uključila diskusije o strukturi i funkcionalnosti državnih instutucija bez suvišnih etničkih zaštita.

Kad se jednom postigne paket o strukturalnim reformama biće neophodno, kao preduvjet za zatvaranje dejtonske misije, da to podrže država i entiteti, da ih legalno potvrde državni parlament ili budu odobrene putem referenduma na nivou zemlje. Reforme državne vlasti mogu takođe zahtijevati revizije izbornog zakona tako da narod u Bosni može izaći na izbore u oktobru 2018. s nadom da će napokon izabrati suverenu demokratsku vladu, bez međunarodne mirovne misije, koja poštuje volju svih njenih građana.

Došlo je vrijeme da se dovede do kraja duga i mučna saga o o nefunkcionalnosti postdejtonske Bosne. Ovo je ključno, ne samo za Bosnu, EU i SAD nego i za Zapadni Balkan gdje novi izazovi kao što je migrantska kriza i nestabilnost u Crnoj Gori, na Kosovu i Makedoniji mogu ponovo zapaliti regionalni sukob.

Two decades after the Dayton Agreement ending the 1992-95 war was signed, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains ethnically divided and economically and politically dysfunctional.

While the EU has declared Bosnia back on the reform track, the pace and scope of the current Reform Agenda is inadequate to address the immediate and fundamental need for structural reforms to arrest the country’s problems.

Put more succinctly, the long road to EU accession cannot be the primary driving force for reform; Bosnia’s own reform priorities must come first. To this end, the EU and US should assist their Bosnian counterparts to launch a new, comprehensive, rational, and interests-based structural reform process -alongside the Reform Agenda - with the objective of ending the international Dayton mission following the elections in 2018.

The history of the international community’s engagement in Bosnia since 1995 offers lessons which could increase the chances of a new more robust reform initiative this time round. There is no space to discuss all of them. Instead I shall focus on the Proximity Talks at Dayton and the April Package negotiations in 2005-6 which came closest to success in pursuing structural reform to Dayton.

The proximity talks at Dayton

There are four important success factors at Dayton which should be kept in mind in preparing a new reform process.

First, the talks didn’t focus simply on ending the war in Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia, but on the steps necessary to stabilize and reconstitute Bosnia as a unified state. These were articulated in the Annexes to the Dayton Accords. While in retrospect one may criticize aspects of the Annexes, they created a solid framework on which to rebuild the country.

Second, the issues discussed at Dayton were not dealt with linearly in a step by step process, but negotiated simultaneously by different working groups. This created the momentum for a comprehensive settlement in a relatively short period of time.

Third, the talks were chiefly conducted by those parties - Bosnian Muslims, Croatia and Serbia, as well as EU and US - whose interests lay in negotiating, not obstructing, a comprehensive settlement. The outcome may not have been as satisfactory as any of the parties hoped, but the alternative - continued war - was much worse.

Fourth, the Dayton negotiations were overseen by a strong, empowered negotiator in Richard Holbrooke who provided clear leadership and direction to a complex process.

The April Package negotiations

The April Package Constitutional Reform Negotiations were conducted from March 2005 through April 2006. Although a second track process until December 2005, there were, likewise, three successful elements to it which are important to consider for inclusion a new reform process.

First, the Bosnian political parties were invited to decide which constitutional reforms they wished to pursue, which they did (civil society groups were encouraged to participate but declined). This created a sense of interest-based Bosnian ownership of the initiative.

Second, the discussions were sustained and intensive which nourished Bosnian trust and confidence in the process.

Third, the April Package fell short of the necessary two-thirds majority confirmation in the Bosnian Parliament when the short-term interests of one of the Bosnian parties trumped the longer term interests of all sides in a comprehensive package of constitutional reforms.

Defining a new structural reform process

Keeping all these factors in mind, the first step to launching a new comprehensive reform effort must be to acknowledge, unpack, and respond in good faith to the interests of all sides in Bosnia some of which impede structural reform.

These include, among others, anxiety over the future of the entities, political party fears of power loss in a reform process, concerns about the capacity of the state to protect and manage the interests of its citizens (not just ethnicities) and the country, the cost of austerity-driven solutions to Bosnia’s economic woes, and the future of the international mission headed by the Office of the High Representative (OHR).

Each of these interests could be tackled through working groups supported by the EU and US with the aim of achieving an agreed-upon middle ground of shared interests thereby reducing concerns over the scope and depth of structural reform. These would doubtless be difficult time-consuming negotiations, but they are essential and can be successful if they are sustained and serious.

Once these negotiations are completed, the Bosnians must then respond collectively to the interests of the EU and US.

Both Brussels and Washington want to work with a Bosnia that honors the rule of law, is truly democratic, and demonstrates the capacity to meet responsibly its international economic and security obligations.

Specifically, for the EU this means greater unified Bosnian engagement in pursuing Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) requirements. For the US, it is about negotiating the defense and security reforms that will make Bosnia a reliable Euro-Atlantic partner and potential NATO member capable of cooperating against organized crime, terrorism, and engaging in peace-keeping operations.

The collective inability of the Bosnian authorities to respond to date with one voice to these interests has made the EU and US wary of investing heavily in resolving the country’s problems because the high risk of failure in dealing with an unreliable partner outweighed the advantage of more intensive engagement.

The EU-US mantra has been clear: better to do less with a dysfunctional Bosnia at peace than undertake one more high visibility reform effort likely to fail and further threaten the fragile stability of the country.

At the same time, the EU - including individual European states - and US must also make a greater effort to speak with one voice on behalf of their interests.

Far too often over the last 20 years, the EU and US have been in subtle competition and even opposed to one another, albeit behind the scenes, over how to deal with Bosnia, despite broadly shared principles and objectives.

Had both worked more effectively and robustly together (the same may be said for Russia in recent years), I believe the international mission would have ended in Bosnia as early as 2006.

The final and most critical step in a momentum-driven reform process must be the negotiation and agreement on a package of structural reforms critical to making Bosnia a fully functioning sovereign state responsive to its citizens, above and apart from its international obligations.

Once again, these negotiations should be fostered by the EU and US and involve Bosnia’s elected leaders and members of civil society. The completion of interest-based negotiations, especially those involving the various Bosnian interest groups and institutions, is a necessary prerequisite to this phase of the process.

Structural reforms include but also transcend fixes to public administration, the judiciary, and economic institutions. They also supersede, in the first instance, compliance with the legal and regulatory requirements of EU membership, and other international obligations.

While it is premature to define what these structural reforms would precisely entail, negotiations must start from the premise that Bosnia is hobbled at all tiers of government, but most immediately and critically at the state level, by redundant and debilitating ethnic protections built into the Dayton constitution and elsewhere in response to the immediate post-war conditions in which the Dayton Agreement was negotiated in 1995.

If the rational interests of all sides are resolved before talks on structural reform begin, it should be possible to reach an agreement that reduces superfluous ethnic interests at least at the state level in time for the 2018 elections. This phase of the negotiations would also inevitably involve discussions over the structure and functionality of state institutions absent the more redundant ethnic protections.

Once agreement on a structural reform package has been reached, it will be necessary, as a precondition to the closing of the Dayton mission, to have it endorsed by the state and entities, legally confirmed by the state parliament or approved through a nation-wide referendum. Reforms to the state government may also require revisions of the election law such that the people of Bosnia may go to the polls in October 2018 with the prospect of finally electing a sovereign democratic government, free of an international peacekeeping mission, that honors the will of all its citizens.

The time has come to bring the long and tortuous saga of Bosnia’s post-Dayton dysfunctionality to an end. This is critical, not only for Bosnia, the EU, and US, but also for the Western Balkans where new challenges such as the migrant crisis and instability in Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia could reignite the potential for regional conflict.